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The relationship between Australia and East Timor (Timor-Leste) from 1941 to 1999 
is analysed in this dissertation. It focuses on the Australian-Japanese conflict in East 
Timor in World War II, the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975, the 
Indonesian occupation of East Timor (1975-1999), and the Timorese independence 
process culminating in 1999. Various studies have explained the history of the 
Australian relationship with East Timor by examining the political forces that 
influenced the events. This dissertation applies the Christian anthropology of René 
Girard's mimetic theory to interpret those forces and provide a new historical and 
theological interpretation of the relationship. 
 
The dissertation shows that East Timor occupied the place of the scapegoated victim 
during the events discussed. It argues that there were particular crises - addressed by 
scapegoating East Timor - which arose from the Australian government’s desire to 
ensure "security" through alliances with larger powers. Through this policy position, 
the well-being of the Timorese people was actively ignored in the pursuit of 
Australian safety and protection. In World War II the threat of the Japanese thrust 
southward impelled an Australian invasion of the then Portuguese Timor. Australia 
later complied with the Indonesian invasion Timor in 1975 and upheld the consequent 
24-year occupation as part of a strategy to retain a positive relationship with 
Indonesia, and thus fortify Australian security.  
 
 ix 
The relationship is analysed by using René Girard's mimetic theory. As a 
theologically-informed anthropology, mimetic theory culminates in an explanation of 
human society and relationships interpreted through Christ's life, death and 
resurrection. Three aspects of the theory are applied to the Australian-Timorese 
relationship: the scapegoat, texts of persecution, and conversion.  
 
Girard presents certain features of the scapegoat process applicable to this study: the 
existence of a social crisis; a crime which is believed to have caused the crisis; an 
entity (the victim) which is arbitrarily accused of the crime and which displays certain 
criteria common to scapegoats; and finally, the violence done to the victim that 
restores harmony and peace. In Girard's analysis, human stories or myths invariably 
contain some or all of these features in order to justify scapegoating violence. Girard 
claims that modern-day attempts to obscure the victimisation of the powerless 
perform the same functions as myths and he describes them as "texts of persecution". 
Official Australian documentary records of historical links with East Timor are 
demonstrated in the dissertation to be texts of persecution that evade responsibility for 
the Australian policies which contributed to the violence done to the Timorese people.  
 
In Girard's view, scapegoating as a completely effective basis for human culture has 
been undermined as a result of the biblical tradition, particularly the Christ-event. The 
Bible shows that the victim is not guilty of bringing threat to the group, but rather is 
innocent. In particular, Christ's identification with victims and his own death and 
resurrection reversed the efficacy of the scapegoating structure by demonstrating that 
it is a lie. Scapegoating victims is therefore a fundamentally unstable means of 
attaining social harmony. Girard describes the recognition of the lie of scapegoating 
 x 
as a "conversion". The conversion towards the victim East Timor which occurred in 
Australia in the late 1990s is argued in the dissertation as a moment of national 
recognition of the innocence of the victim. It resulted from the inspiring resistance of 
the Timorese to their oppression and culminated in overwhelming Australian support 
for Timorese claims to independence. The dissertation shows that claimed Australian 
traits (such as fairness and independence) did not characterise official Australian 
policies during the historical periods discussed. Instead, it was the courageous 
resistance of the Timorese people that exemplified prized Australian values. The 
dissertation thus allows considerations of fear, suffering, nonviolence, forgiveness and 





































"Why?" Pilate asked them, 
"What harm has he done?" 
 









One year after the Dili massacre, in which over 200 young people were shot down 
by the Indonesian military in East Timor's capital, I attended an event that moved 
me to the core. I walked around the room, looking at the photographs on the 
walls: lines of bloated bodies, mangled bodies, dead bodies. I saw the skeletons 
with eyes, the living dead children. And I saw the man with the barbed wire 
cutting into his skin, the flay marks on his buttocks. They were dead, all dead. 
How many dead? I knew very little of the story, so I went to the desk and bought 
the book. 
This event, a book launch in December 1992, had brought together about seventy 
people of various political and religious persuasions, all earnest, all keen to know 
more and read Michele Turner's "Telling East Timor: Personal Testimonies 1942-
1992";1 a small band of Australians in sympathy with the Timorese people and 
wondering what could be done.  Faces were upturned as Justice Michael Kirby 
spoke from the landing, the stairs to either side of him filled with the overflow of 
people. The venue was Callan Park at Rozelle in Sydney, full of its own history 
of heartache, bewilderment, schizophrenia, desperation; a deteriorating place 
earmarked for development.   
 
The frenzied, arresting summons of the babadook, a small Timorese drum, 
accompanied the beautiful young man in the traditional dress of a warrior-king, 
                                                            
1 Michele Turner, Telling: East Timor, Personal Testimonies 1942-1992 (Kensington, NSW: New 






dipping and weaving with his sword, his feet prancing high, his shoulders rippling 
in the light. There were speeches: mind-blowing, incomprehensible, their sorrow 
hanging heavily in the air. Applause. A question or two. Sorrow. 
 
My dominant feeling was shocked anger. I could hardly believe that this was 
happening in Timor, the former Portuguese colony so near to Australia. In the 
next few months connections with the Timorese community in Sydney gave me 
some understanding of life under Indonesian rule. I caught glimpses of the history 
of East Timor, including its connections to Australia. Following this, my Catholic 
Religious Congregation, the Sisters of St Joseph of the Sacred Heart, allowed me 
for many years to pursue this story of injustice as part of a ministry with the 
Timorese people in the preservation and promotion of their main local language, 
Tetun. Efforts to support the people's threatened identity brought me to the 
narrative of death, torture and destruction which was the Timorese story since 
World War II. I tried to make a difference and became involved with the 
Timorese people both in Australia and in Timor itself. Yet I was always 
confronted by the question: Why? What could account for the suffering of this 
small group of people, so closely aligned with Australia geographically and 
historically? How can one comprehend the scale of the suffering? What 
justification could there be for such experiences so close to my nation and within 
my lifetime? 
 
As with many Australians, I am a witness: a witness from afar, not having 
suffered atrocity or the violent death of loved ones. Being a witness is an 







In a sense, it is easy to be a prosecutor, to be against the Indonesian invasion and 
oppression, to oppose the Australian involvement. It is easy to start as a defender 
of the Timorese, to draw attention to their courage, their tenacity, their 
victimisation.  But it is far more difficult to be a witness for humanity, a witness 
summoned to appear before a judgement in the mangled mess of human life and 
try to understand its complexity. Here the discovery of the work of René Girard 
opened for me a means of articulating the witness, providing me with an avenue 
through which to understand justice, violence, mercy, deceit, sorrow and death in 
relation to East Timor. Girard's theories allow for a fresh approach to seeing 
violence within the human condition, an approach that opens fresh theological 
insights, and which depends on the scriptural presentation of the Christ-event for 
the fullness of its premises. A Girardian perspective on the relationship between 
East Timor and Australia provides me, as a witness, with a means to understand 
and see through violence, all within the context of the passion, death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ.  
 
Thus, as an Australian Catholic witness, I analyse the relationship between 
Australia and East Timor (now Timor-Leste),2 attempting to understand the 
background and implications of Australian institutions, agencies, people and 
groups as forces affecting the Timor tragedy. Such a reflection entails assessment 
of historical actions arising from Australian policies and practice that affected the 
relationship.  
 
                                                            
2 The present Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste was known as "Portuguese Timor" until Portugal's 
withdrawal in 1974, and "East Timor" until 2002. These terms will be used during the relevant periods 






Focus of the Inquiry 
Numerous analyses and commentaries exist which detail the political and economic 
realities of the history of the relationship between Australia and East Timor. However, 
as Australia's small neighbour consolidates its recent hard-won independence, and as 
Australians become further distanced from the events, there is a need for an analysis 
which considers the deeper reasons behind Australian decisions and actions. This 
dissertation examines Australian involvement in the relationship as largely 
detrimental to East Timor. It considers the Timorese people's heroic responses to the 
violence they faced as pivotal to the ultimate Australian solidarity as the 21st century 
approached. 
 
As a theological reflection in the light of the Christian Gospel, the dissertation is 
concerned with the underlying motivations of human actions, discerning the forces 
beneath a contentious series of historical connections which formed the relationship. 
The theological anthropology of René Girard provides the structure for understanding 
the events and the suffering which occurred. Applying Girard's insights into 
mimetic theory, violence and scapegoating to the relationship presents a current 
example of his perception of the victimage mechanism as the fundamental driver 
of human interaction. In particular, Girard's understanding is that the Bible, 
particularly the Gospel accounts of the death and resurrection of Christ, 
illuminates the status of the victim as innocent. This revelation unveils the 
deception found in ancient myths and in their modern-day counterparts, "texts of 
persecution", which are founded on the blame of victims and the exoneration of 
persecutors. The category of texts of persecution is a key feature of the 






each of the historical events finds that they contain high levels of distortion and 
omission. As documents issued with the authority of government but containing  
questionable content which ignores or belittles the situation of the Timorese 
people, they are accurately described as "persecutory". Applying Girard's 
anthropological approach to the Australia-East Timor relationship thus provides a 
basis for understanding violence and the efficacy of Christian revelation, especially in 
regard to violence.  
 
Additionally, engaging in a case study such as that of the Australia-East Timor 
relationship can contribute to the discourse concerning Australian self-understanding. 
It can specify underlying contradictions in that self-perception and provide greater 
empirical evidence for deeper self-assessment. In these respects, a theological 
interpretation poses moral challenges concerning national truth-telling, honest 
dealing, and the value placed on the lives of non-Australians.  
 
A significant moment in this analysis involves the increasing Australian concern 
for the Timorese people and eventual championing of their cause. It reflects on 
the solidarity movement that grew in response to Timorese persecution, where the 
suffering of the Timorese and the example of their courage and forgiveness called 
forth responses of compassion towards the vulnerable, illustrating Girard's 
concept of conversion. The record of Australian responses to the plight of the 
Timorese people in their experience of persecution is explored in view of values 
and ideas of identity traditionally claimed as "Australian". The reality of 
forgiveness as presented in the Christian gospel and interpreted by Girard as the 






the suffering they endured and, as such, constitutes a primary Christian challenge 
to the Australian people. 
 
The Relationship 
East Timor and Australia 
The two parties to the relationship being studied in this dissertation, Australia and 
East Timor, can be described as "imagined communities". Benedict Anderson's 
phrase points to the limited yet sovereign status of nations, where no one member 
could ever know all the others, yet from its cultural roots the nation generates 
communities willing both to kill and to die for it.3 Charles Taylor expands this 
idea, writing of the "social imaginary" which "enables, through making sense of, 
the practices of a society."4 Far from fictitious, the social imaginary is present in 
large groups, if not the whole society, covering expectations between people, how 
they "fit together with others".5  
 
Despite major differences of size, ethnicity, colonial history, culture and status as 
recognised nations, the social imaginaries of both Australia and East Timor have 
the common purposes of nurturing their respective societies, protecting and 
ennobling shared existence, and finding and expressing the meaning of human 
life. Bound together psychologically, socially and sometimes physically, and also 
                                                            
3 Benedict R. Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, 
rev. ed., (London: Verso, 2006), 7; Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham and London: 
Duke University Press, 2004), 2. 
4 Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 23. 






with past times and with the dead, the recognisable unities of Australians and 
Timorese are constructed.6  
 
Nevertheless, Taylor's "social imaginary" not only embraces essential if 
indefinable aspects of nations, but also allows for reflection on the possibility of a 
false imaginary.7 He states, for example, that belief in the principle of democracy 
could lead people to imagine that it is already realised in their society, whereas 
the maintenance of this belief requires them to ignore or deny evidence of some 
of the people's exclusion.8 The claiming of certain characteristics within a social 
imaginary, therefore, does not guarantee their actual existence. Thus Australian 
projection of national characteristics such as fairness or loyalty did not assure 
their practice in relation to the Timorese people any more than lack of political 
experience undermined the Timorese capacity for independence. Additionally, the 
existence of some oppositional forces within the Timorese people was incapable 
of negating the desire for independence which came to form the overarching 
Timorese imaginary, just as the false Australian social imaginary of Western 
superiority was not universal. It is in this sense the dissertation assesses, in 
particular, how the group which identifies as "Australian" related to that 
identifying as "Timorese", and how that relationship was influenced and changed. 
 
Identity and Action 
Identity is created through relationships with others upon whom we rely for 
constant re-evaluation of self. What is done in those relationships, especially 
                                                            
6 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 145. 
7 Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 183. 






concerning the vulnerable other, expresses who we are. It is therefore essential to 
an understanding of Australian identity to consider whether values generally 
claimed as "Australian" were demonstrated in the events which affected close 
neighbours in situations of poverty and oppression, such as the Timorese people. 
In this regard, the Australian government and people faced a choice that became 
starker, particularly over the course of the Indonesian occupation: to stand in 
solidarity with the victim, or to support the victimiser who was becoming 
increasingly violent and brutal in its suppression of a nonviolent resistance. This 
choice unveiled the victimised "other" that called for the demonstration of 
claimed Australian values. This dependency on the victimised "other" for 
Australian identity was stridently denied, but became increasingly difficult to 
resist. 
 
Whilst the focus here is not to add to the various inconclusive efforts to define 
any Australian "identity", the documentary record shows that in its relationship 
with East Timor, Australia in many ways did not live up to the values it claims as 
its identifying features. As a result, I suggest that Australian involvement in 
Timor's history contributed to the formation of an Australian identity which has 
traits opposite to those claimed, that is, one where loyalty, the 'fair go', 
independence, and support for the underdog were neglected or betrayed. In this 
regard, the impact of a realpolitik foreign policy markedly influenced Australian 
identity. Australian responses to the East Timorese situation illustrate underlying 








Unpalatable aspects of history and the tendency to ignore or deny them illustrate 
the need for a continuing reflection and discourse about identity.9 A willingness 
to accept the facts of a darker side to the history and culture of one's nation 
involves being able to discern the ethical value of attitudes and actions. This is 
particularly so in relation to the vulnerable, and through principled choice to 
determine possibilities for the future.10 An honest appraisal of Australian values 
and their practice in both formal and informal history is required "to determine 
who we might be as much as who we think we were."11 In particular, analysis of 
the Australian/Timorese relationship charts how a victimised people can pose a 
challenge to and provoke change in a politically stable and economically affluent 
neighbour. Because of the level of Timorese suffering and the substantial factors 
which remain unresolved, the relationship with East Timor provides an essential 
platform for such scrutiny.  
 
History of the relationship 
The dissertation investigates the three major historical periods during which the 
relationship between Australia and East Timor was formed, that is, during the 
Australian presence in Timor in 1942, the Indonesian invasion of 1975, and the 
24-year Indonesian occupation, culminating in the definitive changes that 
occurred in 1999. As the matter of the Timor Sea resources was associated with 
the Indonesian invasion and occupation it also forms part of the discussion.  
 
                                                            
9 Miriam Dixson, The Imaginary Australian: Anglo-Celts and Identity 1788 to the present (Sydney: 
UNSW Press, 1999), 30;  Nelson, Gallipoli, Kokoda,  216. 
10 Dixson, The Imaginary Australian, 13; Gregory Melleuish, The Packaging of Australia: politics and 
culture wars (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1998), 14. 
11 Hank Nelson, "Gallipoli, Kokoda and the Making of National Identity," in The Australian legend 






World War II 
The first feature to be investigated is Australia's presence in East Timor in World 
War II, which was the scene of substantial Australian connection with, and 
sympathy for, the Timorese. However, it is the subject of subsequent ambiguous 
historical treatment. In December 1941 several hundred Australian troops were 
inserted into what was then known as "Portuguese Timor" against the wishes of the 
Portuguese administration. Two months later Japanese troops arrived, their numbers 
steadily increasing over the next fourteen months because of the success of the 
Australians and their Timorese supporters. The Australians withdrew early in 1943 
while the Japanese stayed until the end of the War. The loss of Timorese lives was 
extraordinary – estimated at 40,000 people – when compared with civilian losses in 
other theatres of the War. The positive relationship which developed between the 
Australians and the Timorese people was viewed as significant then and in later 
decades.   
 
However, there is a dearth of reflection on the effects of the Australian presence 
in Timor, with the existing literature concentrating more on the unquestioned 
heroism of the Australians rather than on the courageous Timorese.12 Unresolved 
matters connected with the Timorese/Australian World War II episode betray a 
tendency to acknowledge some historical facts and ignore others, and have 
implications for the veracity of Australia's claim on certain values. For example, 
there is a lack of recognition in the Australian media, popular literature and 
school curriculum of the importance of the Portuguese Timor campaign and the 
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large loss of Timorese lives, despite the statement "Your friends do not forget 
you" printed on leaflets and dropped all over Timor by the Australian government 
in World War II. In a nation like Australia where war memories are important, 
and where loyalty to one's friends is claimed as a value, it is intriguing that this 
campaign has been neglected, and thus reflects a sense of shame at the 
abandonment and loss of Timor. Moreover, later political and economic interests 
with Indonesia seemed to override this war narrative. Given subsequent history, 
all of this has serious implications for how Australia and Timor each understood 
their relationship, and for later Australian government actions and purported 
Australian values and identity. 
 
The Indonesian invasion 
The second important feature is the Indonesian invasion of East Timor upon the 
withdrawal of the Portuguese in 1975, an invasion which Australia did not 
oppose. Within the first few years of the invasion between 60,000 and 100,000 
Timorese people are reported as having been killed.13 Histories of this conflict 
identify the interplay of forces prevalent at the time, such as the international 
pressures of communism and the upheavals in Portugal, as well as the domestic 
political situation of the Whitlam government. Views were expressed that East 
Timor would have been better served as part of Indonesia.14 The Australian 
journalists known as the "Balibo Five" and another, Roger East, were murdered at 
the time of the invasion. Despite numerous inquiries, their deaths remain the 
                                                            
13 John G. Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom, (London: Zed Books, 1999), 71; James Dunn, 
East Timor: A Rough Passage to Independence, 3rd ed., (Double Bay, NSW: Longueville Books, 
2003), 268. 
14 Clinton Fernandes, "Clinton Fernandes on Flood's Memoir excerpted in Public Sector Informant" 
ADFA website, "School of Humanities and Social Sciences – East Timor" UNSW Canberra, accessed 






subject of conjecture, denial and official inaction.15 It has been claimed that 
suppression of the truth regarding the murders characterised official Australian 
action and reports, and that in many respects, this incident and its cover-up 
became symptomatic of successive Australian governments' policies in relation to 
the Indonesian invasion and subsequent occupation.16 
 
The Occupation 
The third feature is the 24-year occupation of East Timor by Indonesia, which 
decimated the Timorese people and made the case of East Timor one of 
international concern.17 Between 102,000 and 183,000 Timorese people out of a 
population of 650,000 died during the occupation through unnatural causes, such 
as extra-judicial killings, torture and politically-induced starvation.18 The period 
was one of "deliberate State-sanctioned violence to achieve political outcomes."19  
 
Significant commentary highlights Australian dependence on Indonesia's favour 
and the resulting effects on policy regarding East Timor.20 Throughout the 
occupation, Australian governments gave succour to Indonesian desires. In 1979 
Australia gave de jure recognition of Indonesian sovereignty and during the 
1980s argued that the matter of East Timor be taken off the United Nations 
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agenda: both matters being associated with the Timor Sea negotiations.21 
Australia was implicated with other international actors in providing weapons, 
military training and passive complicity in the subjugation of the Timorese 
people.22 Publication of the facts of the oppressive situation and the opposition of 
the Timorese to Indonesian rule resulted in increasing unease internationally and 
in Australia.23 A pivotal moment had been the filming and broadcasting of the 
1991 Santa Cruz massacre, also known as “the Dili massacre”, in which more 
than two hundred young people were killed, increasing Australian and 
international concern.  Many Timorese who survived massacres or feared for their 
lives after political activities came seeking refuge in Australia and were denied 
refugee status, but their presence as asylum seekers garnered support for their 
people through the growing conversion they facilitated in the Australian people.24  
 
Throughout the occupation, successive Australian Government policy opposed 
the prospect of East Timor becoming free. This cast serious doubt on subsequent 
claims by former ministers, including Prime Ministers, that they were generally 
neutral or even gave covert support.25 Moreover, levels of compliance, 
cooperation and material assistance indicate long-standing complicity with 
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Indonesia to preserve East Timor's status. Additionally, the ongoing dispute 
concerning the resources of the Timor Sea developed during the period, involving 
complicated efforts to secure the resources in an unstable political climate. In 
1989 Australia and Indonesia signed the Timor Gap Treaty which divided evenly 
the resources of the Timor Sea between Indonesia and Australia. Claims of 
unfairness and greed, and later of spying and duplicity, accompanied the history 
of the disputes.26 Thus, a variety of policies and practices of support for Indonesia 
rendered Australia a partner in the victimisation of East Timor. 
 
Nevertheless, significant popular opposition to government policies influenced 
the Australian Government in the late 1990s to use political changes in Indonesia 
to modify its stance. Internal Australian dissent and solidarity were inspired by 
the Timorese people, and led to policy change and comprehensive national 
support. The Australian-led military force INTERFET27 was formed and 
supported the transition to local rule, while the UN administrated the country in 
preparation for the Declaration of Independence in 2002. Many ordinary 
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Mimetic Theory           
The lens through which this dissertation interprets these historical periods in the 
relationship between Australia and East Timor is found in key concepts within René 
Girard's mimetic theory that present insights into human violence. René Girard 
developed mimetic theory over the course of an academic career that ranged 
across a number of disciplines, beginning with literary-criticism and moving into 
anthropology, psychology, biblical studies and history. Mimetic desire is the 
fundamental premise on which Girard's understanding of humanity is built. Human 
beings, according to Girard, imitate each other in intense and sophisticated ways, and 
hence desire what others desire.  
 
Girard traced how imitative human behaviour led to rivalry and violence, which is 
based in the misperception that one is autonomous, the originator of one's desires. 
In the work of certain modern novelists Girard perceived a growth towards an 
understanding of human beings as being dependent on the desires of others. They 
then projected such insights onto the characters in their novels. This change of 
perspective also manifested itself as a recognition of the motivating power of 
rivalry, and then a turning towards the other, which Girard described as a 
conversion.  
 
Through further studies in ancient mythology, cultural anthropology and 
psychology, Girard perceived that violence resulting from mimetic rivalry in 
ancient societies was quelled by means of the scapegoating of one individual, or a 






of the wider group from attacking each other, thus saving the community from 
itself. Belief in the actual guilt of the scapegoat was fundamental to the 
mechanism's success. The sacrifice of this "scapegoat" as a successful way of 
dealing with rivalry and violence became the basis for religious and cultural 
measures which allowed the communities to cohere. Girard's later work expanded 
his previous insights into the scapegoat mechanism, demonstrating the connection 
of myths to scapegoating. These supernatural, and often fanciful, stories were a 
disguise developed over millennia to conceal the guilt of those responsible for the 
violent sacrifice of victims.  
 
Girard's insights into mimesis in literature and anthropology reached their zenith 
in his investigations into the Bible, particularly in the Gospel accounts of the 
passion of Jesus Christ. Here the innocence of the victim was displayed, and the 
crowd, alongside the political and religious leaders, were unveiled as guilty.  
Girard perceived fundamental similarity between the novelists' changed 
understanding of themselves as dependent on the "other" for their true identity 
and the Gospel's revelation of the innocent "other" made to bear the responsibility 
for social cohesion by being scapegoated. Recognition of the dependency of 
human desire on the desire of the "other" accompanies a realisation of the 
innocence of the scapegoated victim.  The conversion inherent in both reversals 
challenged previous notions of the self in relationship with the world. 
 
Girard argued that the Gospels are the reversal of mythic texts, and therefore the 
catalyst for humanity's ability to appreciate the innocence of the victim, despite 






known as "texts of persecution", continue to exonerate persecutors in present-day 
scapegoating efforts through narratives which are attempts to conceal guilt and 
deflect blame.  
 
This dissertation utilises significant aspects of mimetic theory to analyse the 
relationship between Australia and East Timor. It is primarily a theological 
interpretation, applying to East Timor the status of "scapegoat" within an 
understanding of that term arising from the Gospels’ presentation of the innocent 
Christ. The Australian documentary records are shown to be modern day myths, 
described by Girard as "texts of persecution". Resulting from this investigation, I 
believe that in the relationship with East Timor, Australians were, and still are, 
presented with two interrelated challenges: an opportunity for a deeper 
understanding of the Australian nation, and an opportunity for conversion, that is, 
a growth towards a change of heart in relation to the victimised "other". The three 
aspects of mimetic theory which particularly guide this dissertation are Girard's 




Girard maintains that the phenomenon of scapegoating, the killing or expulsion of a 
victim, was designed to prevent or limit social violence. Human beings traditionally 






victims, thus replacing wholesale violence of "all against all" with an "all against one" 
method of bringing peace and calm, however short-lived.28  
 
The word "victim" is used in the dissertation in the technical sense in which Girard 
defined it, and which is central to his work. In this context “victim” means the 
"scapegoat", the one sacrificed by killing or expulsion by a crowd for social 
protection or order. Victimisation is the mob's response to its internal rivalrous and 
violent strife. While the scapegoat or victim may well be guilty of a crime or 
transgression, in Girard's usage the "victim" is structurally innocent, as it cannot be 
held responsible for all the rivalries and tensions that split a community and lead to 
mob violence. Furthermore, as Girard explains, unless the consciousness of the role of 
the victim is augmented by the willingness to forgive and to embrace nonviolence, 
violence can escalate, with those responsible for the scapegoating themselves 
becoming the "victim" through reprisal. In Girardian terms, the word does not have 
the pejorative or colloquial connotations of helplessness or passivity usually ascribed 
to it, though Girard does identify how victims are powerless before the mob.  
Throughout this dissertation, an application of the concept of scapegoating to East 
Timor as a vulnerable and inconvenient entity within global politics provides a 
different perspective to analyses based solely on political or economic considerations. 
It provides an avenue for anthropological and theological analyses, which provide a 
more fundamental way of understanding the reasons behind Australia's attitudes and 
actions. In particular, focussing on the record of major events in the light of Girard's 
insights brings to light key aspects neglected in the general literature. The literary and 
anthropological resources in Girard's theory allows for a more accurate identification 
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of the status of East Timor in the shared history with Australia, Indonesia, the USA 
and others, and the depths of Australian complicity in its victimisation. This throws 
light on the relationship by reflecting on the way official Australian accounts 
understand past actions, and by considering external influences which affected 
Australian decisions. Furthermore, Timor's role as victim and its response to the 
violence and suffering inspired an Australian conversion towards the vulnerable 
other, thus affecting Australian self-perceptions and understandings of its 
historical actions.  
 
Girard identifies "stereotypes of persecution" which are common to stories of 
victimisation. These stories usually involve social crises, a crime, the criteria for 
selecting a scapegoat, and finally the violence done to the victim.29 Crises produce 
social disruption as a result of mimetic tensions, leading the group to identify a person 
to blame for the crisis. The powerlessness felt by the affected people impels them to 
explain the events through victimisation in order to solve them and return to 
normality. As harm has come to the society, the cause appears criminal, and so 
someone must be accused of the crime. These are chosen because they fulfil criteria 
which ensure that the blaming of them does not cause more problems or violence. So 
a known outsider, a foreigner, or someone without support or connections inside the 
group is suitable. East Timor can be seen as fulfilling these requirements as a weak 
party used to stabilise international relations which faced various major disruptions. 
 
In this sense the theory of René Girard, especially as it focuses on the victimised 
"other", can throw light on the Australia-East Timor relationship. It illuminates the 
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situation by applying the concept of scapegoating to the reversal of fortunes of a 
vulnerable people in relation to a rich and dominant neighbour.  
 
Texts of Persecution 
The second aspect of mimetic theory relevant to the notion of East Timor as victim is 
"texts of persecution". Girard's theory points out that violent acts towards scapegoated 
victims, committed by communities in order to prevent or limit greater violence, were 
accompanied by oral, and later written, accounts of the violent killings or expulsions 
which were often connected to ritual enactment. These accounts developed into what 
has been generally termed "myth" in the West. Girard interprets myths as accounts of 
violent events told from the point of view of the powerful but unconscious majority, 
which attempted to manage natural disaster or community unrest by ascribing 
responsibility to a scapegoat. Myths concealed the guilt of the community and its 
leaders and displaced it onto the victim. 
 
Girard argues that the current dismantling of the scapegoating process as a valid and 
effective means of restoring peace and harmony came as a result of the Jewish 
scriptural defence of the victim and from the Gospel proclamation of the death of the 
innocent Jesus. Because of this, the meaning and efficacy of myths were undermined. 
However, scapegoating has persisted in diluted forms, producing accounts of 
persecutions which have the same structure and serve the same purpose as myths, that 
is, to present the situation entirely from the rationalising point of view of the 
persecutor, with the victims seen as guilty. Girard interprets such modern efforts to 
exonerate violent perpetrators, often with an intent to obscure efforts to bring the 






The concept of persecutory texts is a valuable tool with which to investigate official 
written accounts of the relationship between Australia and East Timor. The decision 
was made to limit the dissertation to important historical events recounted in the 
written record as it is copious and requires in-depth attention. For this reason 
interviews have not been undertaken.  
 
In considering the role of "texts of persecution" I ask whether any Australian 
government accounts of the events could be fairly judged to be among the means by 
which Timor was scapegoated. In addition, I ask whether silence, misinterpretation, 
cover-up and refusal to release records could also be seen as elements of the 
phenomenon of persecution texts.  
 
Conversion 
The responses of the Australian people to the suffering of the Timorese people are 
considered in the dissertation in the light of the third major Girardian insight 
employed, that of human conversion towards the "vulnerable other". Girard regards 
the change from a self-centred notion of desire and identity to a recognition of the 
other-centred nature of desire as key to human conversion and maturation. The 
subject comes to realise his/her dependence on the other, especially the rival or 
the victim, for his/her own identity. This change generates relationship and 
solidarity in a new way, so that one's desire and identity can be formed explicitly with 
the other, rather than unconsciously over against the other. Girard's construction of 
"conversion" is integral to his theory and, as an interpretative category, is an 
appropriate and significant way to understand the Australian experience of the East 







"Conversion" is considered in relation to the unparalleled success of the movement 
supporting East Timor, especially against significant political forces. Important in this 
regard were the solidarity movements and the Christian churches, which demonstrated 
the growing gap between the responses of government and those of civil society 
groups and individuals. Taking the lead by challenging official Australian 
complicity in the victimisation of Timor and so gradually eroding dominant 
narratives based on lies and deception, many Australians underwent a conversion 
in the process of their own advocacy. This conversion influenced civil society and 
those in power, to the extent that official policies were changed and a large 
segment of the Australian populace then supported East Timorese independence. 
While this conversion did not always or usually involve an explicitly religious 
character, it did follow the pattern of conversion that Girard outlines and which 
he identifies with the content of Christian conversion: a movement from self-
centred desire to interdependence with others, and accepting responsibility for the 
other, particularly the victimised. Assessing the success of the movement 
supporting East Timor, especially against significant political forces, is an 
important factor for understanding the solidarity that developed between 
Australians and Timorese.30   
 
The call to Australia to practise the values it desires and proclaims became clearer 
as part of a collective experience of conversion provoked by the example of the 
Timorese people's forgiving responses to violence and suffering.31 Intriguingly, as 
the events of Timor's oppression became known, the actions and attitudes of the 
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Timorese in facing overwhelming persecution showed that it was they, the 
victimised other, who embodied the values and characteristics traditionally 
claimed by the dominant Australian culture. Thus East Timor became the model 
to which Australia could aspire. The Timorese response to violence in large part 
imitated the non-retaliation and forgiveness of Christ as victim. In this regard, 
Robert Schreiter's insights into the power of the victim to restore the humanity of 
both oppressor and oppressed are discussed. James Alison's development of 
Girard's emphasis on the necessity of forgiveness is exemplified by the responses 
of East Timor to the violence inflicted on them. The relationship with East Timor, 
then, provided a Christian challenge to Australia to a deeper self-knowledge, to 
genuine and more generous responses to the poor and oppressed, and therefore a 
deeper commitment towards the values it claims. 
 
The dissertation is in three sections which correspond to the aspects of mimetic theory 
used as the interpretive tool: the scapegoat, texts of persecution and conversion. 
Chapter One of the first section reflects on notions of Australian characteristics which 
were challenged by official policies regarding East Timor, and establishes the 
importance of the national relationships which affected Australian security. Chapter 
Two then outlines mimetic theory, while the third chapter  reflects more deeply on the 
key category of interpretation – the scapegoated victim. The second section examines 
the three historical periods in which the relationship between Australia and East 
Timor was formed and throughout which East Timor occupied the place of the 
scapegoat. The section concentrates on the documentary record as texts of 
persecution. Chapter Four is devoted to World War II, Chapter Five deals with the 






section reflects on the phenomenon of conversion. The concerns of relatively few 
supporters of the Timorese people are considered in Chapter Seven while Chapter 
Eight discusses the almost complete engagement of Australian government, agencies 
and population in the late 1990s. 
 
Conclusion 
Through the lens of René Girard's mimetic theory, this dissertation seeks to 
demonstrate that East Timor became the victim of Australian strategies for national 
security and gain in its relationships with regional powers, particularly Indonesia. 
This analysis is closely focussed on the history of the Timorese-Australian 
relationship, where regional powers joined forces in the "all against one" mechanism 
of sacrifice of the scapegoat East Timor, thus avoiding conflict, but endeavouring to 
benefit economically, and preserving the security afforded by alliances. Additionally, 
Girard's concept of "texts of persecution" demonstrates the myth-like structure of the 
Australian documentary record, a record that seeks to conceal the scapegoating of 
East Timor. 
 
The aperture of a theological reflection based on Girard's insights into the Gospel 
finds the victim interpreting the history. Light is thus thrown on notions of 
Australian identity and, through this, an analysis of the conversion towards the 
victim in the Australian response to Timor can be made. In association with 
Christian teachings and insights into suffering and forgiveness, mimetic theory 
provides a way of understanding the relationship, and therefore the Australian 









THEORY AND THE 
SCAPEGOAT 
Introduction 
This section of the dissertation first describes aspects of Australian life which have a 
bearing on the relationship with East Timor. Generally accepted characteristics of 
being "Australian" such as fairness, independence and loyalty are discussed, followed 
by summaries of significant Australian relationships with other nations including 
Britain, the United States, Indonesia and East Timor. I argue that Australian 
characteristics which are broadly accepted by the dominant culture to describe an 
Australian "identity" are challenged in relationships with other nations, revealing fear 
and insecurity as significant Australian elements. This prepares for the major 
discussions in Chapters Four, Five and Six regarding East Timor, where the exercise 
of Australian independence, loyalty and fairness is found to be particularly 
questionable. The second chapter outlines René Girard's mimetic theory, through 
which the relationship between Australia and East Timor is interpreted in the 
dissertation. The focus is placed on three aspects of the theory: scapegoating, texts of 
persecution and conversion. In the third chapter the role of the scapegoated victim is 
then discussed more fully. Girard's perception that Christ's victimisation provides the 














The analysis of the relationship between Australia and East Timor in this dissertation 
is that of an Australian necessarily approaching the matter from an Australian's point 
of view. The cultural understanding afforded by that affinity, often unspoken and 
more often inexpressible, gives a certain authority to opinions, particularly in cases 
such as this, where death on a horrific scale forms part of the investigation. No 
opinion is absolute or infallible, but an Australian interpretation of the Australian side 
of such a consequential relationship has gravity. The relationship itself and its effects 
on Australians therefore require some contextualisation. This chapter attempts this 
task by research into those dominant Australian cultural values that were challenged 
by the Timorese relationship and the forces which formed them. The focus here is not 
to attempt to define an "Australian identity". Nonetheless, consideration of the 
dominant discourse and self-perceptions around "Australian" values and heroic 
archetypes, particularly as they operated within the Australia-East Timor relationship 
and affected it, is important for later assessment of this relationship. Thus, this chapter 
outlines some of Australia's dominant self-perceptions and how they have operated 
within significant Australian national relationships, including that with East Timor, as 








Values, Self-Perceptions and Contradictions 
Descriptions of Australian characteristics include values such as egalitarianism, 
loyalty, courage, self-confidence, independence, a certain disrespect for authority, 
freedom, and perseverance in adversity.1 At the same time, the complexities of 
Australia's past and present relationships present an array of contradictions alongside 
these qualities. These considerations are integral to any scrutiny of the Australian-East 
Timorese relationship. 
 
Australia is a nation comprising a mix of people from different ethnic origins within a 
highly structured state. It is a society extolling freedom which emerged from a penal 
colony, but a nation where the presence of its ancient Indigenous cultures was not 
legally recognised until 1992. The first immigrants from the British Isles established 
European settlements, and programs of immigration especially after World War II 
contributed to a strongly multicultural character. It is a nation-state which had a 
foundational Christian influence but which developed to be both secular and multi-
religious, one with a strong military tradition yet without the experience of a modern 
war on its soil.   
 
Contradictions are similarly found in characteristics seen by many as "Australian". 
For example, the popular values of "the bush" are often proclaimed as important in 
popular discourse despite the fact that most people live in urban settings. Similarly, 
irreverence and anti-authoritarianism have been championed as "Australian", while 
there is also a long history of paternalism and legalism. Freedom is prized, but is 
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compromised by highly restricted ownership of media and business, and by these 
vested interests having marked influence on government. Australia is successful and 
rich but displays high levels of fear and insecurity in policy-making and social 
interaction. A long-standing sense of inferiority, a "cultural cringe", is amply matched 
by an abundance of celebrated heroes. Australians are descended from many racial 
and cultural groups making Australia one of the most multicultural nations on earth, 
yet it usually projects images of cultural homogeneity, particularly in popular media. 
Moreover, the relatively tolerant relationships in this rich diversity are held together 
successfully, in the main, by formal structures inherited from the British. But perhaps 
most paradoxically of all, a past military defeat – in Gallipoli during World War I – is 
presented as an iconic and central source of the nation's pride.  
 
Independence and egalitarianism are values particularly important to Australian self-
perception and therefore are relevant to any investigation of the history of Australia's 
relationship with East Timor. These values are often popularly expressed through the 
image of “the bush". In this imagery, grit, hard work and an independent streak are 
the hallmarks of "battlers" who eke out an existence from an unforgiving land, 
considering others as equals and treating them fairly without the compromises 
brought by class or status. Efforts to define "Australianness" in terms of "the bush" 
were fed by the growing nationalism which characterised Europe and its colonies in 
the 19th and 20th centuries. James Walter states that the focus on the bush served a 
sense of independence by "distinguishing colonial society in a positive way from the 
British mainstream."2  He maintains that the uniqueness of the Australian bush made 
it "distinctive, not representative", but because of its accessibility through art and 
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literature it "entered the Australian consciousness and became the Australian 
legend."3 Nevertheless, despite their questionable status as true reflections of some 
innate quality of "Australianness", images of the dominant culture are promoted by 
authorities and opinion-makers in ways which reinforce stereotypes. The bush, 
Anzacs and mateship continue to be used to promote the particular views of 
advertisers and governments for their various political, cultural and financial 
interests.4  
 
Blanket application of certain values as images of the "real" Australia, however, omits 
the balance of other views which also have resonances of fact without themselves 
necessarily being the complete truth.  Humphrey McQueen, for example, refers to 
Australian racism being more fundamental than egalitarianism.5 Referring to 
"contradictions in our performance as a responsible member of the international 
community", James Dunn mentions the opinion of Alan Renouf, a former head of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, that "Australians have been a frightened and 
intimidated people."6   
 
Significantly, the attitudes of cultural or political elites have the capacity not only to 
reflect the views of a multi-faceted people, but also to shape them. The image of the 
rugged independence of battlers in the bush, whilst seizing on aspects of reality, may 
have been rather a mental morality-play addressing the hardships and disappointments 
of industrialised cities and towns in the grip of drought and depression. Art and 
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literature may have made a lasting contribution to the development of an Australian 
ethos or myth, yet contrary realities, such as settlement at the rim of Australia rather 
than in the outback, and acceptance of prevailing notions of inferior races rather than 
egalitarianism, indicate some distance between the theories of privileged and talented 
elites and the experience of ordinary people. The phenomenon of an appreciable 
difference between the views and priorities of elites (including the intelligentsia) and 
those of ordinary Australians arises again in considering Australia's relationships, and 
is pertinent to the relationship with East Timor. Of particular relevance is the 
contradiction between projected confidence and the demonstrated Australian fear 
which substantially influenced decisions concerning East Timor from World War II 
onwards. 
 
 Efforts to understand these contradictions are assisted by Winton Higgins' reflections 
on the effects of ethnicity in the development of nationalism in Europe.7 Higgins 
describes the emergence of nation-states over centuries as being associated with 
national identity dependent on the cohesiveness contributed by race, religion, and 
cultural similarities, which provided the evolving political entities with a dependable 
core. This ethnic nationalism guarded itself carefully, tending to "suppress, 
marginalise, assimilate and render invisible all groups other than the dominant one."8 
Identity relied on the exclusion of others.  
 
With these reflections on differences between civic and ethnic nationalism as a 
background, Higgins maintains that Australian national development was a hybrid, 
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but one that "leaned more towards the ethnic side."9 The early dominance of British 
and Irish entailed the exclusion of the Indigenous peoples, but the massive influx of 
immigrants after World War II changed the ethnic make-up of Australian society 
irrevocably, with hundreds of thousands of Europeans impelled to find security away 
from their homelands. Having signed the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention, 
Australia presented many displaced people with the means to escape the War and its 
aftermath. Between 1945 and 1965 assisted migration programs brought two million 
migrants, who enjoyed the chance of employment and better living conditions and 
boosted Australia's population and its agricultural and industrial progress. Although 
non-Europeans were excluded from migration programs until the 1970s when the 
White Australia policy was finally rescinded, the Colombo Plan established in 1950 
was a step in countering adverse international opinions about Australian policy and a 
means of providing regional neighbours with higher education opportunities. Greater 
Asian migration occurred in the 1970s and 1980s with the final demise of anti-Asian 
policies.  
 
Despite strong European dominance, Australia's multicultural reality is becoming 
increasingly diverse, and is generally harmonious and stable because of the strength 
of the "civic nationalism" components of the inherited British Westminster 
parliamentary system and the strong tradition of the rule of law. The balancing of 
civic and ethnic nationalism is not a task that can be claimed to be complete, however, 
particularly in a nation such as Australia. Here the European, and especially Anglo-
Celtic ethnicity, remains the underlying standard by which social and political 
realities are judged with varying degrees of consciousness. Belief in white racial 
                                                            






supremacy and its attendant denigration or paternalism towards difference exists 
within the Australian population, and constitutes "the malign legacy that survives 
under the thin veneer of official multiculturalism."10 Ghassan Hage makes an 
insightful comment about the unconscious supposition inhabiting prevailing cultural 
thought, one which suggests the existence of a "real" Australia which now has a 
variety of cultures as a set of appendages: 
The "we appreciate" diversity, "we value" ethnic contributions, etc., attitudes 
which abound in the dominant political discourse in Australia create a gulf 
between the "we" and that which is appreciated and valued.  In so doing, they 
work to mystify the real possibility, grounded in the very composition of 
Australian society, of a national "we" which is itself diverse. It is this "we" 
that is at the core of the multicultural Real: we are diversity.11   
 
Thus in the assumption of an ethnic Australian core which sees others as apart or 
lesser, there lies an expression of the ethnic nationalism which Higgins is at pains to 
explain must give way in every instance to the hard-won civic nationalism. 
 
A focus on the actions of "a nation" risks reification, where an abstract reality is 
treated as a concrete thing: in this context to consider states, for example, "as 
historical subjects capable of agency and of determining their own ends."12 Aware of 
the danger of confusing the substantive with the substance, reference to "Australia" in 
this dissertation concerns particularly the government acting with the general 
compliance of the population at a particular time and in a particular set of 
circumstances, and not as a completely definable totality.  
The ways in which modern nations conceptualise and institutionalise 
themselves vary drastically. Forms of national identification vary with them.  
Since nation-states today stand for humanity's most basic political units, their 
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variations inform each national community's responses to morally significant 
issues.13  
 
The response of the Australian national community to the situation of East Timor is 
one such moral issue. 
 
The effort to understand a nation's past actions is intimately linked with the general 
population's perception of the nation, which in turn is influenced by the people's 
approach to history. "A nation's self-concept depends in large part on how it 
conceives of its history, its collective memory – the selection, inculcation and 
ritualisation of defining moments in its past."14 Higgins emphasises the importance of 
facing history, however inconvenient or disgraceful, but more especially with the 
willingness to grapple with "the moral significance of the facts."15 This thesis will 
claim that certain facts significant to Australia's official historical relationship with 
East Timor attest to denial, deceit, indifference and ignorance, undermining the self-
images of fairness, equality and independence that many Australians accept as the 
reality. 
 
 "We Australians have trouble in identifying ourselves, in saying what we are, and 
what we are coming to be."16 Manning Clark's insight reflects the number of 
published attempts undertaken since the 1950s to describe the "Australian identity", 
many concluding that if such an identity exists, it is impossible to define.  It is 
possible, however, to demonstrate whether values such as equality and self-
confidence, which are claimed by dominant groups, are applied in concrete situations 
                                                            
13 Higgins, Journey into Darkness, 21-22. 
14 Higgins, Journey into Darkness, 256. 
15 Higgins, Journey into Darkness, 20. 







through which Australians establish and build relationships with other nations and 
peoples. In that way an assessment can be made as to the extent of adherence to 
claimed values.  
 
A multiplicity of distinctive cultural traits operates within Australia, and has done so 
as long as people have inhabited this land, as demonstrated by the Indigenous 
cultures. The dominant cultural traditions have attempted to mediate different and 
sometimes competing cultures and groups, and has generally done it successfully, 
whilst recognising unresolved aspects of the relationship with the Indigenous peoples. 
However, claims to the independence which arises from freedom and courage, 
essential to the images of battlers and the bush, are challenged by the history of 
Australia's international relations and dependencies. This dissertation asserts that fear, 
insecurity and consequent dependency have characterised Australia in the modern 
world, and that the veracity of Australia's claims to independence and belief in 
equality for all can be tested by considering their practice in relating to others.  
Foremost among those relationships is that with the Australian Indigenous peoples, 




The ideal of social equality featured increasingly in colonial Australia but was not 
applied to the Indigenous peoples. Thornhill refers to the concept of "mateship" as 
part of the egalitarian ethos, and demonstrates that it had no connection to Aborigines 






fields.17 Race was integral to the concept of nationality prevalent at the time. This 
ethnic nationalism held the belief that threat and conflict could be avoided through the 
exclusion of coloured races, hence Indigenous people were excluded by being 
dispossessed, ignored or assimilated.18 The inability of the dominant groups to 
incorporate these peoples as contributors to society contradicts claims of 
egalitarianism, and demonstrates that the Australian interpretation of equality was 
limited and insular from the beginning of white settlement. 
 
This exclusion of Indigenous people is connected to questions concerning the use of 
the historical record. The absence of a unifying narrative of the historical relationship 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australia arises partly from the absence of 
comprehensive records, but also from interpretations of the available record based on 
commentators' differing world-views. 
 
During the 20th century, awareness of the prejudice towards and mistreatment of 
Indigenous people grew, culminating in the overwhelming support for the 1967 
referendum, which recognised the Aboriginal peoples' right to vote and charged the 
Commonwealth Government to legislate for Indigenous affairs, giving impetus to 
positive action and organisation at a national level. W.E.H. Stanner in his Boyer 
Lectures of 1968 voiced a growing recognition within the dominant Australian society 
of the time that Aboriginal people had suffered "the great Australian silence."19 
Stanner maintained that Aboriginal people had not been treated as integral players in 
Australian history, but rather had been reduced to subjects to be studied.  
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Poignant descriptions of the initial attempts of the first Governor of New South 
Wales, Arthur Phillip, to obey the orders given him to "open an intercourse with the 
natives, and to conciliate their affections, enjoining all our subjects to live in amity 
and kindness with them" can, unfortunately, now be viewed in the light of the threat 
of near extinction subsequently experienced by the Aborigines.20 The inability to 
establish a relationship of "amity and kindness" was a tragedy arising from numerous 
causes, not the least of which were the taking of the land by convicts and settlers, and 
the status of Indigenous peoples in the minds of 18th and 19th century westerners as a 
"stone-age" people.  For example, as Bain Attwood states, they were valued by 
anthropologists as "artefacts of the human past."21 In colonial art, Aborigines did not 
appear as "social actors", but were seen as part of nature whilst being deleted from the 
unfolding history.22   
 
Alongside Stanner's insights, serious research into Aboriginal history accompanied 
growing international recognition of the rights of Indigenous peoples and greater 
understanding of the effects of colonialism in the ensuing half-century. Aboriginal 
strength in political and cultural arenas accompanied increasing knowledge of their 
story by mainstream society. On the journey towards recognition and equality the 
nation expressed sorrow over the history of dispossession, massacres, child removal 
and assimilation. 
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Despite such positive changes, there still remain many challenges to reconciliation 
and to improving the material position of many Indigenous communities. Conflicting 
and ongoing argument about the place of Aboriginal people in Australian society 
accompanies polarisation concerning the historical record of race relationships in 
modern Australian history. Stanner refers to the exclusion of Aboriginal people's 
experience from that record as arising not only indifference towards them, but also 
through deliberate forgetfulness and denial.23  The silence cannot be seen as the 
unfortunate effect of simple misunderstandings but as a structural reality arising from 
colonial acquisition and particular views of racial and social superiority which gained 
strength in the 19th century. Attempts to redress the exclusion of Aborigines from the 
record of Australian history since Stanner's time were many and varied, but divisions 
among some historians, politicians and commentators remain.  
 
These divisions coalesced around what has been called "the history wars", which 
involved prominent historians such as Henry Reynolds and Keith Windschuttle. 
Opposing views of the record of Indigenous history include the disputes concerning 
the 2002 publication of Windschuttle's work, The Fabrication of Aboriginal History. 
The Introduction to this work states: "It is a study of the historiography, the nature of 
the written history, of the relations between colonists and Aborigines."24 Windschuttle 
maintains that there is a consensus among historians and intellectuals that Australia 
was "allegedly guilty of conscious, wilful genocide" of the Indigenous peoples. He 
claims that such assertions concern "the character of the nation and, ultimately, the 
calibre of the civilisation Britain brought to these shores in 1788."25 He aimed to 
refute these opinions by writing "a series that examines the credibility of the received 
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interpretation" of Aboriginal history.26 The trilogy was received with acclaim in 
politically conservative circles.27  
 
In response in 2003, Robert Manne edited Whitewash, a book of essays by fifteen 
historians, archaeologists, curators or lawyers who criticise Windschuttle's work as 
being rushed, superficial and inaccurate. In the collection, James Boyce sees The 
Fabrication of Aboriginal History as seriously flawed because of the limited sources 
consulted.28 Bain Attwood refers to Windschuttle's omission of available information 
and questions the premises on which he bases his conclusions.29 Prominent historian 
Geoffrey Blainey however, writing elsewhere, supports Windschuttle's accusation that 
selective use of evidence underpins currently accepted versions of Aboriginal 
history.30 
 
The Windschuttle debate is an element in the "history wars" in which government, 
media, historians and members of the public have been engaged, particularly since 
Stanner's unsettling phrase began to inhabit the Australian psyche. That highly-
educated historians, opinion-makers, politicians and commentators continue to 
exchange accusations about selective use of sources and manipulation of evidence on 
Indigenous questions indicates fundamental unease and frustration at an academic 
level, thus weakening the ability of that stratum of knowledge to influence the 
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relationship more popularly. Pertinent to the matter in this dissertation, the fact that 
Australia is still grappling with the written record of its relationship with its 
Indigenous peoples, is significant to its relationships with others. The inability of the 
dominant culture over the years to understand, accept and then describe this 
fundamental historical relationship suggests that Australia's relationships in the region 
with other Indigenous peoples, including the Timorese, could have similar challenges. 
It must be asked what political, social and racial currents affect that later relationship, 
to what extent government, media and church silence contributed to East Timor's 
situation, and whether there are forces at work which continue to ignore, falsify or 
misinterpret the record of dealings with the Timorese people, as is still being claimed 
and counter-claimed regarding Australia's Indigenous peoples.  
 
Britain  
Self-images of Australian independence are challenged in some ways by Australia's 
relationship with Britain, a connection of singular importance to self-understanding 
and the development of its later relationships.31 A kind of "love-hate" relationship 
exists between the British-influenced Australian culture and that of Britain in which 
feelings of loyalty and affection as well as of competitiveness and disdain arise. The 
closeness of the relationship since the beginning of colonisation in 1788 developed on 
the basis of the white population being predominantly made up of convicts and 
settlers from the British Isles, with administration by appointed British Governors, 
and all institutions being modelled on Britain's. There was a tendency in the colonies 
to judge everything by British standards which in some quarters remained well into 
the 20th century. Blainey states that even the values which Australians claimed as 
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distinctive to them were recognised by others as British: courage, independence, self-
reliance and loyalty.32 Whilst the class system did not have the hold in Australia that it 
did in Britain, the use of the colony for the excess of convicts (many of whom settled 
in Australia) and the presence of the lower classes and a significant minority of Irish 
(among both the convicts and the free settlers) contributed to an opinion of the low 
status and lack of quality of the new venture. Where Australian was compared with 
British, it was always in the context of British superiority.33 Richard White writes: 
....the image of Australia as a haven for the second-rate was always strong in 
Britain, and was often shared by intellectuals in Australia. It helped justify their 
disdain for those they considered their social or cultural inferiors.34  
 
Despite such comparisons, Australia remained dependent, "culturally and emotionally 
tied to Britain."35  Strong ties held sway in political, diplomatic and trade matters, 
both forming and illustrating Australia's dependence on the coloniser. In 1901, when 
the Australian colonies became a Federation of States, the Commonwealth of 
Australia became a Dominion of the British Empire. Britain's declaration of war in 
1914 automatically included Australia, with Australian troops being counted as 
British, and in fact all Australians were seen as British subjects until 1949.36 Sports 
traditionally enjoyed by Australians for the most part were based on British models, 
e.g. cricket, versions of rugby, and boxing.  
 
The threats posed by distance, difficulty of communication, and the status of being a 
small population inhabiting a large land mass in Asia encouraged continued 
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dependence on Britain, so much so that Australian foreign policy was dictated by 
London throughout the 1920s and 1930s, with Australia only gradually moving 
towards the exercise of greater international diplomacy. Trade, security and 
diplomatic support from Britain was a matter of course until World War II when, with 
the fall of Singapore and the war in the Pacific, the reality of Britain's inability to 
provide expected levels of support forced Australia to look elsewhere for security. 
With Britain's decision to join the European Economic Community in 1973, economic 
relations declined, further weakening the traditional British-Australian relationship.37 
Nevertheless, while strong levels of migration, trade and investment continued, and 
military and intelligence sharing alliances were retained, Australia chose to retain the 
Union Jack in its flag and the British monarch as its head of State. 
 
Such a strong history of dependence on the founding culture for institutions, symbols 
and protection indicates an insecurity requiring multiple levels of support. Ann 
Curthoys alludes to the experience of the early settlers, soldiers and convicts as being 
uprooted from Europe and believes that a sense of dispossession applied to them.38 
Gregory Melleuish discusses Simone Weil's belief that "a deracinated people can 
express its anguish by dispossessing others without in any way healing the wounds of 
its own dispossession."39 Melleuish states that this can describe the experience of 
Europeans in Australia who, having dispossessed the Indigenous peoples, found 
themselves in a vacuum: "The actual occupation of the country was not succeeded by 
a sending down of roots – so that Australian nationalism grew out of a general 
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environment of insecurity."40 Australia's insecurity required dependence on greater 
powers, a phenomenon which characterises Australian modern history, providing 
constant challenge to images of rugged individualism. 
 
The Australian relationship with Britain, with all its dependency and inferiority, raises 
questions. Given the tendency in Australia in the 19th and 20th centuries to measure 
itself in relation to Britain, what echoes arise in the relationship with East Timor? To 
what extent could it be claimed that the apparent backwardness, weakness and 
impoverishment of East Timor reflected Australia back to itself? Could the later 
demonstration that East Timor was of little account in many Australian eyes flow 
from the Australian sense of self in relation to Britain? 
 
United States of America 
Australian recourse to American protection in 1942 was a realistic response to Japan's 
expansionism and to Britain's inability to provide essential support. The ANZUS 
Treaty, which came into effect in 1952, cemented the Australian-New Zealand-
American security alliance and became the bedrock of Australian foreign policy, 
influencing its other relationships.41 Renouf states that it was Australia's need for 
security, fear of communism and inferiority complex which required the Treaty, a 
formality which was not the preference of the United States, given Australia's already 
demonstrated strategic importance to the US in its dealings in Asia.42 In both its 
advantages and disadvantages the relationship can be seen as a continuation and then 
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replacement of the 'strategic dependence' which the former Prime Minister Malcolm 
Fraser states described Australia's relationship with Britain.43 Long after being prime 
minister, Fraser advocated terminating the alliance, especially because Australia has 
"significantly diminished our capacity to act as a sovereign nation by the way in 
which we have committed ourselves to American purposes."44 Seeking protection and 
security through dependence on a greater power exposes Australia to the threats faced 
by that power, thereby heightening the very insecurity it sought to avoid.  
 
The implications of Australia's efforts to engage with its regional neighbours whilst 
retaining a favoured position with the Americans were seen in regard to East Timor. 
The United States' thrust towards regional dominance accounted substantially for its 
decades-long support for Indonesia's anti-communist regime. The effects of that 
balance of power were felt in Australia which also had its own fears of communism 
and worked closely with the US to counter that threat, all of which contributed to the 
compromised Australian response to Indonesia regarding East Timor for many years.  
Asia 
Australian relationships with Asia have historically involved a degree of ambivalence, 
insecurity and fear, heightened by Japan's role in World War II, the Cold War and 
communism. These features reflected Australia's desire to receive support from 
Britain and the United States while at the same time strengthening defence and trade 
ties with Asia. The interplay of these forces had direct bearings on East Timor in its 
place as part of the Indonesian archipelago.   
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As a predominantly European culture with its geographical place in the Asian region 
far from Europe, Australia often saw Asia in negative terms.45  Gary Smith alludes to 
a sense of isolation arising from the state of being a small number of people in a vast 
continent which produced fears of being "vulnerable, indefensible and desirable."46  
Lack of interaction and familiarity between Australians and Asians brought 
misunderstanding of mutual needs and perceptions, with suspicion and fear 
accompanying racial and cultural differences.  
 
 
Political attempts to engage with Asia were not necessarily shared by large sections of 
the Australia population, forming a challenge to government and indicating that 
underlying fear and suspicion dominated the Australian psyche. D. Smith observes: 
"Public opinion polls throughout the 1990s consistently showed that the political and 
intellectual elites were considerably ahead of broader opinion in their enthusiasm for 
engagement with Asia."47 This hiatus between popular and elite positions regarding 
Asia will be demonstrated as significant in relation to both Indonesia and East Timor. 
 
An expression of the Australian deep-seated mistrust of Asian peoples, and perhaps a 
significant contributor to that position, were the early decades of the widely popular 
weekly newspaper The Bulletin, founded in 1880. Nationalistic, anti-Semitic and 
racist in its early issues, The Bulletin lampooned leaders in every field, supported 
Australian independence and took a hard line in favour of White Australia. Through 
The Bulletin, images of exclusion and violent opposition to people and ideas 
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considered alien were presented to a wide Australian reading public for many years.  
The motto "Australia for the White Man" was part of its masthead until the 1960s, 
testimony to Australian fear, insecurity and sense of racial superiority.48 
 
The maintenance of difference and division had been strengthened by the White 
Australia policy, introduced for a mix of economic and racial reasons. It passed into 
Federal law in 1901 as a way of protecting white citizens' employment opportunities 
from Asian and Islander workers, and to ensure a homogenous population similar to 
that of Britain.49 Post-war immigration remained solely for Europeans, with Asian 




While the policy expressed ideas concerning race and nationalism current at the time 
of its promulgation, it lasted in Australia into the 1970s.  Its isolationism affected not 
only the composition of the population and a protectionist economy, but nurtured the 
defensiveness and sense of superiority which existed among many Australians. These 
aspects of Australian life influenced decisions regarding East Timor over decades, not 
only the political considerations thought necessary at the time of the events, but in 
succeeding decades concerning official government presentation of the history.  
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Engagement with Asia 
Threats to Australia, whether perceived or real, ensured that the nation's security 
within Asia remained a major concern. In particular, Japan's expansionism increased 
Australian belief in its vulnerability to aggression from the Asian north, underlining 
past fears of Asian nations generally. The sense of threat from Asia produced 
problems, neuroses and compromises which affected Australia and Timor for decades 
to come.  
 
Interestingly, the experience of World War II and reliance on the United States rather 
than on Britain was accompanied by Australia's realisation of the importance of active 
engagement for its national interest in the South East Asian region.  Australian 
governments endeavoured to ensure that all other considerations, including traditional 
fears, loyalties, and images of independence, were submerged by the main national 
interest, security.  
 
The interactions of dominant world powers in the subsequent Cold War affected their 
interests in the region. With Australia in alliance with the United States, its approach 
to Asia was "constrained by the demands of anti-Soviet geopolitics in the region."51⁠ 
Furthermore, the communist ascendancies in many newly-independent Asian States 
heightened the sense of threat and linked Australia to the Cold War which was 
gripping Europe. The rise of Mao Zedong's communist China brought the impasse 
between the USSR and the West into the Asian region, presenting Australia with 
further reason to fear Asia through the 1950s and 60s, with the "domino" theory 
posing perceptions of serious threat. Indonesian accusations of Timorese communist 
sympathies in the 1970s made Timor's position in Australia's regard an invidious one, 
                                                            






given the breadth and intensity of Australia's wariness of communism within its own 
borders as well as in the region.  
 
Thus, following World War II, Australia sought to engage with Asia as a way of 
protection. This was represented at an early stage by Australia's membership of the 
South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954, where alliances were formed 
with Asian nations under the overarching relationships with the United Kingdom and 
the United States. While pursuing better relations in Asia, Australia also firmly 
retained its position of alliance with the United States, often cooperating on foreign 
policy in Asia and showing willingness to demonstrate such dependency regardless of 
its effects on relationships in the region. According to Renouf, this resulted in major 
disadvantages for Australia, as it was seen as retaining its dependence on colonial 
powers. He states that as SEATO enjoyed strong British influence, Australia's 
membership weakened the ANZUS alliance, while conversely, the continuing 
Australian dependence on the United States alienated Asian opinion.52 Balancing its 
dependence on amicable relations between the United States with relationships within 
an increasingly powerful Asia therefore, Australia viewed East Timor as relatively 
unimportant, determining not to allow it to interfere with those other relationships, 
especially that with Indonesia. 
 
Particularly from 1970s onwards, governments of both sides of politics were avid in 
pursuit of Asian trade, engaging with the region through regular multilevel visits, 
conferences, treaties, foreign aid, military cooperation, education and immigration. 
With the trade focus shifting from declining European markets to closer Asian ones, 
                                                            






and with the restrictions on immigration lifted in the 1970s from the Whitlam 
government onwards, greater cultural interaction was possible between Australia and 
Asia, and involved immigration and tourism which brought a degree of greater 
tolerance and mutual understanding. While economic prosperity increased in 
Australia and Asia, the increasing wealth of the growing economies in the region 
ensured that they could buy more and better weapons, thus increasing their potential 
threat. ⁠53 Greater ties with Asia brought questions as to what extent Australian 
economic and strategic gains in the region should influence its approach to human 
rights, given fundamental differences of approach between Western and Asian nations 
to this matter.54 This dilemma surfaced with full force as Australia juggled its 
relationships with Indonesia, Britain, the US and the United Nations in the matter of 
East Timor.   
 
Indonesia 
The Asian nation closest to Australia, just a few hundred kilometres to the north, is 
the Republic of Indonesia. The most populous Muslim nation in the world, Indonesia 
boasts a mix of languages and cultures. Its relatively stable democracy (following 
more than 30 years of dictatorship under the former military general, Suharto) and 
swiftly developing economy marks it as a success story of the post-war era. Its 
proximity makes its relationship with Australia significant among Asian nations, even 
more so in its integral connection with events affecting East Timor. 
 
Historically, Australia has shown consistent support for Indonesia. The struggle of 
what was the Dutch East Indies for independence after World War II saw military 
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efforts by the Netherlands to regain control, a move which led the Australian 
government to register complaints with the United Nations.55 Australian trade union 
blockades against Dutch vessels involved in the offensives continued until the 
recognition of Indonesian sovereignty in 1949. Australia was among the first nations 
to recognise Indonesia's new status.  
 
When the first President, Sukarno, promoted policies viewed as verging on 
communism, the concern of the United States was echoed by Australia.  His 
overthrow by General Suharto and Indonesia's subsequent rejection of communism 
allied it to the United States and contributed to its status as a bulwark against China in 
the region. Though authoritarian and controversial, Suharto's long presidency, from 
1967 to 1998, developed the economy and consolidated Indonesia as a significant 
Asian power.  
  
Along with closer political and security ties, Australian governments secured trade 
and investment opportunities with Indonesia, and partnerships of the 1980s and 1990s 
recognised more fully the capacity for mutual economic benefits. These opportunities 
included mutual exploitation of the oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea. Greater 
benefits for Indonesia through these links accompanied the likelihood of Australia's 
greater acceptance in the South East Asian region. Prime Minister Paul Keating 
asserted in 1994 that "no country was more important to Australia than Indonesia."56 
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Popular perceptions and policy regarding Indonesia 
While diplomatic and political interaction with Indonesia has remained a high priority 
of successive Australian governments, deeper cultural and social connections between 
the peoples of the two nations have taken far longer to be made.57 Australia has long 
provided aid to Indonesia, however. Despite its highly significant democratic 
advances and economic progress, Indonesia remains affected by poverty, with 20% of 
Indonesians living below the international poverty line and another 40% hovering 
near it.58 The economic disparities between Australia and Indonesia place Australia 
ahead in terms of current opportunities, but the relative youth and size of Indonesia's 
population provide the conditions for strong growth. While Indonesia's development 
benefits Australian prosperity, it can also cause insecurity. Indonesia was seen from 
the 1980s through the 1990s as the country most likely to threaten our national 
security.59 Surveys show that ambivalence towards Indonesia remains in the 
Australian population. 60 
 
At government levels Australia and Indonesia have entered into a range of agreements 
and treaties since 1964 to build the relationship, including trade, seabed boundaries, 
investment and development, science and technology. Among the most significant is 
the 2006 Treaty on Security Cooperation, the Lombok Treaty, designed to maintain 
close cooperation for peace, prosperity and mutual security by the practical means of 
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combatting terrorism and transnational crime.61 Decades of combined military 
exercises and Indonesian officer training in Australia were designed to enhance the 
relationship. Nevertheless, Indonesia's human rights record in East Timor (and in 
other parts of the archipelago) contributed to accusations of Australian compromise 
and complicity. Much controversy has centred on the Indonesian elite force, 
Kopassus, which continued to receive training from Australia during the 1980s and 
1990s, through the struggle for Timorese independence and beyond.62   
 
The relatively weak relationship between Indonesia and Australia at the levels of 
individuals and communities is in contrast to strong and positive aspects of the 
relationship concerning mutuality between leaders, and government-to-government 
initiatives, especially in defence, security, and trade. However, in the case of East 
Timor, the reverse of this situation developed. As this dissertation details, the 
strengthening of relationships between ordinary Australians and Timorese, with the 
associated analysis and public presentation of a more complete version of the 
narrative of East Timor's history, led to a change so major that it can be described as a 
conversion. This conversion towards the Timorese eventually heavily influenced the 
change in the position of the Australian government from support of Indonesia's 
integration of East Timor to support for Timorese self-determination.   
 
                                                            
61 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Agreement between Australia and the Republic of 
Indonesia on the Framework for Security Cooperation (November 13, 2006), accessed October 14, 
2015, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/nia/2006/43.html 









The Australian relationship with East Timor is characterised by certain extreme 
geographical and historical differences. The vast continent of modern Australia is 
basically European with growing multicultural elements, still grappling with the 
effects on the Indigenous peoples of the arrival of white settlers at the end of the 
18th century. Conversely, indigenous Timorese comprise the greater part of East 
Timor's society, although with Portuguese and Chinese influence for at least five 
centuries. Australian sovereignty evolved from its status as a colony of Britain, 
whereas Timor-Leste, after a European colonisation twice as long as Australia's, 
has had recent experience of armed invasion and occupation, with its final 
independence declared as recently as 2002.  
 
Situated in the Indonesian archipelago, the mountainous island of Timor was 
populated over millennia by a series of migrations which included both Melanesian 
and Malaysian people who developed strong and successful tribal societies. European 
influence came through Dutch colonisation of the western half of the island, while the 
Portuguese arrived on the eastern side in 1515 and established trading posts in the 
1560s. Throughout the 16th to the 19th centuries, resistance to the Portuguese was 
quelled by military force or by playing off one tribal kingdom against another. 
Despite being recipients of over 450 years of Portuguese colonisation, the Timorese 
remained largely poor and uneducated until the 1970s. Some conversions to 
Christianity occurred during earlier times, especially among Timorese elites, 
increasing exponentially among the general population in the latter part of the 20th 
century. Internationally recognised boundaries were established in 1913 between 






The importance of oil to the rapid industrialisation of the world had a direct effect on 
the fortunes of the Timorese people in their dealings with Australia, and became an 
underlying element in Australia's actions regarding East Timor throughout the shared 
history.63  Small but growing interest saw various British, Portuguese and Australian 
groups and individuals considering the oil potential of Timor through an array of 
consortiums and companies in the early to mid-20th century. 
 
The majority of people in both nations identify as Christian. Despite this, 
animism and superstition remain strong in Timor while in Australia meaning is 
increasingly sought in material success. Strong political, judicial and legal 
frameworks based largely on the British system and Judeo-Christian principles 
provide Australians with stable regulatory processes to support social life while 
Timorese people's systems are evolving from Portuguese and Indonesian 
influences, with ancient customs and beliefs retaining underlying cultural 
significance. 
 
As a developing nation, one which suffers the effects of recent military 
devastation, Timor-Leste experiences major hurdles alongside recent significant 
improvement in education, health and political stability. Australian social systems 
are far stronger; for example, on the 2015 UN Human Development Index (a 
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measure to rank social and economic development) Australia is No. 2 whereas 
Timor-Leste is at No.110.64  
 
Alongside the disparities of wealth and stability, there exist certain Australian 
cultural attitudes which tend towards attitudes of superiority towards Timor-Leste 
and its people.  According to Taylor, Western ethnocentrism has tended to 
appropriate civilisation to itself, viewing any lack of European civilisation as the 
lack of "the makings of what we think as a modern state."65 He states that 
ethnocentrism has misinterpreted differences between cultures as being the 
difference between culture and nature.66 He refers to non-Western cultures which 
"have modernised in their own way and cannot be properly understood if we try 
to grasp them in a general theory that was designed originally with the Western 
case in mind."67 He acknowledges a nation as a people "existing prior to and 
independently of its political constitution."68 Thus the "social imaginary" which 
conceived that a small, oppressed and linguistically diverse group could become a 
sovereign nation such as Timor-Leste contrasts with the "social imaginary" in 
Australia and in other Western nations which thought such an outcome 
impossible for the Timorese people. The dire effects on the Timorese people of 
World War II and the later Indonesian invasion and occupation have been outlined in 
the Introduction and are detailed further in the dissertation. These were devastating 
events, giving the Australian involvement  with East Timor an unparalleled 
importance. 
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Historical dependence on Britain, the United States and increasingly on Asian 
neighbours has served modern Australia's need for security but challenges notions of 
Australian independence. Australia's dependence on Britain was not dissolved by 
choice, but by war-time realities, and was replaced by a dependence on the United 
States with increasing engagement with Asia. Additionally, Australian fear of Asia 
has accompanied long-standing attitudes of superiority and suspicion. Furthermore, 
Australian attitudes to people of different ethnicities or cultures, both Indigenous and 
others, have not always displayed the egalitarian ideals which have been traditionally 
claimed by the dominant cultural traditions in Australia. A major casualty of the 
desire for Australian security has been the Timorese people, whose fortunes have 
been negatively influenced in major regional events in which Australia was involved. 
A long-standing interplay of fear, dependence and hubris has demonstrably influenced 
Australian dealings with East Timor.  
 
With major Australian political, religious and media institutions having engaged for 
decades with forces destructive of the small and weak Australian neighbour East 
Timor, honesty is required to describe the Australian relationship with that nation. 
Interpreting the political and moral choices in the history may contribute towards 
redressing official deceit and popular ignorance in regard to the relationship between 







The interpretation of Australian political and moral choices affecting the relationship 
between Australia and East Timor in this dissertation uses interrelated aspects of René 
Girard's mimetic theory. Girard's theory is conventionally divided into three parts: 
mimetic desire, scapegoating, and the conversion which arises from the Gospel's 
revelation of the innocence of the victim . Outlining these three aspects of mimetic 
theory prepares for the interpretation of the victim status of East Timor throughout its 
shared history with Australia, and for an appreciation of the Australian conversion 
towards the victim which eventually occurred. 
 
Mimesis   
Imitative desire 
Girard's studies in literature, anthropology and scripture concern an articulation of 
what it means to be human.1 He states that "mimetism defines humans."2  For him, 
human behaviour flows from "mimetic desire", which means humans desiring 
according to the desire of another.3 Aside from the appetites that arise from the need 
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for survival, Girard maintains that all human desire is essentially imitative, or 
"mimetic", the unconscious imitation of someone else's desire.4  
 
Being imitative, mimetic desire is neither autonomous nor spontaneous; rather it is the 
attraction to an object because of another's possession of it or desire for it. 
Paradoxically, the desire of a person for an object signals to the other that the object is 
desirable, hence desire is mediated between persons, producing levels of 
interdependence. Fashion in dress and taste shows the power of mimesis. The height 
of fashion for men in the Western world in the 1970s included long hair and flared 
trousers, an indication of similarity of age, financial status and cultural affinity. Forty 
years later, trousers which hung from the hips rather than the waist were fashionable 
for a time for both young men and women – the desire to imitate others and follow the 
trend overriding the obvious discomfort. Personal and group identity is mediated by 
others because desire is according to the desires of others.  
 
Rivalry and conflict  
Girard maintains that the desiring person – the subject – imitates the desire of another 
– the model or mediator – who possesses or desires an object. With both subject and 
mediator desiring the same thing, rivalry is likely to arise. If both refuse to share the 
object, there is conflict, even physical violence. Girard uses interactions of children as 
illustrations. For example, Penny and Eva are playing in the toy corner. Eva drops her 
blocks when she sees Penny bouncing a ball and moves to take the ball herself. Penny 
wasn't particularly interested in the ball, actually intending to get a doll, but when she 
                                                            




realises that Eva wants the ball she hangs on to it and won't let Eva have it. Both girls 
desire the same object, each pushing the other in their rivalry.  
 
Metaphysical desire 
It is not the object itself that is the only focus of the rivals however; each wants it 
because of the other's desire for it. In the rivalry over possession, the object itself can 
recede into the background as the antagonism and even violence intensifies between 
those desiring it. Yet mimetic theory points to deeper motivation than merely the 
desire to have something, or even to have it because someone else wants it. 
Fundamentally, the person desiring the object wants to be what the other is, or to be 
what the other could become when in possession of the object. Girard states: 
"Imitative desire is always a desire to be Another."5 On the surface, mimesis is 
acquisitive, with two or more wanting the same object, but the deeper reality is that 
the desire concerns being, with having seen as the means to that end.6 This 
phenomenon Girard terms "metaphysical desire", a desire or yearning for being that 
underlies human relationships.7 The basic structure of desire is the longing for being, 
following from the belief that one's own experience of lack of being could be allayed 
by that which someone else has, or what someone else desires.8  As Peter Stork points 
out, 
...the theory proposes that the subject not only seeks to possess the object to 
which the model points, but also seeks to be "possessed" by it, for the 
acquisitiveness of desire is not primarily directed at the object itself but at 
what it signifies, namely the model proper.9  
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External and internal mediation 
Girard used a triangle to symbolise the mimetic relationship between the desiring 
subject and the model.10 The taller the triangle, the greater the relational distance 
between those involved, for example, in status or regarding geographical place or 
time. Girard calls this type of mimetic relationship external mediation, which involves 
great distance between the subject and model. It poses little threat to roles or 
relationships, making the chance of rivalry remote. One of Girard's examples is Don 
Quixote's desire to be a knight like Amadis de Gaul who was seen as the best of 
knights, the very identity which Don Quixote then desired for himself. Amadis existed 
only in the pages of fiction so therefore no challenge or threat was possible to him as 
the model, nor to Don Quixote, through rivalry. In external mediation the imitation is 
often recognisable. For example, Don Quixote freely admits he copies Amadis de 
Gaul; in Flaubert's novel Madame Bovary, the main character Emma sings loudly of 
her adulation of characters she reads about.  
 
While rivalry does not have the scope to develop in external mediation, it does have 
untoward effects. In the case of Cervantes' hero, the effect was on Don Quixote's 
identity, because of his desire to be as Amadis was. Michael Kirwan states, "By 
allowing this fictional character to choose for him all the things he should desire, Don 
Quixote effectively abandons any independent judgement of his own."11 His desire for 
the trappings of Amadis was essentially a desire for the being of Amadis, thus 
weakening his own identity.  
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If the distance between subject and model is diminished (in Girard's triangular 
depiction), the possibility of rivalry increases. The mediation is described in this case 
by Girard as internal. Internal mediation is that form of mimetic relationship which 
occurs more readily between persons or groups who share similar status, or age, or are 
neighbours or contemporaries. The triangle is flatter, as is obvious in the example of 
Penny and Eva recounted above. Moreover, Girard's interpretation of Shakespeare's 
works in his book A Theater of Envy presents internal mediation at work on various 
levels.12 For instance, characters in A Midsummer Night's Dream demonstrate the 
workings of internal mediation. The device of Puck's magic potion enables 
Shakespeare to concertina four lovers' experiences of falling in and out of love with 
each other into one night, thus presenting through comedy the human tendency to 




Unlike Don Quixote and Madame Bovary in their external expressions of mediation, 
"the hero of internal mediation, far from boasting of his efforts to imitate, carefully 
hides them."13 Eric Gans comments: "The closer the mediator to the self, the less one 
is willing or able to admit his influence."14 Girard maintains: "In our days (the 
imitative nature of desire) is hard to perceive because the most fervent imitation is the 
most vigorously denied."15 Concealment, then, is a feature of internal mediation, and 
it is therefore easy to mistake its effects for self-motivated human action.    
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Girard's insights into mimetic desire have resonances for the Australian relationships 
with its own cultural history, its regional neighbours, and East Timor. The influence 
of mimetic desire on Australian identity is expressed in its inherent contradictions as a 
predominantly rich yet fearful European culture so close to Asia. Australian 
dependency on powerful friends for assistance and for the formulation of policy are 
concealed under claims of independence and strength. The understandable Australian 
desire for security has been its overarching focus, one which had dire effects on its 
relationship with the much smaller and more dependent East Timor. 
 
From Romantic Lie to Novelistic Truth 
A feature of Girard's mimetic theory with particular application to this dissertation 
concerns his exposition of the "romantic lie", a term which describes literary works 
which conceal or are ignorant of the mimetic influence in plots or characters. The 
"romantic lie" is discussed in Girard's first book, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, where 
he explores the works of Cervantes, Flaubert, Proust, Stendhal and Dostoevsky. 
According to Girard, these novelists presented characters early in their careers who 
displayed the autonomous and spontaneous features of the heroes and heroines which 
he terms "romantic". The actions and decisions of such characters display some 
distance from reality. They appear as people who operate wholly from self-
motivation, displaying self-sufficiency and spontaneity to a high degree. An example 
from current popular literature might include Hercule Poirot, the Agatha Christie 
detective who exhibits total control of his chosen task of sleuthing, and whose foibles 
are presented not as human weaknesses, but as comic relief. He is always right, and 
the contributions of others to the resolution of the plot is trivial and accidental. 
However, his desire to be seen to be astute in the highest degree, to solve all cases 
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single-handedly and to present himself in extreme sartorial elegance betrays in Poirot 
the mediation of other people's opinions of him as the controlling factor in his 
behaviour. His identity is buffeted by the opinion of other people: when anyone 
expresses an ignorance of who he is, Poirot is crestfallen. In Girard's triangular 
schema, Poirot as the subject desires the good opinion of those whom he meets. 
Seizure of the object of his desire, that good opinion, is dependent on his ability to 
reveal the murderer, that is, on his fulfilling of the desire of the other characters to 
have the mystery solved, the killer brought to justice, and themselves exonerated. 
Undoubtedly, Poirot also wants good to prevail and criminals brought to justice, but 
the author presents the character as the single autonomous brain operating in the plot.  
 
Hence the desires, thoughts and actions of characters like Poirot can be seen by 
readers to be derived from others, but in the narrative itself the character's own 
appreciation of that influence is non-existent. Reflection on the character can detect 
his or her dependence on others, but nothing in the narrative depicts any such self-
knowledge. There is no movement in the character Poirot, neither in individual stories 
nor in his whole career. At the end of his career he voices a slight recognition of his 
peculiarities: "I have been too self-righteous, too conscious of rectitude."16 
Nevertheless, the climax of the plot of that final story finds him again completely in 
control, presented by the author as not only the omniscient sleuth, but as judge and 
executioner as well.17   
 
In Girard's view such writing is deficient, where the model of desire appears but is not 
unveiled as such in the plot. Girard states: "we shall use the term romantic for the 
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works which reflect the presence of a mediator without ever revealing it."18 This type 
of romantic literature so ignores the dependence of human desire on the desires of 
others that Girard adds the description "lie". He describes such fiction as "the lie of 
spontaneous desire."19 At its worst, the characters are shown to be spontaneous actors, 
with little or no clues given to their mimetic dependency, deceiving the reader into 
believing that autonomous desire is real and normal. 
 
Girard distinguishes between what he terms "romantic fiction" and "novelistic 
truth".20 In the more mature works of the writers he discusses, Girard sees characters 
who showed a more realistic understanding of human relationships. In these books he 
detects a growing realisation that the usual characterisations of general spontaneity 
are false, and that humans are imitative, not original, at their core. For Girard, these 
writers' later works are true novels, demonstrating the ability of the writer to reveal 
the effect of the rival or model on the desires of the subject.  
 
An example that Girard uses is derived from Stendhal's novel The Red and the Black. 
Two rich men in the town enjoy the prestige brought by wealth and breeding. One is 
the mayor, and the other an influential rival. The mayor wishes to engage a certain 
Julien Sorel to tutor his sons, but his desire arises from his knowledge that his rival is 
also looking for a family tutor. The mayor's desire for this particular tutor is based on 
the fear expressed to his wife that the other man "might very well steal this one from 
us."21 When negotiating with Julien's father, the mayor shows he is willing to pay 
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well, but is misled by the cunning old man who says: "We have a better offer."22 This 
convinces the mayor that his rival has the upper hand, which in turn intensifies the 
mayor's determination to engage Julien. The mayor's resolve is not based on the 
merits of the tutor, but results from his imitation of his rival's desire. So the object of 
the mayor's desire is not so much the benefit a particular tutor may have been to his 
children's education, but to vanquish his rival. He wants what his rival wants, because 
his rival wants it. As Girard states: "The ever-increasing price the buyer is willing to 
pay is determined by the imaginary desire which he attributes to his rival."23  
 
This episode of the book contains not merely a literary presentation of a small-town 
intrigue, but reveals the motivations of characters as dependent on others. This 
revelation, identified by Girard, is the result of the writer's own insight into the 
operation of human desire. Hence, for Girard, the difference between the "romantic 
lie" and the true novel is the ability of the writer to reveal the effects of mimetic 
desire. Through their later characters, the authors that Girard studies demonstrated an 
increasing capacity to express human motivation and behaviour as arising from the 
interdependence of desire. Black and white depictions of relationships gave way to 
more nuanced characterisations, with greater recognition of the dependence of the self 
on the other. This is described by Girard as "novelistic truth".24   
 
Girard maintains that this growth in the novelists themselves occurred at varying 
degrees and at differing rates. As they undertook their own interior journey into 
understanding the nature of human desire they were gradually able to express it in 
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their writings.25 They realised that they themselves were subject, in Girard's terms, to 
mimetic desire: their progression from romantic fiction to great novels reflected their 
deepening understanding of their own dependence on others' desires. In this way, they 
recognised the metaphysical nature of desire. Girard describes this process as a form 
of conversion. Integral to a novel's greatness, for Girard, is its revelation of these 
underlying motivations. He states:  
So the career of the great novelist is dependent upon a conversion, and even if 
it is not made completely explicit, there are symbolic allusions to it at the end 
of the novel.  These allusions are at least implicitly religious.26 
 
Thus for Girard, the ability of great novelists to see through their artificial 
presentations of human relationships and to express that in their writing indicated a 
major personal conversion. They moved from "romantic" literature to true novels as 
they awoke to the previously unconscious influence of the rivalry and conflict 
inherent in their own metaphysical and mimetic desires. Their previous inability to 
see their dependence on the desires and the person of the other had generated a false 
sense of self. Once they recognised the influence of the other's desire the nature of 
rivalry and conflict with that other was apparent. This led to the insight that rivalry 
was undergirded by the impetus to claim the being of the other, which they then 
reflected in their novels. Girard states:  
....under the influence of romanticism we attach too much importance to the 
individual hero. The novelist's fundamental concern is not the creation of 
characters but the revelation of metaphysical desire.27  
 
Further to his analysis, the realisation that novelists expressed through their characters 
their personal interior revolution was a catalyst for Girard's own personal growth, a 
phenomenon which he admits he had simultaneously detected in himself. However, it 
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was the evidence of the content of the novels coupled with his knowledge of the life 
experience of the novelists that formed the basis for the comparison with himself.  He 
reflects: 
Like all novelists, Proust's narrator moves freely from room to room in the 
"museum without walls" of his existence. The novelist-narrator is none other 
than Marcel cured of all his errors, who has overcome his desires and is rich 
with novelistic grace. The great Cervantes is also a Don Quixote who has 
overcome his desires, a Don Quixote who can see a barber's basin as a barber's 
basin but who nevertheless remembers that he once saw it as Mabrino's 
helmet. This clear-sighed Don Quixote is present in the book only for an 
instant; it is the dying Don Quixote of the conclusion. Proust's narrator too 
dies in The Past Recaptured and he too is cured in death. But he comes to life 
again as a novelist. He reappears in person in the body of his novel.28  
 
The insight into something of a similar movement in himself is described by Girard 
thus:  "When I wrote the last chapter of my first book ... I realised I was undergoing 
my own version of the experience I was describing...."29 The resolution of a 
potentially life-threatening health problem brought his intellectual-literary conversion 
to a deeper personal level, as described by Hodge: "Facing death led Girard to a crisis 
that stripped him of his notions of self-aggrandisement and intellectual arrogance."30 
Girard stated: "Conversion turned into something really serious in which the aesthetic 
gave way to the religious."31 In this way his experience of his insight showed its 
personal implications – one that was changed by the realisation of mimetic desire, 
leading to a more genuine understanding of himself.  
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As indicated, mimetic theory has at its base the contention that the desires humans 
appropriate from others fundamentally flow from a sense of "lack of being" that is 
behind the drive to possess or acquire.32 Human beings can experience an inner 
emptiness which is perceived as remedied only by gaining the object of their desires.33 
The possible ensuing conflict is not only over possession but, at a deeper level, over 
identity, recognition and prestige which are distortions of the underlying desire for 
being.34 Related to Girard's point, Robert Schreiter comments: "To withstand 
vulnerability and fear we need to construct a sense of self and safety."35 Among the 
means employed for that purpose, humans "choose to draw boundaries....by 
exclusion, placing beyond that boundary those who are 'not us', those who are 
'them'."36 Yet these boundaries mask the underlying and on-going crisis of being and 
identity.  
 
Mimetic desire, while focussing on externals such as objects or relationships, is 
therefore fundamentally a matter of identity. In Girard's view, the progression from 
romantic fiction to great novels indicated that the writers realised that the characters 
of their novels were, in effect, projections of themselves. Girard sees this as a 
humbling experience of self-knowledge, a type of collapse of previous understandings 
of the self. It becomes, in his words, an "existential downfall".37 Honest appraisal 
allowed the novelists to refine their work out of the experience of this personal 
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collapse.38 Such a change of perspective is reflected in the fortunes of the characters 
such as in illness, reversal of approach and opinion, or death. In relation to these 
inversions, Girard states, "All the heroes, in the conclusion, utter words which clearly 
contradict their former ideas..."39 Stepan, in Dostoevsky's The Possessed, illustrates 
this fundamental change of mind:  
I've been telling lies all my life. Even when I told the truth I never spoke for the 
sake of the truth, but always for my own sake. I knew it before, but I only see it 
now.40    
 
Such collapse of one's perception of the self necessarily influences relationships. 
Hodge notes: "As Girard's experience attests, the experience of crisis, emerging from 
one's relation to the other, can provoke a change in one's self and how one thinks 
about and interacts with the world."41 These changes in the relationship of the self to 
the world are not cosmetic but are so basic that they are appropriately named 
"conversion".  Hodge describes the fundamental personal upheaval which such 
existential conversion affords as "the breakdown of the rivalistic 'romantic self' and 
the emergence of the relational other-centred self, out of which self-awareness, 
agency and responsibility properly emerge."42 Hence conversion in the Girardian 
sense is the inner realisation of the lack of autonomy of the self, as a result of an 
existential crisis provoked by one's relation to the other. It has an irreplaceable role in 
the development of identity, as interdependence with others forms the growth of the 
self. Thus conversion and identity are interrelated. Girard states: "Metaphysical desire 
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brings into being a certain relationship to others and to oneself. True conversion 
engenders a new relationship to others and to oneself."43 
 
Nevertheless, even where true novelists present a person's desires as being dependent 
on the desires of others, there is no guarantee that the story will be read that way. The 
revelation of mimesis demands that the reader, too, is able to grasp the unfolding 
understanding of the central role of imitation in human desire. Not all are so able, and 
the general human appreciation of one's desires as unique and individual - the staple 
of popular writing - remains widely believed. More often than not, those who are 
satisfied by reading romantic fiction are often oblivious of the workings of mimetic 
desire when presented it by "true novelists" (as defined by Girard), and so miss the 
mimetic dimensions of such plots and characters. In these cases Girard warns: "the 
truth of the revelation remains hidden even at the heart of its revelation."44 The reader 
needs the capacity to receive the revelation, to comprehend the operation of mimesis 
in the tale, and hence to appreciate it as an invitation to a humble acceptance of this 
reality of human existence. If they are taken in by the distortion however, they 
interpret their own lives accordingly, thinking that they are as independent of others 
as they imagine the subject whom they read about to be. Girard states: "The reader, 
who is usually convinced of his own spontaneity, applies to the work the meanings he 
already applies to the world."45   
 
Thus, mimetic theory poses to both writers and readers intellectual and personal 
challenges regarding the fundamental reality of human desire. An appreciation of the 
dependence of one's desires on the desires of others, the tendency to rivalry, the 
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constant possibility of blaming others and using various forms of violence to resolve 
consequent crises, are essential elements of the self-knowledge which arise in 
recognition of mimetic desire. As this thesis later discusses, elements of the "romantic 
lie" and "existential downfall" are apparent in the historical record of the relationship 
between Australia and East Timor. 
 
Scapegoating 
The second part of this chapter addresses the fundamental Girardian theme of the 
scapegoat, a pivotal aspect of mimetic theory which has particular application to the 
relationship between Australia and East Timor. While Girard's initial insights dealt 
with mimesis within literature, he subsequently developed his theory through 
anthropological investigations of archaic cultures and religions. The elements of 
mimetic rivalry which he had found in great literature echoed the rivalry and violence 
at the heart of ancient societies, though with a further element: that such rivalries were 
culturally resolved by scapegoating a victim.  
 
The persecution of the scapegoat was first investigated by Girard in his 1972 book 
Violence and the Sacred.46  In this and further works, he discussed societies that faced 
violent internal disruption from accumulating mimetic rivalries which threatened their 
existence. Illustrating this thesis from ancient and medieval history and literature, 
Girard presented examples of crises during which the social fabric disintegrated and 
hierarchical systems collapsed, and during which the social group attempted to find 
and blame a cause.47 In such social crises, human relationships were irrevocably 
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changed, and the systems and institutions which make ordinary life possible were 
eroded or destroyed.  
 
Girard showed that such threats to cohesion traditionally could be resolved (at least 
temporarily) in uniting against a common enemy, either internal or external, or 
apportioning blame for some crime to a member of the social group regarded as the 
cause of the uncontrollable threat. The identification of such a cause required a 
culprit, who became the scapegoat. Therefore, a single individual or group became the 
group's victim, killed or expelled as though guilty of the original conflict.48  The "all 
against all" violence which threatened the survival of the group gradually began to be 
replaced with an "all against one'"process. Thus for Girard, there are certain 
identifiable features or stereotypes of scapegoating: a crisis; a crime; criteria for the 
choice of scapegoat; and the violence done to the scapegoat to solve the crisis and 
assuage its effects.49 These stereotypes are discussed in this dissertation in relation to 
the Australian treatment of East Timor.  
 
Girard perceived that escalations of violence were able to be avoided through the 
scapegoat effect, the blaming of a substitutionary victim. Girard states:  
By a scapegoat effect I mean that strange process through which two or more 
people are reconciled at the expense of a third party who appears guilty or 
responsible for whatever ails, disturbs, or frightens the scapegoaters.50  
 
The violent despatch of the scapegoat to solve mimetic social crises constituted the 
unifying sacrifice which restored social peace. "The sacrifice serves to protect the 
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community from its own violence."51 Girard thus proposes that the spread of violence 
is prevented by this violent sacrifice.52 Significantly, the scapegoat is required to be 
one which could not perpetuate further violence in the form of vengeance, so the 
victim is by definition one without a defender.53 Additionally, an important element in 
the process is the presence of "an eminently manipulable mass" of people who allow 
themselves to be orchestrated into believing in the guilt of the scapegoat.54 With the 
problem of rivalry solved by way of the death or expulsion of the victim, communities 
experienced harmony again for a time, until rivalry and violence again arose, 
requiring another scapegoat. 
 
The feat of solving social ills which the victim appeared to accomplish through his or 
her sacrifice resulted in the victim then being regarded as supernatural and divine. 
Through a “double transference”, the social group also came to perceive that the same 
victim was responsible for the original crisis, as part of a plan to deal with the threat 
or crime and generate the harmony which resulted from sacrificial expulsion or 
murder. As the effect of this sacrifice was the restoration of harmony, victims were 
elevated to the status of gods, mysteriously causing and resolving violence.55 Girard 
showed that the features of "the sacred" – as causing and resolving conflict – were 
present across a range of cultures.56 
 
In the eyes of ancient communities the victim filled the position of both the one 
responsible for disharmony and the one whose extermination had brought peace. 
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Harmony, order and prosperity were seen to come from the sacrifice of the victim, 
and hence grew practices of attributing supernatural or divine status to the victims. 
The violence towards the victim was sacralised, raised to a plane which concealed its 
fundamental barbarity.57 Girard sees the beginnings of religions and thence cultures in 
these processes.58 Sacrificial rituals with prohibitions and taboos developed to 
remember and re-enact the processes which saved the group from itself, keeping alive 
warnings against behaviours which risked descent into social chaos. Kirwan 
summarises: "The origin of religion, therefore, is to be found in 'sacrifice', which is 
none other than the violent extermination of the scapegoat."59 Thus the violence 
against the victim which protected societies from themselves was perceived as 
"sacred".60 
 
Hence Girard argued for what he called the scapegoat or surrogate-victim mechanism 
as the hypothesis which could account most satisfactorily for religion and culture.61 
The religion and culture generated from scapegoating a victim established social 
order, allowing communities to survive with some level of peace. Over time, the 
repetition in ritual of the sacrifice of the victim became the "sacred" act which caused 
the community to cohere. With attendant rituals, myths, taboos and prohibitions, it 
ceaselessly reminded the community of its precarious grip on harmony, and became 
the means of reinforcing the limitation of violence which the victimary mechanism 
was designed to ensure. Girard states: "the various 'scapegoat' phenomena are...the 
very basis of cultural unification, the source of all rituals and religion."62 The religio-
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cultural institutions established from scapegoating were regarded as "sacred" because 
they enshrined and expressed the basis for the community's survival.  
 
For Girard, the heart of religion and culture is the surrogate-victim mechanism and its 
resolution in sacrifice through which the human race seeks to protect itself from its 
own violence. Initial violence was quelled and peace restored by the sacrifice of a 
scapegoat. Seen at once blameworthy and salvific, the victim's power over the group 
through its extermination began to be ritually repeated, in efforts to retain its 
temporarily harmonising effects. Oral and then written accounts of such sacrifices and 
their effects on communities grew into myths, with prohibitions and taboos guarding 
the community from regressing into behaviours which generated the original crises. 
Thus sacrifice, myth and prohibition evolved into religious and cultural institutions, 
whose rites and norms channelled the violence, steadying the propensity of human 
beings to descend into mimetic crises.  
 
Features of Scapegoating 
Girard detected certain features of both scapegoaters and their victims. The 
unconsciousness and unanimity of the persecutors were significant, as were the 
credibility and marginality of the scapegoat. 
 
Unconsciousness and unanimity 
For the scapegoating process to provide a satisfactory solution to social problems, the 
scapegoaters needed to be oblivious of the innocence of their victim. They cannot see 
that their blame of the victim is arbitrary or unreasonable. In their view, the victim is 
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truly responsible for the conflicts causing the social crisis. They are unable to see how 
they transfer their own guilt, rivalries and tensions onto the substitutionary victim.63  
 
Girard demonstrates that in ancient societies the replacement of 'all against all' by the 
violent act of 'all against one' depended on all the members of the social group being 
in complete agreement as to the cause of the crisis. As rivalry and discord had been 
experienced by the whole community, the resolution had to be found by the group 
acting in concert to eliminate the perceived threat. Only then could the desired effect 
of the restoration of complete communal peace be achieved. Girard describes how the 
unanimous performance of sacred rituals in Dinka societies and the requirement of 
unanimity in Greek and Hindu myths are examples of how the ritualistic repetition of 
sacrifice would be useless if not accepted by everyone.64 
 
Girard identifies the contagion of mimetic desire, firstly, with the consensus of the 
group that one, not all, are to blame for the social crisis, and secondly, with the 
unanimous act of all acting as persecutors as they dispense with the scapegoat. In this 
unanimous act, the collusion of all in the death of the victim protected everyone from 
being subsequently blamed for the death of the victim, and in turn contributed to the 
resultant universal group harmony. Thus the most powerful force in society, the 
crowd, which was so recently threatened by its own reciprocal violence, turns that 
violence onto the victim distinguished by some difference interpreted as blameworthy 
and, by killing or expelling the victim, resolves the crisis through sacrifice. The victim 
is apprehended as the one responsible for the threat, but in reality that one is the 
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scapegoat, the persecuted one, done to death by an unconscious crowd.65 In a reversal 
of relationship, the different, isolated and powerless one bears the supposed guilt, 
while the perpetrators conceal their persecution.  
 
Marginality and credibility 
The selection of the scapegoat was dependent on the marginalisation and credibility of 
the victim. The victim needed to be familiar to the group (usually as an insider of 
some kind) but marginal and easily made an outsider. Girard demonstrates these 
elements of selection in the myth of the king, Oedipus.66 The citizens of Thebes are 
desperate to find someone to blame for the social crisis occasioned by a plague 
affecting their city. Already marginalised because of a physical deformity and his 
foreign status, Oedipus is accused of the worst crimes imaginable – parricide and 
incest – and thus becomes a credible suspect. His persecutors act together against him 
in the hope of bringing harmony and health back to the city.   
 
Moreover, Girard maintains that victims were sometimes chosen "because they 
belong to a class that is particularly susceptible to persecution rather than because of 
the crimes they have committed."67 He cites ethnic and religious minorities in this 
category, but the situation of being disabled either physically or behaviourally also 
applies, as seen in Oedipus.68 Any marginalised person, whether a known foreigner or 
one more on the inside such as a monarch or political leader could be in danger of 
being victimised.69  
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Another required element was the credibility or legitimacy of scapegoating the chosen 
victim. Such a one would have to be similar enough to the group to be an adequate 
substitution, but different enough to uphold a suspicion of guilt. For example, 
Oedipus was both insider and outsider. He was the king of Thebes, and so was well-
known and revered. Yet, he was different from the common man, as well as being 
deformed and of foreign upbringing. Furthermore, the victim needed to be someone 
on the edges of the society who lacked (or would not activate) the support of family or 
powerful connections, thus lessening the possibility of even more revenge overtaking 
the community. In Oedipus’ case, he lacked family support, with his own uncle 
ultimately usurping his position. Girard explains:  
The desire to commit an act of violence on those near us cannot be suppressed 
without a conflict; we must divert that impulse, therefore, toward the sacrificial 
victim, the creature we can strike down without fear of reprisal, since he lacks a 
champion.70  
 
As this dissertation later shows, these features of scapegoaters and scapegoats are 
apparent in the shared Australian-East Timorese history. 
 
Myth 
Integral to his ground-breaking insights into scapegoating and of particular interest to 
this thesis, is Girard's exploration of myths. Girard posits that over millennia, myths 
developed from repeated scapegoating acts that established the harmony and survival 
of the social group. In Greek myths (such as those of Oedipus and Dionysus), in 
Indian and African tales, and those of North American indigenous peoples, Girard 
detects scapegoating as the common element.71 Through oral recitation or in texts, 
myths pinpointed both the cause and the resolution of the community's mayhem. 
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Myths initiated and developed the religious and cultural identity of the group by 
recording and enacting sacrificial events to which the group's survival was 
attributed.72  Nevertheless, Girard recognises that through myths belief in the fault of 
the scapegoat was maintained, along with exoneration of the murderers.  Thus they 
were the means of camouflaging sacrificial murder by justifying sacrificial rituals.  
 
Through analysis of various myths, Girard demonstrates that these narratives of 
scapegoating were all told from the perspective of those who benefitted from the 
process – the mob. He declares: "Mythic systems of representation obliterate the 
scapegoating on which they are founded, and they remain dependent on this 
obliteration."73 Referring to the myth of Oedipus, Girard states: "Oedipus is indeed 
the responsible party, so responsible that he frees the community from all 
accountability."74 Girard's interpretation made sense of obscure phenomena in myths 
and cut through the often stylised externals to reveal a single uniform feature present 
in them all: myths are all presented from the perspective of those who benefitted from 
the process, those who blamed and then killed the victim and those who experienced 
the ensuing, if short-lived, peace.75 In order to conceal the violence towards the 
victim, the myth needed to distort the facts in some way, so that the perceived guilt of 
the victim was paramount. Kirwan explains that myths are "rationalisations or 
disguised accounts of an original act of violence, the truth of which the groups needs 
to conceal or displace from itself."76 In this way the victim's fate and the community's 
innocence were validated.  
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From Myth to Jewish Scriptures 
Girard's theses on the importance of myth to social identity and cohesion were 
expanded fundamentally through his insights into the Jewish and Christian scriptures. 
He argues that the Jewish and Christian scriptures unveiled for humanity the true 
status of the victim as an innocent scapegoat of the mob. This insight revealed the 
murderous character of societies, their religions and cultures, which were founded on 
and maintained by such practices.77 Contrary to the myths of antiquity, the Jewish 
tradition gradually challenged ancient sacrificial cultures by telling its mythic stories 
not solely from the dominant perspective of the persecutors, but through the 
perspective and voice of the victim. Girard emphasises the distinctiveness of the 
Jewish scriptures as opposed to myths:  
the initiative of Jewish authors and their critical reappraisal must undoubtedly 
be credited with the affirmation that the victim is innocent and that the culture 
founded on murder retains a thoroughly murderous character that in the end 
becomes self-destructive once the ordering and sacrificial benefits of the 
original violence have been dissipated.78  
 
The understanding of the innocence of the murdered victim and therefore of the evil 
of scapegoating found in the Jewish scriptures was a gradual revelation.79 According 
to Girard, these texts began the journey towards "complete revelation of collective 
victimage as the founding mechanism of human culture."80 The growing insight in the 
Jewish scriptures into the true nature of scapegoating is apparent in stories such as 
that of Abel who is the victim of Cain (called the founder of culture) and Joseph who 
is an innocent victim of his brothers and of Potiphar's wife (Genesis 37:1-50:26).  
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Moreover, many of the Psalms give voice to the victim:  
   Show me a sign of your favour, 
     so that those who hate me may see it and be put to shame, 
     because you, Lord, have helped me and comforted me. (Ps. 86:17 NRSV)  
and 
 Do not let my treacherous enemies rejoice over me, 
     or those who hate me without cause wink the eye. 
        (Ps. 35:19)  
 
Further, the Suffering Servant in the Book of Isaiah is shown as the victim at the 
mercy of a mob. The text declares his innocence despite accusations: "They gave him 
a grave with the wicked, a tomb with the rich, though he had done no wrong, and 
there had been no perjury in his mouth" (Isaiah 53:9). The isolated and excluded one 
is shown in these texts as the victim of the powerful, and God is seen as favouring the 
victim, not the dominant group.81 Girard states: "Throughout the Old Testament, a 
work of exegesis is in progress, operating in precisely the opposite direction to the 
usual dynamics of mythology and culture."82  
 
Girard identified the phrase "hated without cause" as one of the many biblical insights 
into the plight of the victim. It occurs in Psalm 69, and Verse 4 reads: 
More in number than the hairs of my head 
    are those who hate me without cause; 
many are those who would destroy me, 
    my enemies who accuse me falsely.  
 
The Psalm displays an understanding of the victim as the focus of the sacrificing 
crowd. The victim faces a multitude in the grip of a contagious process of blame. The 
Psalm holds no exoneration of those who hate, accuse and destroy, as their 
accusations are false. Therefore, the victim has no case to answer: he/she/they are not 
                                                            
81 Girard, The Girard Reader, 17. 
82 Girard, Things Hidden ,157. 
 
 81 
the cause of the machinations against them. The plaint of the victim is the reverse of 
the ancient mythic camouflage of the truth. 
 
 
Raymund Schwager isolates three attributes of the persecutors of the victim in Psalm 
69 which are repeated in other Psalms, that is, they are "numerous, deceitful and hate 
without cause."83 These characteristics show the distinctive perspective of the Bible 
on scapegoating and parallel elements of mimetic theory. Schwager states:  
According to Girard, the tendency towards violence is effective everywhere. Thus 
the enemies are very numerous. Violence, furthermore, has no cause of its own. It 
grows almost unnoticed when the desire for life and fulfilment deteriorates, 
becomes mimesis, and generates the vicious cycle of rivalries. Finally, violence is 
always accompanied by falsehood and mendacity.84  
 
The application of this Psalm to the Timorese people is apposite: they are small in 
number in the face of powerful enemies. The deceit and evasion accompanying their 
subjection is apparent in the documentation and clearly shows that their persecution 
was not as a result of any fault of theirs. They suffered the fate of the accused and the 
hated, but had done nothing to warrant accusation or hatred.  
 
From Myth to Gospel 
Girard regards the New Testament – particularly the Gospels – as the culmination of 
the Jewish scriptures' insights into the innocence of the victim and thus the reversal of 
myth. The Christian scriptures definitively unveil the scapegoat mechanism as the 
violent foundation of religion and culture that unconsciously dominates societies.85  
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The New Testament's reiteration of a verse from Psalm 118 is a case in point: "It was 
the stone rejected by the builders that proved to be the keystone." In Matthew's 
Gospel Jesus quotes this verse after relating the parable of the tenants who violently 
dispose of the servants and even the son of the landowner (Mt 21:42). The verse 
occurs again in Acts 4:11 in Peter's speech to the rulers and elders in which he 
proclaims the saving death and resurrection of Jesus. The victims in both situations 
display the reversal of innocent/guilty, inside/outside. The act of rejection constitutes 
them as victim, but the recognition of that fact – accomplished by the Gospel –  
capsizes the edifice of meaning previously built upon their victimisation. Thus the 
shift from mythology to the Christian scriptures results from the single major 
divergence between the two forms of text, that is, the differing interpretation of the 
victim.  
 
The reversal of the perception of the victim, argues Girard, was completed by the 
Passion of Christ. He states: "the control exercised by persecutors and their accounts 
of persecution over the whole of humanity are at stake in the Passion."86 Contrary to 
the content of myths, the Passion accounts "express the denial of magic causality and 
stereotyped accusations."87 The show trial, the torture, the manipulation by religious 
and political leaders, and the fickleness of the crowd expose the event as one more in 
an incalculable number of scapegoating events. Yet the singular difference which 
collapses the whole victimary structure, in both its previous and future manifestations, 
is the narrative which places the blame squarely where it lies: on the perpetrators of 
the victim's death or expulsion, not on the victim.  
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The Gospel of John contains a particularly cogent demonstration of scapegoating that 
reveals the movement of the process, even while the participants are unaware of what 
they are doing. It occurs in the meeting between the Pharisees and the chief priests 
where they expressed their frustration and fears concerning Jesus (Jn 11:47-54). The 
High Priest Caiaphas states: "it is better for one man to die for the people, than for the 
whole nation to be destroyed" (11:50). In this sentence Caiaphas expresses the 
traditional purpose of the scapegoat: to limit communal violence by the violent 
dispatch of one member.88 This Gospel scene thus unveils the unconscious operation 
of scapegoating. 
 
Furthermore, the Gospel illustrates the reversal of myth in the depiction of Jesus as 
the "Lamb of God" (Jn 1:29). Girard points out that while the Gospels do not 
expressly mention "scapegoat" the reality exists in the image of the lamb.89 John the 
Baptist's identification of Jesus as the Lamb of God shows the Gospel's designation of 
Jesus as victim from the beginning of his public ministry.  
 
Christ's death reveals the truth that the violent act of killing a surrogate victim 
produces a false harmony which is incapable of providing a permanent and life-giving 
foundation to society. The Passion of Christ exposes the lie of scapegoating and 
therefore condemns the false bases of religion and culture.90 The power of cultural 
and religious violence to unify humanity begins to disintegrate as the truth of this 
narrative is understood. Stork summarises:  
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The Gospels proclaim an undermining of that false peace and the 
fragmentation of a society built on violent unanimity. In other words, the New 
Testament completes the process of desacralisation by revealing the mimetic 
genesis of scapegoats and their founding and structuring function in human 
culture.91 
 
The collapse of the efficacy of scapegoating as a divinely-approved and successful 
means of building and maintaining human society had further implications. The 
"otherness" of victims as marginal, weak and expendable was unveiled as a baseless 
excuse for the blame heaped upon them. The revelation of the Gospel of the 
innocence of the victim meant that the "many against the one" could now no longer 
apply without the many being recognised as the culpable ones. 
 
Texts of Persecution 
Girard regarded myths as the record of scapegoating events. Their distortions 
concealed both the violence done to the victim and the guilt of the persecutors. The 
Jewish and Christian scriptural texts gradually unveiled the violence and instability of 
scapegoating and so demonstrated the lie at the basis of myth. 
 
Girard's earlier insights into mimetic rivalry and associated violence in literature 
unveiled the similarly false basis of human relationships which resides in notions of 
individual autonomy. He described the self-sufficiency and independence of 
characters in popular novels as the "romantic lie". It is apparent that ancient myths 
and "romantic lies" share commonality as textual records or expressions of human 
interaction. Integral to both is the element of falsehood. That element is considered in 
this dissertation as substantial in relation to the Australian relationship with East 
Timor. 
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Efforts to conceal the truth of present-day scapegoating resemble myths, and are 
termed by Girard as "texts of persecution". However, they are also different from 
myth, according to Girard, in that the victim is not sacralised or divinised (or is only 
vaguely sacralised). Texts of persecution are therefore easier to decipher than 
mythology. They represent an “intermediary zone between mythology and the more 
radial demythification” of the scriptures.92 According to Girard, this intermediate 
phase can be very violent as humans struggle to cope with the undermining of the 
victimage mechanism but continue to try to deploy it in increasingly ineffective ways 
(as was the case in East Timor in which victimisation was rife but ultimately futile). 
 
 
This dissertation demonstrates that official Australian documentary records attempt to 
soften the circumstances of the scapegoating of East Timor, to distort the facts and to 
exonerate those responsible. They are thus described as texts of persecution. In the 
analysis of these texts, the effects on the Timorese people are stated, but it is the 
Australian involvement which is the major focus. Available Australian government 
resources are used, although there remain documents which are not available or where 
access is denied on the basis of "national security" (a fact which is relevant to this 
dissertation).93 The CAVR report, presented to the United Nations by the Timorese 
government in 2005 are also used for matters from the 1970s to 1999 for clarification 
and as factual material. Newspaper and church reports detail the increasing concern of 
civil society and ordinary Australians as the solidarity movement grew in a process of 
change and conversion that made a just Australian response possible.  
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The record demonstrates that official Australian actions regarding East Timor 
were characterised by insecurity, deceit and passivity arising from a perception of 
the "national interest". Investigation shows that actions of successive 
governments were designed to ensure protection of various Australian interests at 
all costs, culminating, after the traumas of the Second World War, in 
acquiescence with Indonesian priorities, regardless of the effects on a smaller and 
weaker neighbour. In this way, the Australian documentary record witnesses to 
Australian complicity in historic persecution. Its attempted justification and 
cover-up forms it as "texts of persecution". 
 
Conversion  
Girard saw important similarities in his early work on literature and his later work on 
the relationship of myths and the Bible. The movement from the lie of self-sufficiency 
to the truth of interdependence that he found in literature is mirrored for him in the 
replacement of myth by the Bible. It is a type of "conversion". The conversion of the 
writers whom he saw as true novelists was a turning away from separation from the 
"other" (which is inherent in fantasies of self-sufficiency) to recognition of 
dependence on the "other" for the discovery of one's identity. The crucial element that 
Girard clarified in relation to mythology and the Bible was that this conversion must 
involve the recognition of violence towards the victimised and innocent "other" that 
results from self-sufficient notions of desire.94 Biblical conversion resists the 
repudiation of the other that leads to victimisation, and results in knowledge of one's 
complicity built on false notions of identity and relationality. It requires the 
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acceptance of the culpable self. It rejects the establishment of identity on the basis of 
separation, rivalry and violence.  
 
Girard also identified the influence of biblical imagery and stories on the novelists, 
seeing in their recognition of mimesis a movement similar to the unveiling of the 
violent separatism operating in myths. He states:  
I recognised the importance of the Gospels in the individual experiences of the 
novelists who came to grips with mimetic desire and came to a knowledge of 
mimetic desire. In fact, they have a kind of conversion experience, and this 
conversion is of the same nature as the shift from mythology to the Gospels.95   
 
The reversal of position towards the self and the other contained in the novelists' 
turnaround from "romantic lie" to "novelistic truth" was described by Girard as 
"existential downfall".96 A similar collapse of meaning is evident in the comparison 
between myth and Bible, with the biblical texts locating such a change around the 
victim. For example, in unveiling the innocence of Jesus and the guilt of the 
scapegoaters of Jesus, the Gospels reveal the violent and false basis of myth, of which 
scapegoating is the hidden, generating principle.97 Existential downfall brings a 
revelation of the truth of human interdependence occasioning a disintegration of 
systems of meaning. Just as the false self of the writer gives way to an 
acknowledgement of dependence on the other, so the unstable foundations of society 
are discovered to be built on the violent victimisation of the other. 
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Theological Criticism of Girard's theses 
Despite the growing influence of Girard's theories in various academic fields, there 
have been major criticisms levelled against it, including its scope and method. Girard 
has been accused of presenting a theory which purports to explain all aspects of 
human nature. Furthermore, it is claimed that his theory lacks scientific rigour as it is 
unable to be verified by scientific controls.98 He is said to discard larger 
methodological frameworks in favour of historical particularities and reference to a 
limited number of novels to construct his proposals.99  Because of the focus of this 
dissertation, I will focus on major theological criticisms.  
It is claimed that Girard's work it is not consistent with traditional theological 
positions, in that it diminishes the traditional Christian understanding of God's salvific 
work. In this regard, John Milbank questions social theories based on notions of 
human conflict, such as Girard's.100 He maintains that Christian theology is itself a 
social theory, one that is revealed by God and based on peace. Drawing on Milbank's 
and Girard's insights into anthropology and revelation, Alison maintains that while 
God's perspective on humanity has indeed been revealed, it has also to be discovered 
in the practicalities of human life.101  
Furthermore, Girard's earlier works did not include positive mimesis, the imitation of 
goodness, nor did he make room for deeper understanding of sacrifice in the Christian 
sense, particularly in the sacrifice of Christ on the cross. In this regard a major 
contribution was made by Raymund Schwager, whom Girard found a valuable 
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interrogator and interpreter.102 He maintained that Girard presented a knowledge of 
human desire which appears to be beyond the writings of anthropologists and 
psychologists. Instead, states Schwager, he discovered a "profound psychology that is 
closely related to Christian faith."103 As a result of his interactions with Schwager, 
Girard changed his mind and expanded his understanding of traditional theological 
doctrines, such as on Christ’s sacrifice. He explained this in an interview:  
I now accept calling this 'sacrifice' in a special sense.  Because one person did it, 
God the Father pardons all, in effect. I had avoided the word 'scapegoat' for Jesus, 
but now I agree with Raymund Schwager that he is scapegoat for all - except now 
in reverse fashion, for theologically considered the initiative comes from God 
rather than simply from human beings with their scapegoat mechanism.104 
 
Additionally, Neil Ormerod questions Girard's emphasis on desire as mimetic. 
Distinguishing between elicited and natural desire, he maintains that Bernard 
Lonergan's appreciation of the desire for God as natural to human beings provides a 
"necessary complement" to Girard's view of desire as mimetic.105 He points to 
Lonergan's recognition of human desire for the good as providing "an alternative 
account of the origins of culture distinct from mimetic rivalry and the way of 
sacrificial violence suggested by Girard."106 In response to at least some of this 
criticism, Girard has affirmed mimetic desire as intrinsically showing that humans 
have a desire for God.107  
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Other criticism includes that voiced by Kevin Mongrain, who compares the thought of 
Girard with that of Hans Urs van Baltasar, showing certain deficiencies from 
Baltasar's point of view about Girard's position on human nature and God.108  
Mongrain states that Balthasar was writing in the 1970s and concentrated mainly on 
Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World. He found there that Girard did not 
seem to give enough credence to the action of God in the life of humanity, as though 
God were sitting on the sidelines. Even the death of Christ appeared to be solely from 
the human point of view. After reading Balthasar, however, Girard made some 
concession to his thought as he developed his own theories over the next thirty years. 
Mongrain notes that Girard developed his theory of mimetic desire with an increasing 
emphasis on good mimesis leading to the following of Christ.109  
 
I believe that Girard's willingness to learn through his interactions with theologians 
indicates that he saw his work as a process rather than a fixed set of theories. When 
applied to the relationship between Australia and East Timor, as attempted in this 
dissertation, his insights appear to me to present a comprehensive and coherent 
schema with which to consider the suffering which occurred. Based as they are in 
human experience and knowledge in many areas, Girard's theories provide release 
from the limitations of solely political or solely spiritual explanations. Furthermore, 
interpretation of the historical events in the light of the victimage mechanism 
challenges the duality which characterises most present-day historical investigation, 
including that concerning Australia-East Timor history. To propose the Christian 
revelation as the interpreter of the human sciences was not only ambitious, but proves 
both satisfying and successful, even if unfinished.  Girard's work links literary 
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criticism, anthropology, philosophy, ancient historical and literary studies, scriptural 
studies and theology in a tour de force which honours the human endeavour of each 
discipline to find meaning, while at the same time revealing their interdependence.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the fundamentals of mimetic theory in order to lay the 
groundwork for this dissertation’s analysis. The outline is expanded in the following 
chapter by means of a closer examination of Girard's concept of the scapegoated 
victim. The dissertation then shows how mimetic theory is a valuable means of 
reflection on the relationship between Australia and East Timor. The violence 
characterising the historical situations affecting both nations can be seen as the 
violence of the dominant group towards the weaker, in order to protect and maintain 
security. In succeeding chapters I draw on Girard's thought to demonstrate how 
official Australian actions towards East Timor were those of violence towards the 
victim, sacrificed on significant occasions to ward off external threats and strengthen 
relationships with larger neighbours.
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CHAPTER THREE  




This chapter outlines the methodological approach taken in the dissertation to the 
interpretation of the history of the relationship between Australia and East Timor. It 
does this by showing how a methodological framework can be deployed using 
Girard’s notion of the "victim" as the main interpretive category.  
 
Girard's precise definition of "victim" is applied to East Timor throughout the 
dissertation. In Girard's terminology, "victim" is a technical term which designates a 
person or group scapegoated by others to achieve release from fear or threat. The term 
is applicable to East Timor which was adversely affected by the desires, rivalries and 
conflicts of larger powers and which suffered widespread death and destruction as a 
result. A review of historical facts shows East Timor as small, weak and expendable, 
fulfilling the requirements of Girard's designation of "victim". The dissertation 
concentrates mainly on Australia's involvement in that process. It demonstrates the 
Australian role in the relationship as that of persecutor, but one which ultimately 
underwent a conversion and supported the victim. 
 
In Girard's view, the falsity of the scapegoat mechanism was unveiled by the Gospel 
revelation of the innocent victim Christ. Girard declares: "The Crucifixion is what 
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highlights the victimary mechanism and explains history."1 Thus an interpretation of 
the history of East Timor using Girard's concept of victim as its pivotal instrument is 
necessarily Christian.  
 
Two discussions emerging from this Christian theological approach are employed to 
explain the interpretive power of the victim as demonstrated by East Timor. The first 
concerns the identification of the innocent victim Christ with all victims throughout 
his life and death. East Timor exemplifies the "innocent victim" its recent history. 
Secondly, the understanding of Christ as the innocent victim has implications for the 
response of Christ's followers to victims. As the church is the "body of Christ" formed 
by the Eucharist, the Christian identity is that of being one with Christ, willing to 
pattern themselves on him. This is expressed by imitation of Christ's values and 
priorities, among which his concern for victims is the paramount expression of his 
love and imitation of the Father. As a result, the response of the church to the violence 
inflicted on victims such as the Timorese people is of the essence of Christianity. This 
is of particular importance to me and receives strong emphasis in the dissertation. The 
requirement of the church to imitate Christ in order to identify with his concerns is 
juxtaposed in this chapter with occurrences of its historical neglect and victimisation 
of others. Such historical facts point to the gradual, even imperceptible, nature of the 
revelation of the victim.  
 
While the involvement of the Australian nation was not that of a Christian entity, the 
recognition of the victim identified by Girard as influencing the modern world had 
significant and continuing Australian effects. Among these are the tendency for 
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parties in a conflict to each claim to be victim, a feature of the history that can be 
detected in Australia's relationship with East Timor. Furthermore, concern for human 
rights, also an effect of the revelation of the victim, emerged and prevailed in 
Australians as they recognised the victimisation of the Timorese people.  
 
Thus the relationship between Australia and East Timor in this dissertation is 
interpreted through Girard's exposition of the innocence of the victim, which in turn is 
dependent on the Gospel revelation for its completion.  
 
The "victim" - a Girardian structural term  
The contemporary understanding of "victim" as passive and helpless is almost 
universal and presents dangers when employing it regarding East Timor and its 
history. The suggestion of weakness in popular usage does nothing to honour the 
Timorese people's responses to their experiences nor to the way they see themselves. 
A new institute of memory in Timor-Leste, Chega! National Centre – Through 
Memory to Hope, demonstrates this awareness. It declines to use the word "victim" 
and replaces it with "survivor".2  As signalled in the Introduction to this thesis, the 
concept of "victim" as Girard uses it is different from popular associations such as the 
self-styled martyr and other demeaning connotations.  
  
In Girardian theory, the "victimage mechanism" is a structural term which refers to 
the sacrifice of a scapegoat, whereby an entity is burdened with the responsibility for 
some social threat or ill. Internal violence was traditionally avoided by the community 
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by placing the responsibility for the threat upon a scapegoat.3 For Girard, the role of 
the victim was pivotal to the development of cultures and religions. Societies were 
dependent on victims for their very existence. Without the convenient and unprotected 
scapegoat onto which the pent-up rivalries or fears of a community could be focused, 
violence had the capacity to weaken the group, even to extinction.4 Furthermore, 
mimetic theory shows that the victim was not seen as passive or self-absorbed. On the 
contrary, the achievement of being responsible for the return of harmony and 
cohesion in the group led to the victim’s being considered as "sacred".5  
 
The application of Girard's concept of victim to East Timor allows the history to be 
interpreted in a particular and insightful way. That interpretation necessarily affects 
the way that the Australian involvement is viewed, as Australia participated in the 
persecution. The Timorese people held what is termed the "epistemological privilege" 
of the victim.6 Being the subject of oppression, victims have a particular insight into 
the situation which is denied their persecutors. In their poverty and friendlessness they 
can see and understand from a unique angle. This does not necessarily endow them 
with superiority in either morality or insight, but it does mean that their view is 
different from that of their oppressors.7 Their perception can lack the distortion that is 
inherent in being part of the mob, and thus carries a unique authority.8 Alison 
expresses this concept as the "intelligence of the victim" which he defines as "the 
discovery of the sort of human beings we are, and how we tend to build our personal 
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and social identities on a series of exclusions."9 The victim reveals that the exercise of 
retaining power and privilege by way of scapegoating is a distortion of humanity. In 
the Timorese case, the influence of Christian faith augmented this perception with a 
belief in their identification with the suffering Christ.10 Thus through Girard's 
exposition of the victim mechanism, a means of "seeing through violence" has been 
made available. 
 
Effects of the biblical revelation 
The Gospel reveals the truth of the victim 
Of paramount importance to mimetic theory is the concept of the innocence of the 
victim, revealed in the death and resurrection of Christ. Alison states: 
...the resurrection brings a completely new perception of what Jesus' life and death 
had been about: the Father's interpretation of Jesus' life as hated without cause. By 
giving him back, the Father permitted a fresh rereading of the death of Jesus, and 
of his life and self-interpretation leading up to it, and thus affords a completely 
new perspective on human victims.11  
 
As Jesus' passion approached, the Gospel quotes Psalm 118 to point to the revelation 
which he was about to achieve through his death: "The stone which the builders 
rejected has become the cornerstone" (Mt 21:42). The guilt for Jesus' death was 
placed on the shoulders of those to whom it belonged, so eroding the violent culture 
of sacrifice. As the gradual revelation of the innocence of the victim shown in the 
Jewish scriptures reached its climax in the death and resurrection of Christ, the 
premise on which societies and their religions and cultures had been built – the guilt 
of the sacrificial victim – was revealed as false. ⁠  
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Through the resurrection of Jesus Christ, the innocence of the victim is revealed and, 
with it, the instability of human cultures which are built on the lie of the guilt of 
victims. Girard states: "The Passion unveiled the sacrificial origin of humanity once 
and for all. It dismantled the sacred and revealed its violence."12 The proclamation of 
the Gospel enabled in a powerful way humanity's journey away from sacrificial 
scapegoating, and revealed the mendacity of the basis upon which societies were built 
and maintained. Christ's death and resurrection subverts sacrificial scapegoating by 
revealing the victim as innocent. Girard's insights into this phenomenon have 
application in the Timorese instance, and introduce concepts which have far-reaching 
consequences, particularly in the way forgiveness and the revelation of the victim are 
importantly linked.  
 
The biblical revelation of the innocence of the victim has made gradual but 
fundamental changes in human relations. Conspicuous among these is the growing 
concern for human rights, a reality that accompanies ambit claims for the status of 
victim. Paradoxically, violence has simultaneously increased. 
 
Human rights 
Girard demonstrates the relentless advance of concern for victims which, from small 
beginnings in the Christian message, has now become a distinguishing aspect of the 
modern world, without parallel in antiquity.13 Christ's unveiling of the victim 
mechanism has brought a comprehensive, if gradual, change towards victims. Girard 
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notes that concern for victims "is unifying the world for the first time in history."14 He 
states that it "is the secular mask of Christian love" and that "there is no doubt that it 
stems from Christianity."15 Girard claims that this concern evolved as more and more 
focussed and that "in no other culture has anything even remotely similar ever 
existed."16 He refers to the vindication of victims becoming more apparent, with "new 
hidden victims of society" continually being discovered.17 Despite appalling 
backsliding, for example in the Nazi era, the concern for victims is a dominant value, 
even a "calling" in today's world.18 I argue that this concern for the victim was the 
main driver in the conversion of Australians to the Timorese cause. Significantly, it is 
this value that assisted the Timorese in making claims for their independence and 
freedom, but was also ironically used as a justification for their oppression (as will be 
shortly discussed).  
 
Increase in violence 
Parallel to the growth in awareness of the victim and human rights however, has been 
a paradoxical increase in violence. As scapegoating could no longer claim divine 
approbation, the "sacred" religious and cultural protections for society, based on the 
violent sacrifice of a victim, began to disintegrate.19 On the surface, this situation may 
appear to be beneficial, with humanity privy to the forces which condemned the 
innocent. One effect of the collapse of this previously successful means of social 
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control, however, is an increase, not a decrease, of violence.20 Societies can no longer 
quell their own violence by scapegoating because they cannot maintain the fiction of 
the victim's guilt. As a result, violence rises because of humanity's failing efforts to 
seize the former effects of the mechanism: calming crises by blaming and punishing 
satisfactory victims. But as the resumption of harmony can no longer be counted on, 
more and more violence is seen as necessary to achieve the original result. Girard 
states: "As in the case of drugs, consumers of sacrifice tend to increase the doses 
when the effect becomes more difficult to achieve."21 Clear evidence of such 
accelerating violence towards the Timorese people during their recent history is 
presented in this dissertation. 
 
Claiming the status of victim 
Wolfgang Palaver writes of the increasing concern for victims which accompanies 
this world-wide increase in violence as the double-edged effect of the desacralisation 
of scapegoating. He refers to: 
...the ambiguous cachet of victimhood that marks, on the one hand, the biblical 
overcoming of the scapegoat mechanism leading to modern human rights and the 
temptation of vengeful lament typical of modern terrorism, and many more 
distortions connected to the biblically enabled recognition of the victim, on the 
other.22 
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He then traces the effects of the perversion of concern for victims when it is expressed 
as "a violent exploitation of the claim of being victimized."23 He cites radical Islam, 
and the West's recent "war on terror" as examples of extreme justification of violent 
response to a sense of victimhood, either personally or on behalf of others.24 Girard 
indicates that the perversion that claims the status of victim can be used for power 
over others and even persecution.25  Aggressors are loath to admit to aggression and 
easily apply to themselves the condition of victim. Even a cursory reading of 
humanity's current situation shows the truth of Girard's statement: "The aggressor has 
always already been attacked."26 The modern phenomenon of people’s appropriating 
the title of victim to themselves is a result of certain effects of the growing 
understanding of the victim's innocence revealed by the Bible.  
 
 
The evidence presented in this dissertation establishes that there was a tendency for 
Australians to consider themselves to be the victim in the historical circumstances 
discussed. The threat to Australian security and the fear it engendered gave 
Australians the basis for considering themselves as the victims, a role which then 
allowed the victimising of another. It is in this sense that Australia's actions towards 
Timor can be interpreted as scapegoating for the purposes of Australian security. As 
will be discussed, Australia initially acted out of fear for its own protection, thus 
becoming involved in the invasions which decimated the Timorese during World War 
II. Some decades later, Australia complied with the Indonesian invasion and 
occupation not from fear, but from a calculation that its overall security would be 
enhanced by such complicity. Moreover, Australian financial gain from the resources 
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of the Timor Sea also gave motivation for supporting Indonesia. Material gain and the 
desire for security resulted in violence towards a weaker neighbour. While Australians 
certainly did not actively kill or maim Timorese, the responses to a number of 
Timorese situations can be demonstrated to be among Palaver's "many more 
distortions" of the concern for victims quoted above. This victimisation suffered a 
hiatus when the reality of the Timorese people's suffering became clear to the 
Australian population, and a moment of conversion towards the victim overtook the 
nation as a whole.  
 
Christ identifies with victims 
Growth in human rights, increased violence and claims to victimhood are notable 
results of the revelation of the victim which have some bearing on this dissertation. 
But the category of "victim" to explain East Timor's history is more fully 
demonstrated through the biblical witness that Christ's innocence as victim applies to 
"all analogous victims."27 Christ, in fact, identifies with victims and is, in some way, 
in and with all victims. Before going to his death as victim at the hands of the 
authorities and the crowd, Jesus championed the poor and oppressed, the victims of 
society. He consistently demonstrated in his human interactions that God favours the 
reproachable or oppressed "other". Jesus willingly conversed with the Samaritan 
woman who was considered the "lesser other" because of her nationality as well as 
her gender – an engagement which left his disciples perplexed (Jn 4:27). He was 
criticised for eating with sinners (Mk 2:16) and defended the woman caught in 
adultery (Jn 8:1-11). He taught that the poor widow who put in the least actually 
contributed the most (Mk 12:41-44). His parables reversed prevailing notions of 
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goodness; for example, it was the humble sinner who found God's favour, not the 
paragon of virtue (Lk 18:9-14), and the repentant, ingrate son was forgiven and loved 
by God as much as the dutiful son (Lk 15:11-32). Furthermore, in the parable of the 
lost sheep (Lk 15:3-7) God as shepherd shows a willingness to leave the ninety-nine, 
the community, "in the wilderness" in order to pursue and tend the lost one, thus 
presenting a complete reversal of the accepted norm of sacrificing the one for the 
good of the many.28  
 
Christ's whole human life showed him bestowing on society's victims the full 
outpouring of his compassion. His final recorded parable in Matthew, that of the Last 
Judgement (Mt 25), places those victims at the centre of his concern. Of ultimate 
importance, however, is the declaration in that parable, that what is done to them is 
done to him. This identification with the oppressed is depicted again where Saul, on a 
mission of vengeance against those who followed the way of Jesus, is confronted with 
that same Jesus identifying himself with those being oppressed. "I am Jesus, and you 
are persecuting me" (Acts 9:5). Convicted as a blasphemer and a criminal, Jesus died 
as a social outcast. His identification with victims was complete. 
 
The Eucharist forms the Church as Christ's body 
The apotheosis of Christ's identification with victims at his death continues to be 
made present in the Catholic Church. This is accomplished through the Eucharist 
where Christ's self-giving death is re-presented in obedience to him, "This is my body 
which will be given for you; do this as a memorial of me" (Luke  22:19). The 
                                                            
28 James Alison, Raising Abel: the recovery of the eschatological imagination, 2nd ed. (London: 
Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 2010), 35. 
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fundamental self-understanding of the church as Christ's body existed from earliest 
times: "Now you together are Christ's body" (1 Cor. 12:27). St Augustine states: 
"When you hear 'The body of Christ' you reply 'Amen'. You are saying Amen to what 
you are."29  
 
But to be the body of Christ in the world is to be the body of the victim Christ, with 
all the identification with victims which that status entails. It is through the Eucharist 
that the church is formed as the body of the victim, Christ. The Eucharist makes 
present the sacrifice of Christ on the cross through which he undermined sacrificial 
scapegoating, revealed the innocence of the victim, and made possible a new way of 
being in relationship. While the human rights discourse is important as an expression 
of this concern for the victim, Hodge notes that such discourse "requires a socio-
political body to make it effective."30 The church's "authentic promotion of the 
innocent victim, as socio-political body in history, enacting its faith in ecclesial 
solidarity with the self-giving victim, Christ", has the capacity to provide this 
effectiveness.31  
 
Robert Daly makes clear the fundamental purpose of the Eucharist as forming the 
body of Christ and influencing human sociality, stating:  
The transformation that brings about the Eucharistic presence happens for us, that 
we may become more fully and more truly the Body of Christ. The whole purpose 
is the eschatological transformation of the participants.32  
 
                                                            
29 Early Church Texts, “Augustine on the nature of the Sacrament of the Eucharist Sermon 272,” 
accessed 12 October 2017, 
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William Cavanaugh expands further: "our assimilation to the body of Christ means 
that we then become food for the world, to be broken, given away, consumed."33 In 
becoming the body of Christ the church says to the world: "This is my body which 
will be given for you" (Lk 22:19).  
 
Such a claim has weighty consequences. As practical examples, Hodge and 
Cavanaugh trace the fortunes of the church in two societies where the state had 
become the enemy of the people, victimising them for its own preservation and 
ideology: East Timor and Chile. Cavanaugh describes the Chilean church's initial 
acquiescence to the state, and its Eucharistic journey towards championing the 
victimised people. He presents the integral links between Christ, victims of the state 
and the church's liturgy: "a Christian practice of the political is embodied in the 
Eucharist, the remembering of Jesus' own torture at the hands of the powers of this 
world."34  
 
Further, Cavanaugh explores the Eucharist as producing "a communion stronger than 
that of any nation-state."35 A threat is posed to victimising regimes by the counter-
politics formed in the people through the Eucharist.36 As Hodge explains in relation to 
East Timor, the human reality which can be formed through the Eucharist is one 
which exposes victimisation and enables people to work in solidarity for the 
oppressed.37 In both Chile and East Timor the church grew into exemplifying Christ's 
identification with the victim, willing to become the self-giving Eucharist with and in 
                                                            
33 William T. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics and the Body of Christ (Malden,  
    MA.: Blackwell Publishing, 1998), 232. 
34 Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 2. 
35 Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 18. 
36 Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, 120. 
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him. Growing concern for victims among Catholics in both countries demonstrated 
the authenticity of their celebration of the Eucharistic sacrifice.38 In the case of 
Australia this witness was crucial for the growing solidarity with Timorese people and 
for the integrity of the church as it moved towards supporting the victimised people.   
 
Imitating Christ 
The implications of being the body of Christ for Christians and for the church as a 
whole are fundamental. If Christ identifies with victims, then the Christian's and the 
church's project of following Christ, patterning oneself on him and imitating him, 
means similar identification with the world's victims. Girard underlines the depth of 
that identification: 
The entire edifice of culture rests on the cornerstone that is the stone the builders 
rejected. Christ is that stone in visible form. That is why there can be no victim 
who is not Christ, and no one can come to the aid of a victim without coming to 
the aid of Christ.39 
 
In the neighbour, especially the vulnerable, the Christian now sees the face of Christ, 
the loving and forgiving victim.40 Daly agrees:  
We, who are affluent, know instinctively that if we want a comfortable, secure, 
safe life, we must insulate ourselves from victims. But if we are Christians, when 
we are doing that, we will be isolating ourselves from Jesus Christ, the victim. We 
can't have it both ways.41  
 
Clearly, Christ's revelation of the victim mechanism has profound consequences for 
Christians. I argue that the victimisation of the Timorese people constitutes the 
                                                            
38 John Paul II,  Mane Nobiscum Domine, 2004, accessed 2011. 
https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_letters/2004/documents/hf_jp-
ii_apl_20041008_mane-nobiscum-domine.html 
39 René Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, trans. S. Bann and M. Metteer 
   (Stanford, Cal: Stanford University Press, 1978), 429. 
40 Terry Veling, For You Alone: Emmanuel Levinas and the Answerable Life (Eugene, Oregon: 
Cascade Books, 2014), 4. 
41 Daly, Sacrifice Unveiled, 222. 
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victimisation of Christ, and became an issue that challenged the comfortable, affluent 
Australian identity. 
 
The interpretation of history through the eyes of the victim entails for Christians the 
responsibility of imitating God incarnated in Jesus Christ. Girard states:  
Recognising imitation and its ambivalence seems to be the only way of feeling 
that it is still possible to go from reciprocity to relationship, from negative 
contagion to a form of positive contagion. This is what the imitation of Christ 
means.42  
 
The imitation of Christ in East Timor was crucial in formulating a nonviolent 
response to oppression and violence. The content of the imitation of Christ has been 
comprehensively discussed by Hodge in relation to the Timorese people influenced by 
their Catholic faith in Resisting Violence and Victimisation. In particular, he discusses 
the willingness to renounce revenge, the acts of forgiveness and willingness to be 
forgiven, and the attempts to build positive relationships despite the violence of 
neighbours and of state oppression.43 The response of the Australian populace was 
greatly influenced by the Christ-like positions that the Timorese took in response to 
violence which showed them to be both innocent and morally upright. Moreover, the 
responses of the Catholic Church in Australia to the situation of East Timor, to be 
discussed further, comprised sincere efforts to respond to the victim in the manner of 
Christ, but contained instances where the challenge of the imitation of Christ proved 
overwhelming. 
 
                                                            
42 Girard, Battling to the End, 109. 
43 Hodge, Resisting Violence and Victimisation, 195, 190, 142. 
 
 107 
Concealment of the revelation  
The formation of the church as the body of Christ identifying with victims is, 
however, incomplete. The revelation of the innocence of the victim can be concealed 
even by Christianity itself. Cavanaugh muses on whether "the unfaithfulness of the 
church in the present age is based to some extent precisely on its failure to take itself 
seriously as the continuation of Christ's body in the world, and to conform itself, body 
and soul, not to the world but to Christ (Rom 12:2)."44 Girard's claims that 
Christianity is the means through which humanity can approach an understanding of 
the violent foundations of human societies, including religions, is challenged by the 
spectacle of violent Christian history. Referring to the alignment of church and state 
under Constantine, the Crusades, the Inquisition and forced conversions as examples 
of Christian violence through the centuries, Stork demonstrates that Girard's argument 
cannot be used "as an apologetic for historical Christianity."45 The exposition of the 
victim mechanism can never minimise atrocities by Christians or authorised Christian 
leaders or churches.46 Similarly, Hodge acknowledges that the Church constantly 
faces the danger of the return of sacred violence "through exclusion, exploitation, 
authoritarianism and repression."47 Christianity, therefore, has shown that it does not 
do away with violence on the level of culture, but rather undermines its ability to use 
violence to control violence. As previously discussed, the breakdown of the victimage 
mechanism has seen extreme violence increasing, showing that Christian communities 
are as susceptible to the contagion of violence as any others.48 
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Christian violence, however, does not pose some type of proof negating the message 
of Jesus. On the contrary, if somewhat startlingly, it proves its truth. Fleming clarifies:  
That Christians would mistake terribly Jesus's message, in fact, tends not to 
undermine this message but to corroborate it in important respects by attesting 
historically to the insidiousness, pervasiveness, contagiousness, and seeming 
intractability of violence in culture.49  
 
He further states that "one might say that historical Christianity became ... one of the 
principal mechanisms for hiding its own revelation."50  Such concealment is shown, 
for example, in the reversion of Christianity to previous sacrificial structures.51 
Certain atonement theories such as the penal substitution theory, common in the 
Western Church and which influence preaching and practice in some local churches, 
owe much to archaic forms of sacrifice.52  Similarly, the concealment of the Gospel 
message of love by the Christian victimisation of millions of people blatantly echoes 
historical victimage. Hence the explanation of human history provided by the 
crucifixion is not an automatic cure, as though the mere knowledge of the victim 
mechanism would bring it to an end. Not only does the crucifixion reveal the lie of a 
peace built on violence, but highlights what exists, that is, the human tendency 
towards that very violence. 
 
Regardless of the slowness of human stumbling towards recognition of the victim, 
Girard contends that the source of the demythologisation of religion, through which 
the genesis of religion is discovered to be violence against an innocent person, has 
come from the Christian religion itself.53  However, he warns: "Christianity 
demystifies religion. Demystification, which is good in the absolute, has proven bad 
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in the relative, for we were not prepared to shoulder its consequences. We are not 
Christian enough."54 The consequences of the revelation include the knowledge that 
as violence stems from the reciprocity inherent in mimetic rivalry, the choice of 
whom we imitate has profound implications for humanity. Being "not Christian 
enough" is an indictment of relationships between individuals and within groups. The 
only relationship not subject to negative mimesis is with God, the one who is not 
subject to rivalry or violence, the totally "other" who identifies with victims and 
stands with them.55   
 
Conclusion: East Timor as victim interprets the history 
Employment of Girard's concept of "victim" to throw light on the Australian-East 
Timorese relationship thus requires deliberate contemplation of the Christian 
revelation. Christ's identification with victims and his repudiation of violence towards 
them erodes humanity's usual apparatus for attaining peace. It unveils the structures 
by which the security of one depends on discrimination against another. As a result, a 
Girardian analysis of the troubling historical relationship between the peoples of East 
Timor and Australia presents an uncomfortable and dark side to Australian 
government policies and actions. A choice needed to be made about whether the 
Timorese people were to be viewed as a security threat or enemy, for example as a 
base for communist operations, as a rival with others for resources, or as a victim of 
the politics of larger powers. Moreover, that Australians may have unconsciously seen 
their own relationship as a nation to the US, communist USSR, and Indonesia 
reflected in the weakness and vulnerability of East Timor, and wanted to avoid it, is 
also possible.  
                                                            
54 Girard, Battling to the End, x. 
55 Hodge, Resisting Violence and Victimisation, 79; Girard, Things Hidden, 218. 
 
 110 
Nevertheless, all these factors point to the Australian government's preoccupation 
with the Australian place in the competitive security, political and economic realities 
of their region. Through the Australian strategies of gain and dominance, and of 
perceiving itself as a victim, Australia ignored its own complicity. Hodge states: "For 
Girard, the perennial human problem is the cycle of violence that blinds people to 
their own place in distorted social relations."56 Thus it is apparent that merely political 
explanations of the basis for the relationship between Australia and East Timor are 
inadequate. They are incapable of analysing human experience in ways which give 
due regard to the forces which move people through fear, desire and love. 
 
The use of the concept of "victim" to gain meaning from historical events presents 
choices as to where one stands. Hodge expresses this by stating that Girard's central 
existential question is "in whose desire will I dwell and find direction for being. In 
biblical terms, where will I pitch my tent? On top of the victim (with the mob), or 
alongside the victim (on the Cross)?"57 Making that choice and embracing the 
responsibilities which accompany it confront us with Levinas's questions concerning 
ways in which, as Veling states, "I can be responsible for that which I did not do, and 
take upon myself a distress which is not mine."58 But the confrontation takes on a 
particular character in the Australian-Timorese case: recognising that for which I am 
responsible as part of a complicit political body. The Australian tendency to claim 
positive aspects of one's history (as other nationalities do) requires also the 
willingness to shoulder the more negative past. In that sense I am responsible, we are 
responsible, for the doing and for the distress.
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Application of Girard's theories to the history of the relationship between Australia 
and East Timor presents an interpretation which arises from the revelation of the 
innocence of the victim in the Gospel. The value judgements applied are connected to 
characteristics traditionally claimed by Australians, and as such, are fair measures of 
the Australian side of the relationship.  
 
This research shows that Australian insecurity was expressed by dependence on 
traditional patrons such as Britain and the United States, and increasingly on the large 
and developing neighbour, Indonesia. Australian resolutions of the dilemmas posed 
by its small population, distance from cultural partners, and indefensible coastline 
caused untold suffering to the Timorese people. They were used as expendable pawns 
in the regional events perceived as threatening to Australians. In Girardian terms, East 
Timor became the scapegoat of Australian fear, sacrificed for Australian protection. 
 
The three chapters in this section have similarities in that the historical events and 
their official Australian documentary records are investigated to ascertain to what 
extent East Timor could be described as Australia's "scapegoat". The similarity of 
organisation of content ensures that both Australia and East Timor are discussed 
fairly. Isolation of one historical period in which East Timor was scapegoated could 
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risk applying the concept on a limited scale, whereas analysis of the three historical 
periods which saw the greatest connection between the two nations allows for a more 
comprehensive assessment of the Timorese position in relation to Australia. In each of 
the chapters, Girard's formulation of "texts of persecution" is applied to the official 
record. 
 
Chapter Four considers events of the Second World War. East Timor was scapegoated 
by Australia and Japan in the pursuit of their mimetic and conflicting desires: Japan 
for expansion and Australia for security. East Timorese people befriended 
Australians, but were victimised by the presence of Australian troops (which drew the 
Japanese to Timor), by the success of the Australians (which caused continual 
increase in Japanese troops) and by the subsequent official disregard, or even disdain, 
of the wartime history. The declaration "Your friends do not forget you" testifies to 
the official relationship being characterised by Australian self-interest, one which did 
not reciprocate the friendship of the Timorese. Despite traditional Australian 
celebration of wartime exploits, for which the Australian action in Timor qualifies as 
highly successful, the Timor campaign is generally ignored. The documentary record 
is fairly described in Girardian terms as "texts of persecution". 
 
Chapter Five deals with the Indonesian invasion of 1975 when East Timor was again 
scapegoated by powerful neighbours, as Indonesia and Australia attempted to protect 
themselves from communism. The shared mimetic desire of the two large nations 
caused mutual dependence which was also influenced by shared dependence on the 
United States. Relationship with the East Timorese people was considered of lesser 
value than that with the Indonesians, despite the wartime connection between 
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Australians and Timorese. Indonesia's expansionist desire for the whole of the island 
of Timor was supported by Australian governments through deceit and complicity, to 
the extent that those who murdered six Australian-based journalists in East Timor as 
the invasion drew near have not been brought to account.  
 
Chapter Six examines the 24 years of the Indonesian occupation. The official 
Australian  documentary record is again explained by Girard's concept of "texts of 
persecution", as they consist of bias, embellishment and exoneration concerning 
Indonesian actions and policies. In particular, official Australian statements on the 
Santa Cruz massacre show concern to strengthen the relationship with Indonesia at the 
expense of that with East Timor. A case study exemplifies the victimage mechanism 
occurring at macro and micro levels in the Australia-East Timor relationship: the case 
of Monsignor da Costa Lopes and former Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam. 
The study shows the four attributes of scapegoating identified by Girard: crisis, crime, 












WORLD WAR II 
 
Introduction 
The first situation which calls for focused attention is the Australian relationship with 
East Timor (Portuguese Timor) in World War II. This episode was the first major 
connection between the Australian and Timorese people and was highly significant in 
the formation of the relationship, influencing subsequent historical periods. This 
chapter demonstrates that East Timor had the hallmarks of the scapegoat, but that it 
was Australia that predominantly perceived itself as the victim. Furthermore, the 
chapter shows that readily available texts, including those of government, can be 
described fairly as "texts of persecution".   
 
The protection of Australian security in the face of Japanese aggression was attempted 
by means of an Australian invasion of Portuguese Timor in December 1941. This 
move contained features of scapegoating as described by Girard: a group perceiving 
itself as under threat and thus a victim; the willingness by that group to protect itself 
by sacrificing another; and the sacrificed party being vulnerable and experiencing 
suffering. The distortion of the Australian record completes the Girardian 
interpretation, showing that readily available Australian documents are "texts of 
persecution", that is, modern day myths. 
Summary - World War II   
The Australian intervention in Portuguese Timor was in response to fears that the 
proximity of Timor may pose a threat should the Japanese incorporate it into its 
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expansionary plans during World War II. As a result, Australia sent a few hundred 
commandos of the 2/2 and 2/4 Independent Companies to Dili, the capital of 
Portuguese Timor in December 1941, against the express wishes of the Portuguese 
administration.1 Two months later the Japanese also invaded East Timor. The 
Australians, assisted by many Timorese, conducted a guerrilla campaign over 14 
months against Japanese troops. The highly successful Australian commandos 
assisted by the intrepid and friendly Timorese harassed the Japanese even though they 
were far outnumbered for the whole operation. Towards the end of 1942 thousands 
more Japanese troops were inserted in response to the Australians' success and the 
general unwillingness of the Timorese to capitulate. The exploits of the Australian 
commandos in resisting a much larger Japanese force have been documented. 
Dunn refers to the operation as "one of the few success stories in a rather bleak 
year."2  Cleary notes that "when all other Allied resistance in Asia had ceased to 
exist, this small group of Australians showed that the all-conquering Japanese 
could be matched and beaten.3 Returned Australian soldiers (men who were 
deeply affected by their Timor experience) and relatives of the returned 
Australian soldiers (in acknowledgement of the effect on their fathers of the 
loyalty of the Timorese) also produced material to recount their experiences and 
their appreciation of their Timorese allies.4  
 
The withdrawal of the Australians in 1943 left the Timorese without support. It 
allowed the Japanese complete control, contributing to further death and 
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destruction, as the Japanese remained on the island until the end of the War. A 
conservative estimate of consequent Timorese deaths at that time is 40,000 (all 
civilians) as a result of starvation, Allied bombing, and Japanese reprisals.5 
Substantial Australian sympathy for the Timorese has remained a cause of dissension 
in Australia as the death and destruction experienced by the Timorese formed a 
backdrop to events in subsequent decades.  
 
Australian fear of invasion 
Discussion of Australian presence in Timor begins with analysis of the perceived 
threat of invasion of Australia in World War II. It underlines the bitter poignancy of 
the Timorese experience as victim of the mimetic rivalry of larger powers.  
 
At the beginning of his comprehensive treatise on Australian foreign policy entitled 
"The Frightened Country", Alan Renouf (a former head of the Australian Department 
of Foreign Affairs) stated the aims of national foreign policy as "preservation from 
attack and threat of attack" and the safeguarding of "the independence of the 
sovereign state."6 It is undeniably true that every nation shares these common 
objectives. But as World War II approached, major obstacles to the maintenance of 
Australian security were apparent, including the size of the population relative to that 
of the continent.7 Isolation was a double-edged factor, supplying both the protection 
and the risks of distance. Consequent fear and insecurity contributed to the Australian 
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dependency on larger powers, particularly the United States.8 Australian fear centred 
on the possibility of invasion, and thus the seemingly impossible task of protecting the 
Australian continent constituted one of the crises facing Australia at that time, a crisis 
which was a catalyst for the Australian incursion into Portuguese Timor.  
 
Two factors which initially heightened the concern in both the population and 
government were the existence of a genre of popular literature called "invasion 
fiction", and Japan's interest in commercial possibilities in the half-island of 
Portuguese Timor, geographically close to Australia's north. 
 
Invasion Fiction 
Fear of invasion had inhabited the Australian psyche for many years. Dr Peter 
Stanley, previous Principal Historian at the Australian War Memorial and author of 
many books on the military history of both World Wars, states: "For more than a 
century Australians have frightened themselves repeatedly with stories and novels 
depicting imaginary invasions."9 Catriona Ross has shown that up until 2009, there 
had been thirty such books published.10 From popularity as novels in the late 19th 
century, a steady stream of similar writings on invasion has continued to be written as 
articles, books and websites. Urgent and didactic, novels of the Australian invasion 
fiction genre emphasise the imminence of disaster and seek to shock readers into an 
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acceptance of the perceived danger.11 The basic plot is reshaped to fit the times, but 
the fundamental story remains the same, and is constantly repeated. The threatening 
character, the "other", is traditionally Asian. At base, this collection of fiction is the 
textual expression which Ross describes as the "historic and deep-seated cultural 
contention that Australia is at risk from Asian invasion."12  
 
Portuguese Timor and fear of Japan 
Fear of Japan featured in this literary style in the early twentieth century, mirroring 
political wariness of the time. Japan's growing industrial power and military strength, 
its successful wars against China, Korea and Russia, and its 1902 alliance with Britain 
formed an integrated backdrop both for fiction and for political responses to Japanese 
expansionism.13 Stanley states: "Australian diplomacy from 1901-1939 saw the threat 
of Japan its central issue."14   
 
The geographical position of Portuguese Timor and its proximity to Australia made it 
strategically important to security hence it became a focus of Australian wartime 
deliberations. By the mid-1930s there had been signs of Japanese interest in 
Portuguese Timor. A 1939 government submission noted that Japan had interests in 
two major companies in the territory, was gaining concessions in Portuguese Timor 
for oil and crops, was cornering that island's coffee trade, and was making efforts to 
control the pearling trade and strengthen its shipping services.15 These moves 
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bolstered the belief that Japan's real objective in its interest in Portuguese Timor was 
its inclusion in the expansion southwards. There were fears of the "possibility of 
Japanese penetration and infiltration into the Netherlands East Indies and Timor."16 
With Australian foreign policy still being dictated by London, and keen to establish 
British interests in the face of Japanese penetration into the area, in 1937 the British 
Government had suggested the establishment of an air service to Dili, advising the 
Commonwealth Government of Australia to develop closer contacts with Portuguese 
Timor "for strategic reasons."17   
 
Australia's traditional reliance on Britain eroded swiftly in the face of the political and 
military disaster that was the fall of Singapore in 1942.18 With Japan's southward 
advance, the Australian chiefs-of-staff were convinced of invasion and advised 
cabinet that such was likely by April 1942, with a landing in the east coast in May.19 
Political and military leaders realised that the Australian defence services were too ill-
equipped and inexperienced to counter any threat of invasion.20 Therefore the 
government withdrew the 2nd AIF from the Middle East to shore up the defence of 
Australia. In doing this, Australian Prime Minister John Curtin resisted Winston 
Churchill's attempt to divert two of Australia's divisions to Burma.21 Military strength 
and war effort were increased in Australia in view of the perceived threat by Japan.  
 
Undoubtedly, only those who experienced the deep-seated fear and the expectation of 
a Japanese invasion could properly appreciate the situation in Australia in 1942. 
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Australians were embroiled in a World War and their traditional support by Britain 
was weakened. They inhabited a vast and undefended landmass and believed it would 
be engulfed by Japan's southward march. Australians feared for their nation and for 
their lives. Wartime Australian citizens and government, seeing a formidable Japanese 
force moving south – and lacking information to the contrary – understandably 
believed that an invasion was imminent. The nation was in the crisis of war, in which 
all the fears of the past intensified. 
 
Japanese intentions  
It is now almost universally accepted that the primary reason for Japan's expansionist 
push southwards was to establish the "Great Southeast Asia Co-prosperity Sphere".22 
This scheme was proposed as a Japanese economic, industrial and political empire 
stretching from Manchuria to the Dutch East Indies and through to New Guinea and 
the Pacific. Retaining this 4,000 mile sphere of influence was believed by the 
Japanese to guarantee a flow of oil from the Dutch East Indies and be a bulwark 
against invasion of Japan herself.  
 
While Japan's designs on Australia and the region have been matters of some dispute, 
there is now consensus among reputable historians that the Japanese did not intend to 
invade Australia.23 Stanley has concluded that an invasion of Australia by Japan was 
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not planned by the Japanese High Command.24 His views have been supported by 
English military historian Sir Antony Beevor.25 Australian David Horner, who was 
professor of Australian defence history at the Australian National University and has 
authored many books on defence matters, also concurs.26 A government paper from 
1992 details the reasons for the realisation that Japan was not intending to invade.27 
Significantly, such historians are building on the evidence of the lack of invasion 
plans which the Australian Official War History had detailed as far back as 1957.28  
 
Suggestions of including an invasion of Australia in the push southward did surface 
however, but only in Japanese naval ranks. The organisation of the Japanese armed 
forces is relevant to this point. While the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters had 
operational command of the armed forces, the army and navy had administrative 
control, each operating their own extensive departments and generating plans and 
strategies. Bullard comments on the long-standing rivalries between the army and 
navy that could even result in contradictory policies being presented to General 
Headquarters and to the final authority, the emperor.29 It appears that the general staff 
of the navy considered that an invasion of Australia was warranted and that three 
armed divisions would suffice.30 The army staff disagreed, however, maintaining that 
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such an invasion would require ten divisions or more.31 They argued that the size of 
the continent precluded the transportation and supply of an invading force of that size, 
and was impossible given that their forces were already stretched by offensives on a 
number of fronts including Burma and China.32  Stanley states that the Japanese army 
and navy commands constantly argued among themselves and lacked "clear direction 
from a single strategic body."33 Even in the navy, states Horner, "there was no 
unanimity about the need to invade Australia."34 Stanley quotes the Army Imperial 
Headquarters war diary: "We expended much effort restraining the Navy's 
simplistic....dash to Australia."35 As quoted in Australia's official War History, Japan's 
wartime Prime Minister Tojo Hideki said (before his execution in 1948) that Japan 
had no plans to invade:  
We never had enough troops to do so. We had already far out-stretched our lines 
of communication. We did not have the armed strength or the supply facilities 
to mount such a terrific extension of our already over-strained and too thinly 
spread forces. We expected to occupy all New Guinea, to maintain Rabaul as a 
holding base, and to raid Northern Australia by air. But actual physical invasion 
– no, at no time.36   
 
Nevertheless, while an invasion was not planned, there were attacks against the 
Australian mainland. These were designed to isolate the nation from its Allies and to 
prevent the use of Darwin's strategic position by the United States. The first bombing 
of Darwin on 19 February 1942 killed over 240 people and wounded up to four 
hundred, with most civil and military facilities destroyed.37 Sixty-four more attacks on 
Darwin followed in following weeks, as well as air attacks on inland towns in the 
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Northern Territory through to November 1943.38 The destruction of Darwin was a 
preliminary strike "to disable its potential as a threat" to the invasion of the Dutch half 
of Timor.39  Occupation of the islands to Australia's north-east would cut links to US, 
Commonwealth and Dutch interests, thus neutralising threats to the Japanese 
expansionist designs.40 The Japanese generals were confident that Australia could be 
bullied into submission through such isolation and by associated psychological 
pressure.41  
 
Contributing to fears of a Japanese attack on Australia was the Papua New Guinea 
campaign, particularly the Battle of Kokoda fought between Japanese and Australian 
forces from July to November 1942. The Kokoda Track and the exploits of the 
Australian soldiers subsequently filled Australian imaginations as proof of imminent 
peril to the mainland.42 In the years following, stories have abounded that the invasion 
plan was thwarted by the Australians at Kokoda.43 Nonetheless, the moral triumph of 
the Australians at Kokoda was not the sole reason for victory in the south-west Pacific 
nor can it be seen in isolation, as the American victories in the Solomons were crucial 
and more costly than the Papua campaign.44 The Australians who bravely and 
skilfully fought against the Japanese in New Guinea did so against an enemy who was 
attempting to cripple Australia, not invade it.45 
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Thus the threat posed by Japan was real and had fatal consequences for parts of 
Australia, but it was largely a threat of isolation rather than invasion, although the 
Australian population did not know that at the time. Nevertheless, by May 1942 
Australian authorities had received information that there were no Japanese plans to 
invade. Allied intelligence reports and code-breaking had clarified the matter beyond 
question.46 These reports were confirmed by diplomats who relayed to their superiors 
that the Indian Ocean, and not Australia, was the Japanese focus.47  The Australian 
Government did not make Japan's lack of intention to invade Australia known to the 
population, preferring instead to encourage the Australian people to continue to 
"work, fight and save" as their war effort.48 It was a decision compounded in its 
intricacy by Curtin's realisation that Australia's security lay with the United States and 
not with Britain, and his insistence on the use of Australian troops to bolster the 
security of the homeland.49  
 
The consensus among historians remains that there was not at any time a threat of 
Japanese invasion of Australia, though there was a real threat of aerial attack and 
isolation. Nevertheless, the situation was perceived as desperate by the small and 
fearful Australian population. The subsequent tragedy, however, was not primarily 
felt by Australians in their own country but by the Timorese in their homeland.  
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The invasions of Portuguese Timor 
The larger drama of the Second World War in this region saw the foreign powers of 
Australia, Britain, the Netherlands and Portugal operating in competition with Japan 
for the possession and control of territory and in pursuit of national stability. A 
mimetic principle stated by Girard applies: "the ultimate object of attack is not 
fighting: rather, it is possession."50 ⁠ The resulting violence towards each other resulted 
in invasions of Portuguese Timor by both Australia and Japan. Both nations breached 
Portugal's neutrality by entering its colonial territory against the wishes of the 
Portuguese authorities. Such illegality placed both incursions in the category of 
invasion.  
 
The bald facts of the initial incursions are these: The Dutch East Indies, which 
included the western half of the island of Timor, was included in Japan's expansionary 
focus.51 The eastern half of Timor was a possession of Portugal, whose neutrality 
throughout the war was a significant element affecting Japanese plans, as is discussed 
later in this chapter. On 12 December 1941 the Australian "Sparrow" Force consisting 
of about 1,400 men joined Dutch defence troops in the area of the capital of Dutch 
West Timor, Kupang. The decision was then taken to land 155 men of the Australian 
2/2nd Independent Company, part of Sparrow Force, along with 260 Dutch troops, in 
Portuguese Timor on 17 December 1941. Just over two months later, on 19 February 
1942, the Japanese military invaded Kupang on the Dutch-administered western end 
of Timor with two battalions of the 228th Infantry Regiment of the 38th Division. On 
the same day one battalion from that regiment landed at Dili, the administrative centre 
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of the eastern Portuguese region.52 The date is significant for Australia, as the date of 
the bombing of Darwin. 
 
While it is true that the Australian invasion was not of the same type as that of Japan – 
in that the Australians did not deliberately kill Timorese people as Japanese soldiers 
did – the Australian action placed Portuguese Timor at risk and vulnerable to the 
actions of Australia. Though there may have been reasons to protect the Australian 
mainland from aerial or infantry attacks, the Australian decision to go into Timor set 
in train massive loss of life in which an expendable entity was sacrificed for the good 
of the stronger. Certain features of Girard's designation of the scapegoat are apparent 
in Portuguese Timor's predicament. It was not the focus of blame for any part of the 
escalating conflict in the region, but it occupied a geographical position which 
became the focus of warring rivals. Its structural insignificance made it marginal and 
therefore superfluous, to the extent that the death and damage inflicted on it has 
received little if any official Australian consideration. The victimisation of Portuguese 
Timor thus took the form of collateral damage in the interests of Japanese 
expansionism and Australian protection. 
 
Protection of Australia 
The Australian incursion into Portuguese Timor in December 1941 was seen as 
necessary to protect Australia, but it became the catalyst for the Japanese advance. 
Australian dependence on Britain for military decisions dictated actions regarding 
Portuguese Timor as the cables to and from Lord Cranborne (the U.K. Secretary of 
State for Dominion Affairs) and John Curtin (the Australian Prime Minister) indicate. 
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These cables detail the official strategy of the Australian incursion: to assist the 
Portuguese in the defence of their territory and by safeguarding the colony in the 
event of a Japanese attack, thus protecting it against Japanese aggression.53   
 
Nevertheless, the cables also reveal that the main consideration was the protection of 
Australia. Wray comments on the "utmost concern" of the Australian War Cabinet at 
the swift advance of the Japanese and the undefended airfield and flying-boat base in 
Dili.54 Curtin wrote to Cranbourne that the defence of Timor as a whole was closely 
bound up with the defence of both Darwin and the Netherlands East Indies.55 He 
stated that any occupation of Timor by Japan would seriously prejudice the defence of 
Darwin.56 Portuguese Timor was seen as "the entrance door to Australia."57 
Cranbourne had earlier stated that the object of the "necessary action" of sending 
Australian and Dutch troops was to safeguard vital interests by denying Portuguese 
Timor to the enemy.58 Significantly, as early as September 1941,59 the Australian War 
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Cabinet had positively discussed the preventive occupation of Portuguese Timor by 
the Australian and Dutch forces. It is notable that Cranbourne wrote that the aim was 
to "liquidate" the Japanese, yet Japan had not invaded the island when that particular 
cable was written.60 Thus official communications of the time saw incursion into 
Portuguese Timor as crucial to the protection of Australia.61 How the small Australian 
force of a few hundred men was meant to accomplish that feat was not clear.62  
 
Australian breach of neutrality 
Australian troops entered the territory administered by Portugal without invitation, 
thus breaching Portuguese neutrality. The incursion was met with vehement written 
and verbal opposition by Portugal and by the local authority, Senõr Manuel Ferreira 
de Carvalho, the Governor of Portuguese Timor.63  He rejected the suggestion that 
Portuguese Timor required the protection which the Allies said they were offering.64 
That offer came via the Honorary Consul David Ross, acting for Britain and 
Australia, who was told to deliver a message to Governor de Carvalho on the day after 
the landing. The message expressed the Commonwealth of Australia's regret:  
We assure you Portuguese sovereignty will not be impaired and in fact it is to 
defend that sovereignty as well as to prevent Japanese aggression that our 
forces have co-operated with Netherlands Government in taking this action.65 
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The message included the statement that "in order defend against Japanese aggression 
it has been found necessary to prevent Japanese breach neutrality in Timor"(sic).66 
Thus the Commonwealth of Australia claimed to uphold Portuguese neutrality by 
itself violating that status, blaming a possible future breach by Japan. The Australian 
logic thus follows the mimetic reciprocity identified by Girard: "people always have 
the impression that the other is the first to attack, that they are never the ones who 
begin."67 
 
The Allied troops landed despite the governor's strongly worded protest: "Under these 
circumstances, every disembarkation of forces will be considered as a breach of the 
neutrality of our territory."68 Further reports in the cables describe the reaction of the 
government in Portugal to the entry of Allied forces as "a violation",69 "most 
serious",70  and "violently unfavourable",71 thus presenting Australia and Britain with 
a major crisis in their relations with Portugal. The Governor remained steadfastly 
against the Australian arrival: his obstructive attitude even suggesting to the Allies 
that he could possibly assist the Japanese.72 
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Japanese breach of neutrality 
Neutral Portugal played an important political role in the international community 
during the war. Its capital Lisbon was a base for operatives on all sides to collect 
information.73 The mimetic rivalry of the European powers is demonstrated in their 
fears concerning Portuguese neutrality and any threat to the advantages they gained 
from that status.  
 
 
One of Portugal's concerns was their belief that the Dutch might have used any 
invasion as a means of extending their reach by taking over the whole of the island of 
Timor.74 Britain, on the other hand, was fearful that the Portuguese, offended by any 
incursion into their territory, might allow the Germans into the Iberian Peninsula.75 In 
a similar way, but for different reasons, the Japanese administration opposed 
breaching Portugal's position in case of repercussions in Europe, choosing therefore 
not to target the Portuguese colonies of Macau and Timor.76 Dunn writes:  
Evidently the Germans were apprehensive that any Japanese move against a 
Portuguese territory would provoke Lisbon into offering the Allies base facilities 
in the Azores, a move that would deal a severe blow to U-boat operations against 
Allied shipping.77  
 
The Allies worried that an Australian advance may have caused the Portuguese to 
retaliate by allowing the Germans to use their territory, while the Japanese were 
concerned that any foray of theirs into Portuguese lands may have caused Portugal to 
favour the Allies. Thus while the British and the Australians had used a possible 
assault by Japan as a reason for their plans for invading Timor, there had been no 
indication that Japan would infringe the status of Portugal and its possessions.  
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Concerning the Japanese quandary regarding violation of neutrality, Frei presents the 
"agonising debates" undertaken by the Japanese from the beginning of December 
1941 which involved the army, the navy, legal experts, the foreign ministry, the prime 
minister and the emperor.78 But finally the decision was made for the Japanese to 
enter Portuguese Timor, two months after the Australians. Frei summarises: "Since 
Australian and Dutch troops had been the first to take up positions in Portuguese 
Timor, Japan was now free to attack."79 Thus the Australian move into Portuguese 
Timor breached Portuguese neutrality, but was claimed to be necessary to offset a 
Japanese incursion. The subsequent violation by Japan was claimed to be in response 
to the Australian breach of neutrality.80  
 
Regardless of Japanese anguish over whether to invade Portuguese Timor, the 
protection of their proposed Sphere of Co-Prosperity finally overrode their reluctance 
to risk repercussions in Europe. Their desire for expansion coupled with Australian 
fear produced an unforeseen and violent tragedy. Both nations demonstrated a 
fundamental mimetic concept, expressed by Girard as: "the aggressor has always 
already been attacked."81 Each blamed the other for neglect of international law, each 
depicted the other as the aggressor, and thus each appropriated the role of victim. In 
doing this, they each imitated what the other perceived to be the desire and threat of 
the other. 
 
Control of Portuguese Timor appeared to the antagonists as a way of providing an 
advantage over the other, and therefore each desired to possess it. While possession 
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was the underlying reason for the mutual invasion of Timor, the outcome was the 
violence done to the Timorese people. As Girard states: "The ultimate object of attack 
is not fighting: rather, it is possession."82 Possession appeared as the salve for the 
concerns of each, the expansionism of Japan and the Australian anguish to protect 
itself. The mimetic rivalry in this situation exemplified the "romantic lie", each party 
grasping for possession in the mutual imitation of desire.83 Neither wished to shoulder 
the responsibility of breaching Portugal's neutrality (thus risking possible 
repercussions elsewhere) so each blamed the other for the situation. Each nation 
claimed the high moral ground of priority: Australia for protection, and Japan for 
innocence of breaking an international convention until forced into such an action by 
the pre-emptive incursion by Australia. Each then blamed the other for the ensuing 
violence, while imitating the other.  
 
A further element in Girard's understanding of mimesis applies - that of the 
"stumbling block". It denotes "a situation that comes about when a person or a group 
of persons feel themselves blocked or obstructed as they desire some specific object 
of power, prestige, or property that their model possesses or is imagined to possess."84  
In their mimetic rivalry, Japan desired to possess further territory while Australia 
desired to possess freedom from that Japanese expansion. It was a situation of intense 
competition, yet it led to thorough-going imitation, as both advanced into Portuguese 
Timor. Australia and Japan showed that they were rivals imitating each other at the 
same time as competing.85 In their mimetic competition they were faced with 
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Portuguese Timor, into which each felt they must intrude to gain their purposes. 
However, its nature as a colony of a neutral power meant that each needed to mount 
an illegal invasion in pursuit of their desires. Australia and Japan found Portuguese 
Timor an obstacle which first ensnared them. The territory became a means of further 
expansion for Japan which absolved itself by blaming Australia.  
 
The Timorese people, however, were not passive in this process and were the subjects 
of activity both as friends and rivals. Timor frustrated the desires of both Japan and 
Australia and became a mimetic obstacle, though in different ways. In Japan's regard, 
the East Timorese proved most unhelpful, their lack of cooperation requiring a whole 
Japanese division to occupy the territory until the end of the war when those troops 
could well have been effectively used in Papua New Guinea. In regard to Australia, 
many Timorese were true friends and allies in supporting and giving their lives. The 
Australians withdrew in early 1943, but the devastating effects on the Timorese 
people continued until 1945, as the Japanese remained until the end of the War.  
However, subsequent events show the lasting influence of Timor in later Australian 
history. Australian forgetfulness of the friendship of the Timorese has remained a 
stumbling block of conscience against which the proclamation of Australian values 








Scale of Timorese Suffering 
Australians in Timor 
There was, of course, an actual victim in all this turmoil. The element missing from 
the deliberations of Japanese and Australians, as well as the Portuguese, the British, 
the Dutch and the Germans was the welfare of the local people in Portuguese Timor. 
There is no evidence that anyone considered what the Timorese people may have 
thought or desired. There are no thoughts expressed in the documents about their fears 
and anxieties, and no reflection on the possible effects of armed foreigners coming 
into their ancient tribal society. The Japanese advance southwards ignored the welfare 
of all peoples it encountered, including the Timorese. Similarly, the Australian 
government's insecurity and fear in the face of an expected invasion by Japan 
rendered it insensible to the probable effects on Timorese society of the invasion of 
their territory. Dunn comments: "Had the Allies not intruded into the territory and 
transformed it into a war zone the Timorese may have escaped the ordeal they were 
subsequently to endure."86 In order to consider the enormity of the effects of the 
incursions into Portuguese Timor, the events of the following fourteen months when 
the Australians were present is summarised here.  
 
The few hundred Australians who had moved into Portuguese Timor in December 
1941 lacked their own radio equipment until they constructed a wireless and made 
contact with Australia on 19 April 1942.87 They were then supplied by air drops 
which augmented their living off the land and their dependence on the Timorese 
people. The commando force was able to conduct a rear-guard action against the 
Japanese, employing with success the guerrilla tactics in which they had been trained. 
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Apart from direct hit-and-run attacks, establishment of communication with Australia 
meant provision of valuable intelligence on ship and troop movements and 
identification of targets which were then attacked by RAAF Hudson bombers.88  
 
In May 1942 the Australians were ordered to keep harassing the Japanese forces since 
there was no possibility for them to be evacuated. In June, the Australian government 
argued for US involvement to assist with the guerrilla campaign in Timor, but were 
rebuffed because of General MacArthur's conviction that the greatest danger would 
come from the Atlantic.89 The Japanese increased their numbers in August with 
specially trained troops as a result of the Australians' success in killing or eluding 
them. The 2/2nd Company was reinforced by the 2/4th Independent Company in 
September 1942 although the number of Australian men was never more than 700 at 
any one time. That month, the original Japanese garrison was withdrawn from 
Portuguese Timor, replaced by units of the 48th Division, one of the elite Japanese 
formations. Thus the few Australians were engaging, evading and frustrating 
thousands of men in four or five Japanese battalions along with their tank, engineer 
and artillery supports.90 In November 1942, seven further battalions from the 48th 
division were inserted.91 Cleary cites Japanese documents which put final Japanese 
troop numbers at 20,000, the standard strength of a Japanese infantry division.92   
 
Support by the Timorese  
The Australian troops who conducted the Timor campaign attested to the general 
support of the East Timorese people as the pivotal reason for their success. That 
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testimony illustrates the quality and depth of the relationship which the Australians 
and Timorese developed. Cleary alludes to the attitudes of the Australians which was 
essential to good relationships:  
After entering the neutral territory uninvited, and then luring the Japanese there, 
the Australians pulled off a remarkable feat in bush diplomacy and mass 
mobilisation, despite having little advance knowledge of the people and their 
language.....The result was a rag-tag army of professionals and volunteers that is 
unrivalled in Australian military history.93   
 
Further, Cleary comments: "The (Australian) men were friendly and engaging and, 
unlike the colonials, treated the people with respect and were particularly courteous to 
the women."94 The "criados" (in the 21st century more correctly referred to as 
"veterans") were the young Timorese men who, with the active cooperation of their 
families, provided the Australians with shelter, shared their food, helped them during 
their bouts of malaria and tropical diseases, relayed information on Japanese troop 
movements, pointed out the best observation and ambush positions, and protected and 
carried the commandos' equipment whilst they were engaging the Japanese. Such 
assistance was essential to the success of the Australian mission in fighting the 
increasing numbers of Japanese and those West Timorese whom the Japanese used as 
militia. Up to forty men of the Independent Companies died in Portuguese Timor, but 
only ten of these in combat.95 The deaths of Japanese are calculated as many 
hundreds.96  
 
Shockingly, many Timorese deaths were also the result of Australian success. Allied 
bombing of Japanese positions wiped out villages and crops, so causing starvation. 
Added to this, the sustained and ferocious Japanese retaliation against the Timorese 
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because of their support of the Australians added to the grievous toll. Yet the words of 
the Australian men indicate the levels of loyalty they found among the Portuguese 
Timorese. For example, describing a youth who undertook to pretend to sell produce 
to a Japanese troop section as a way of spying on them for the Australians, Archie 
Campbell of the 2/2nd Independent Company wrote: 
It is almost incredible that he is willing to risk torture and death for the 
Australians who are indirectly responsible for all the misery the Japs have 
heaped upon the Timorese: the burning villages, the killings, the terrified 
women carried into slavery and defilement. Yet there he goes – no fanfare, no 
drama – just a casual wave and a smile, and he is gone.97  
 
Lance Bomford, of the 2/40th Battalion which joined up with 2/2nd in September 
1942 wrote: 
Each of us had his native, called a criado. They carried our packs so we were 
free with our guns, and without them we just couldn't have fought like we did... 
The natives would spot when the Japs were making a move and relay the 
message to us so we could set up ambushes. Even at the end when it was tough 
we were dependent on them to keep one jump ahead of the Japs. It wasn't just 
the criados, there were lots who helped us..... Early in December we got orders 
to move to the coast. It was a great feeling to be going home but it was a sad 
parting from the Timorese boys who'd done so much for us. Quite a few of us 
had tears in our eyes. I'd have loved to have taken my little fella back with me. 
He cried when the time came to leave. I gave him a note [praising him], what a 
good lad he was, gave him a few odds and ends. What happened to him Lord 
knows.98  
 
Lt-Col. Sir Bernard Callinan became the leader of the 2/2nd in May 1942. 
Interviewed by Michele Turner, he said:  
It was upsetting what the Japs did towards the end. They'd move into an area 
where the natives were loyal and say, "Look, if you help Australians we'll come 
and burn your villages and destroy your crops." And they did it. Then the Japs 
would go to another area and say, "Over there they're helping Australians, 
wouldn't you like to go down and take all their pigs and goats?" – playing on 
greed and old antagonisms, not just releasing them from the restrictions of the 
Portuguese, but really encouraging them to do it. 
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So after a while our natives thought, "Well, we have to look after ourselves." 
That's only realistic. But many would stand up to beatings by the Japanese, still 
saying they didn't know where we were or where we'd gone or anything, and 
they would get badly beaten. When the natives were getting more restless 
towards the end none of the creados was affected; they stuck right to us.99 
 
Exhausted, the 2/2nd was evacuated to Australia in December 1942 with some 
Portuguese civilians, while the 2/4th was withdrawn in early 1943, which meant that 
their Timorese companions were left to return to their homes, finding that their 
support of the Australians was to be brutally repaid by the Japanese who remained in 
their thousands in Portuguese Timor until the end of the war.     
 
 
Effects of the Timor Campaign 
Wartime Australian society experienced fundamental disruptions caused by the 
military mobilisation of many in the population, the rationing of food and clothes, the 
uncertainty of the world situation, the focus of the government on protecting security, 
the absence of loved ones, and the fear which centred on the possibility of invasion 
from the north. Like so many societies through the ages, threat to life and well-being 
resulted in disruption of civil and family life and a sense of liminality not experienced 
in times of peace.  
 
Nevertheless, the number of Timorese deaths is extraordinary in comparison to the 
Australian and world-wide death count. James Dunn stated: 
The census of 1947 showed that the population of the colony had declined from 
472 221 in 1930 (the year of the previous census) to 433 412. From these 
figures it has often been estimated that 40 000 Timorese died as a result of the 
war, but the real figure must have been much higher, probably more than half as 
high again, even if a minimum natural growth rate is taken into account.100     
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Using this calculation, a figure of between 40,000 and 70,000 Timorese who died 
during the War, all civilians, finds general acceptance. Between 8% and 14% of 
Portuguese Timor's 1939 population died between 1941 and 1945, despite Timor’s 
status as the colony of a neutral power. This figure is startling when compared with 
the numbers of deaths in the populations of those nations officially at war. The 
percentage of British military and civilians who died is calculated at 0.8% of the pre-
war population, and that of United States deaths at 0.3% of their population.101 
Australian deaths are calculated at 0.4% of the 1939 Australian population.102 
 
The enormity of the effects of the War on East Timor is further seen when comparing 
its fortunes with those of Papua New Guinea. The support of the local people of PNG 
for Australian soldiers is well-known. It is estimated that 15,000 Papuan civilians died 
during the conflict.103 Australian responsibilities towards its New Guinea territories 
required the payment of compensation for the destruction which the local people 
endured. Therefore, between 1942 and 1948, the Australian Government's War 
Damages Commission paid £6,710,799 to villagers to cover death, injury and 
destruction.104 Conversely, minimal payment was made by the Australian government 
to local Timorese helpers by way of silver coins, and small amounts repaid for 
material assistance. There was no reparation for injuries, even when requested by 
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Portuguese authorities after the war.105 No other compensation has been paid to the 
Timorese people for their extraordinarily large World War II losses. 
 
The mimetic aggression of Japan and Australia is seen in the context of Girard's 
explanation of the measures which societies take to protect themselves. He states: 
"Everywhere in the world, even today, any natural or man-made disaster intensifies 
the appetite for victims and causes accusation to proliferate."106 In World War II, the 
threatening disorder required the apportioning of blame which was accomplished 
relatively easily by identifying the aggressors – the Japanese. Thus Japan was the 
focus of Australian anger and fear. The proximity of Portuguese Timor to Australia 
involved that territory in matters of Australian security however. Its use by Japan to 
attack Australia was seen as a possibility, and hence Timor's very existence rendered 
it a probable threat to the interests of Australia. Girard notes that present-day victims 
need not necessarily be seen as a culpable cause of social ills and disruption. The 
Timorese people were not blamed by the Australians for the crisis, but their territory 
was seen as desirable to the enemy, and even more than this, as somehow morally 
culpable in potentially becoming a base of operations for the Japanese. In this way, it 
needed to be neutralised as a threat, and so became a victim of Australia’s security 
interests. Australia, seeing itself as victim of the Japanese, prepared to strike at the 
aggressor, and in the process sacrificed the Timorese to their security. Though the 
Timorese were not scapegoats in one sense (except when the Japanese blamed them 
for assisting the Australians), by virtue of their land, they became the real victims of 
the Japanese and Australians as the voiceless, vulnerable other sacrificed by both for 
their own ends.  
                                                            
105 René Girard, The Girard Reader, ed. James G. Williams (New York: The Crossroad Publishing 




Texts of Persecution 
The effects of the Timor campaign do not end with the close of the Second World 
War, or with the passing away of returned Australian soldiers and their Timorese 
friends. The scapegoating of East Timor has been enshrined in the written record of 
the campaign which further suppresses the interests of the Timorese and justifies 
Australian action. 
 
As discussed earlier, Girard's mimetic theory enshrines insights into ancient myths as 
being disguised accounts of scapegoating incidents. Victims in the ancient world, 
sacrificed for defence or social harmony, were not honoured, or even remembered. 
Myths buried their victimisation, weaving gilded fantasies of their persecutors and the 
communities they protected from their own violence. In a similar way, the 
victimisation of Portuguese Timor by Australia in World War II has received textual 
treatment with myth-like resemblances. Girard termed modern day myths "texts of 
persecution", though these texts increasingly lack divine justification and put other 
transcendent entities in their place (e.g., the nation-state). The chapter now details 
significant examples of the textual evidence which has successfully minimised the 
importance of the Timor campaign.  
 
Texts concerning the fear of invasion of Australia 
First to be considered are texts generally available to the public in libraries and on the 
internet concerning the supposed Japanese invasion of Australia. The history of this 
episode has direct bearing on the perception of Australia as victim and, as will be 
seen, on the presence of an unconsciousness among Australians as to the actual 
victims in the saga.  
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Despite evidence to the contrary, belief in an impending Japanese invasion in World 
War II remains in some influential circles in Australia. Many available texts continue 
to suggest, and even at times specifically to declare, that Australia was in danger of 
invasion. The opinion of eminent historians that any Japanese naval suggestions of 
invasion were never countenanced as official strategy have often been ignored or 
challenged. For example, some of Paul Keating's speeches as Prime Minister used the 
phrase "invasion of Australia" repeatedly.107 A current website devoted to the theory 
of invasion by Japan attacks opinions which question Japanese invasion plans.108 
Peter FitzSimons' best-selling 2004 book Kokoda makes clear the fear of invasion in 
1942 but does little to present any information that it was a misplaced fear.109  
 
Admittedly, in a growing number of cases there is recognition that Japan was not 
intending to invade, for example, the website of the Department of Veterans Affairs 
correctly states:  
The Japanese had no plans to invade Australia during the Second World War 
but they did plan to cut Australia's supply line with America by establishing 
bases in the south-west Pacific islands.110  
 
Popular belief in an impending Japanese invasion was strengthened in 2008, however, 
when the "Battle for Australia" became a Commemorative Day to be celebrated on 
the first Wednesday of September annually. It ranks third in importance after Anzac 
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Day and Remembrance Day.111 Thus the erroneous notion that Australia was the 
object of Japanese invasion plans has been recently cemented officially. The idea of 
Australia being "victim" is unavoidably connected to this version of events. The idea 
that Australia was to be invaded appears to be fuelled by a continuing fear of invasion 
from the north. The notion underlies the precarious nature of a small population in a 
large continent. It also acts as a justification for actions during WWII and 
subsequently, for example, that Australia is justified to use smaller territories, such as 
East Timor, to achieve its own security interests.  
 
There appears to be difficulty in some quarters in distinguishing between opinions 
understandably held in the past and historically accurate statements based on recent 
evidence. To be able to acknowledge that Australia was not going to be invaded does 
not diminish the people of the time who genuinely thought that invasion was 
imminent. The task of those with the present benefit of historical evidence is to 
concentrate on what did, in fact, happen. Australia was not invaded by the Japanese 
military, and as has been shown, there was not a credible plan to undertake such an 
invasion. 
 
Texts concerning the Australian campaign in Timor  
In light of a prevailing erroneous view that Australia was to be invaded by Japan, it is 
not surprising that the facts and significance of the Timor campaign itself can be lost. 
Internalisation of fear in large sections of society alongside relatively simplistic 
notions of an ideal Australian "character" and a suppression of the treatment of the 
Timorese in WWII contribute to the minimisation of Timor's role in the war. The 
                                                            




tendency among some Australians is to forget this unique wartime narrative. This is 
particularly the case when its complexity and evidence of moral complicity mean that 
notions of exceptional diggers, battlers and heroes need to be applied as much to the 
Timorese as to Australians.  
 
The Official Australian War History, documents in the National Archives and the War 
Memorial, as well as books, commentaries, articles, education curricula and websites 
comprise the record available to the Australian public concerning the events of the 
Second World War in which Australia and Portuguese Timor were linked in what is 
known as the "Timor Campaign". This material demonstrates that not only did East 
Timor itself become a victim sacrificed for Australia's protection, but substantial 
elements of the documentary record remain ignored, are incomplete in interpretation, 
or retain distortions which are unchallenged. Thus the memory of the campaign itself 
is suppressed and becomes a means of continuing to victimise the Timorese. The 
accounts of the history currently available in Australia are almost without exception 
written from the Australian perspective. They extol Australian virtues, ignore 
Australian errors, and are oblivious of the Timorese. They are well described as “texts 
of persecution” that justify military action that took no account of the Timorese 
people. In contrast, in those cases where the Timorese story is told with due 
recognition of the Timorese people, light is thrown on the victimisation process, 
requiring a deeper Australian reflection on the experience.  
 
The presentation of the history of the Timor Campaign in books, films, the Australian 
War Memorial and on the internet usually ignores facts or fails to make the 
connections required to influence Australian people's understanding of the place of 
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Timor in the War.112 Such imbalance suggests an Australian ignorance which 
resembles the unconsciousness required in the victimage mechanism. Tempered and 
challenged somewhat by the testimony of some returned Australian soldiers and by a 
constant, if muted, ostinato narrative of the debt owed to the Timorese since the War, 
it is clear that the unconsciousness is not total. The available record, however, both 
reflects and feeds the general ignorance, thus distorting the facts, maintaining 
romantic illusions of autonomous Australian heroism, and forgetting the Timorese. 
 
Some grassroots Australian efforts have seen photograph exhibitions mounted and 
Australian sightseeing in Timor to promote the Timorese War involvement.113 These 
accounts of this remarkable campaign combine to present the narrative of a feat which 
has few parallels in that the resourcefulness, courage and resilience of the Australians, 
with the sustained support of the local people, ensured that they were the only Allied 
fighting force which remained viable in South East Asia at that time. "In the island 
archipelago to Australia's north, the only place where shots were still heard was on the 
island of Timor."114  Informative as they are, these works are specialised and have not 
yet affected popular general knowledge about Timor's wartime role. At its best, this 
narrative presents the dependency that Girard argues as integral to conversion: that we 
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are not autonomous individuals, but relational beings dependent on others, which this 
campaign showed. 
 
In contrast to these resources, most current Australian general history books have 
little on Timor and even less on the Timorese-Australian connection during World 
War II. Recent Australian war histories ignore the Timor Campaign, mention it only 
minimally, or are focused only on the Australians.115 These omissions and emphases 
make the record incomplete and in some cases, misleading.   
 
There is one printed document from World War II, however, which has come to 
symbolise the complex and ambiguous nature of the relationship between Australia 
and East Timor and its textual record. As was the practice world-wide at the time, the 
Australian Government produced and distributed a large number of propaganda 
leaflets designed to lower enemy morale or to encourage civilian populations in 
theatres of war. One leaflet dropped over Timor declared "Your friends do not forget 
you."116 The leaflet invites the trust of the Timorese people, promising that 
Australians would remember their assistance, the small print going so far as to state 
that Australians would return to oust the Japanese. Unfortunately, the participle of the 
Portuguese verb in the heading (“do not forget") was misspelled as "nõa" instead of 
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não, and rendered the sentence meaningless at best, thereby negating its original 
intention.117 On another level the badly presented document symbolises the Australian 
hubris and forgetfulness that has characterised the subsequent history, and represents 
much of the current written record of the wartime relationship: inaccurate, self-
serving, and oblivious of the meaning of the war experience for the Timorese people.  
 
The leaflet remains a challenge to Australians and expresses underlying unease in 
many Australians concerning subsequent treatment of East Timor. The nagging sense 
of betrayal and victimisation both in World War II and during the Indonesian 
occupation is evoked by the leaflet's wording, with all its mistakes. The mention of 
"friends" places the relationship above simple regional connections. Denis Kevans' 
poem "Never Forget You" picks up something of the betrayal, not only of Timor by 
Australia, but (with some poetic licence) of government betrayal of something dear to 
the ordinary Australian: 
For a promise made by the soldiers 
that their leaders never kept.118   
 
The promise has not been kept by the Australian nation as a whole, and yet the 
keeping of it is daunting. How does one nation remember another when it was that 
other which lost tens of thousands of people as a result of the friendship? How can the 
remembering happen in the face of further betrayal, as in Australia's role during the 
Indonesian occupation from 1975? The facts of Australian involvement in Timor's 
World War II history affect the relationship significantly and have been remembered 
at key moments to provoke the Australian conscience. 
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Standing as witnesses to the diplomatic anxieties, claims and counter-claims, breaches 
of neutrality, accusations, justifications, invasions, reinforcements, and bombing were 
480,000 Timorese people. The omission of their suffering from the bulk of the 
Australian written record in preference to the relentless promotion of a threat to 
Australia and the courage of Australians contrasts with the poignancy of the Official 
History's recording of the reception which the Australian soldiers received on the 
afternoon of the day they arrived in Timor, December 17 1941. It relates that the men 
"were agreeably surprised to find the inhabitants apparently friendly towards 
them."119 One can imagine the brash, open-faced Australians somewhat buoyed by the 
attitude of the locals. One can also imagine the curious relief of the Timorese at 
meeting people who appeared to lack the superior disdain of many Portuguese. The 
friendliness of the Timorese was not solely a result of their character, but was a 
response to the easy-going camaraderie with which the Australians treated them. The 
mimetic relationality was initially positive, which could be remembered to challenge 
later negative actions. That friendliness was to be tested by the later dire choices 
which awaited them.  
 
Given that so much material continues to downplay or to challenge the evidence that 
Australia itself was not to be invaded, is it sadly unsurprising that so much material 
similarly continues to ignore the invasions endured by the Timorese. The absence of 
adequate reference to the Timor campaign in history books belittles the relationship, 
and in so doing, is testimony to the victimisation of the Timorese people for 
Australian protection. 
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The Timor Campaign and the Australian School Curriculum  
The general lack of written material about East Timor and the often skewed emphases 
in favour of Australia in material about the relationship in World War II is echoed in 
the school curriculum. There is no mention at all of East Timor in connection to 
World War II in the 2013 Australian curriculum.120 While teachers and schools with 
an interest in Timorese history are known to use resources to help students understand 
some of the current and historical realities affecting the two nations, the exclusion of 
the regional neighbour Timor from the even a range of choices within that section of 
the curriculum is extraordinary, given the loss of Timorese life as a result of 
Australian presence on their land. The absence of this topic from the 2013 Curriculum 
which is designed serve the nation for a number of years echoes the exclusion of any 
realistic treatment of Indigenous peoples in Australian schools during past decades. 
Along with the paucity of material available to the general public on Timor in the 
Second World War, such denial of information to the next generation can be said to 
constitute a "text of persecution" in its own right. 
 
Conclusion 
In the "all against all" turmoil of the World War, where nations fought for supremacy, 
possession and self-protection, the defenceless entity of Portuguese Timor was 
sacrificed as a victim of Australian fear. The welfare of the Timorese people was 
ignored in the Australian effort to prevent conflict – whether real or imagined – from 
reaching Australian shores. The paradoxes of the events are vast: that Australia – the 
larger, richer nation which feared invasion – remained secure, while Portuguese 
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Timor - the smaller, weaker territory - became the victim, suffering an invasion and a 
four-year occupation by the Japanese.  
 
Furthermore, the popularly available record is well described as  “texts of 
persecution". It maintains the distortions which accompany a narrative told from the 
perspective of a victor or a persecutor: in this case, a foreign power mounting an 
invasion in order to protect itself.  The reiteration of the fears of the past concerning 
an "invasion of Australia" ignores current historical research. Accompanied by little 
acknowledgement of the actual locus of invasion, Portuguese Timor, it indicates a 
displacement of the status of "victim" onto Australians instead of those who endured 
the invasions, the Timorese people. 
 
While documents written at the time of the invasions would naturally reflect the 
political and military constraints on the dissemination of factual material of those 
times, the passage of decades now demands more clarity and a wider perspective. 
Currently available material stocked by libraries, accessible on the internet, and 
mandated for use in schools, however, continues to present a narrative almost entirely 
from the Australian viewpoint. Traditional images abound of courageous Australians 
(victorious in the face of defeat), the victim under threat and the hero battling to the 
end. This Australian self-focus distorts the facts, belittling the enormity of the 
suffering of the Timorese people and ignoring their courage and service in Australia's 
regard. 
 
The honouring of war heroes and the celebration of Australia's role in numerous 
world conflicts is of major importance to the Australian community. Nevertheless, the 
forgetfulness of material relevant to East Timor's devastation testifies to an Australian 
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national unconsciousness concerning a friendly neighbour. A high degree of 
ignorance exists in Australia about the suffering of the Timorese, the death and 
destruction wrought by both Japan and the Allies, and the promises of remembrance 
which the Australian government delivered in writing to the Timorese population. 
Thus the documentary record is not a thing of the Australian past, but remains a 
collection of the myth-like "texts of persecution" that continue to have power to 
distort memories. It is evidence that East Timor, through Australian neglect of the 




CHAPTER  FIVE 
THE INDONESIAN INVASION  
OF EAST TIMOR 
 
Introduction 
Mimetic theory insights into scapegoating and violence throw light on the history of 
the relationship between Australia and East Timor. In the previous chapter, the 
extremity of Timorese suffering in World War II was described as a particular type of 
scapegoating, using mimetic theory. The official Australian documentary record was 
shown as a collection of "texts of persecution", that is, modern day myths which 
recount the episode entirely from the point of view of successive Australian 
governments, as the dominant and victorious players, exonerating their actions and 
excluding appropriate recognition of the Timorese people and their suffering. Further 
aspects of mimetic theory can be applied when considering the next major event in the 
relationship between the two countries, that of the invasion of East Timor by 
Indonesia in 1975 and the involvement of Australia. In this infamous incident, 
Australian governments participated in the scapegoating of East Timor consistent with 
the actions and attitudes present in World War II. The outworking of the WWII 
attitude shown by Australia to sacrifice East Timor for its own security were 
reinforced and put on public display before, during and after the invasion. In this 
scenario, the communists were now perceived as the external threat that needed to be 
opposed. The great powers of the region – Indonesia, Australia and the US – agreed 
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that Timor had to be sacrificed in order to prevent this enemy from threatening any of 
these allies. 
 
In particular, this chapter asserts that the record of the Australian involvement in the 
Indonesian invasion contained in the Australian government's publication Australia 
and the Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976 almost completely exemplifies 
Girard's "romantic lie". These documents portray an imagined autonomy of policy and 
action, which is consistent with Girard’s notion of false autonomy in the romantic lie. 
Yet the authors' unconsciousness of the influence of others is unveiled by slavish 
imitation of their desires. In this case, the "romantic lie" reveals Australian inability to 
recognise its mimetic dependence on Indonesia (and other world powers) and the 
resultant sacrifice of East Timor to ensure security with Indonesia.  
 
From the documents, the chapter shows the dependence of Australia and Indonesia on 
each other to achieve security. A singular threat perceived by both nations was the 
growing communism in Asia. The actions of Indonesia in quelling its internal 
communists brought it a favoured position in the eyes of the United States, with 
consequent economic and military support.1 Perceptions of East Timor as courting 
communism made its position in relation to Australia and Indonesia precarious.2 
Indonesian tactics capitalised on political divisions in Portugal, broadcasting 
suggestions of Timorese communism in a process of subversion.3 Australian 
compliance with Indonesia was to thwart communism through the incorporation of 
Portuguese Timor into Indonesia, that is, through the sharing of a common scapegoat. 
                                                            
1 James Dunn, East Timor: A Rough Passage to Independence, 3rd ed. (Double Bay, NSW: 
Longueville Books, 2003), 115; 306. 
2 Dunn, East Timor, 161-162; 187. 
3 Dunn, East Timor, 139. 
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The threat of social destabilisation, seen by Indonesia and Australia to be promised by 
communism, was met by their combined channelling of fear onto a common enemy.4 
In this way a type of unanimity between the two nations was produced, within which 
the violence inflicted on the enemy, Portuguese Timor, was justified. Furthermore, 
Australia also sought to maintain and develop mutual regional protection and trade 
resulting from Indonesian control of the whole archipelago. Australia thus became 
willingly compliant with Indonesia as the Timorese people became the sacrifice 
required to repudiate communism and achieve the benefits of Indonesian expansion.  
 
The entanglement of Australia at this time flowed from unconscious Australian 
dependence on Indonesian desires, manifesting as politically astute decisions which 
sacrificed the weaker neighbour, Portuguese Timor. A particularly vivid example of 
the depths to which Australian governments descended in pursuit of Indonesian 
favour is discussed, that is, the matter of the deaths of the journalists, the "Balibo 
Five" and Roger East.5 Thus Indonesian desires became the model for Australian 
desires, engendering mimetic dependence, the record of which in official Australian 
documents remains a "romantic lie" that obscures this reality.  
 
Summary - The Indonesian Invasion  
The Indonesian annexation of Portuguese Timor was a result of long-held 
expansionist desires of Indonesia, evident in its acquisition of West New Guinea in 
1962 and its opposition to the creation of Malaysia up to 1966.6 In 1963 the US 
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advised Canberra that Indonesian desire to control Portuguese Timor was obvious.7 
This ambition was seen as caused by dissatisfaction with the amount of territory that 
Indonesia gained at independence.8 It also suggests the Indonesian view that Timor 
required rescue from the European coloniser Portugal.9 The withdrawal of Portugal 
and the threat of communism provided a proximate context for the realisation of those 
desires. The importance of Indonesia to Australia's political and economic prospects 
was demonstrated when, faced with Indonesia's intention to subsume East Timor upon 
the withdrawal of the Portuguese, Australia was careful not to oppose it.   
 
The establishment of the Democratic Republic of Indonesia in 1948 had drawn 
together peoples from a range of disparate cultures on the archipelago under one 
political umbrella, all of whom had experienced Dutch colonisation. The historical 
anomaly of the Portuguese colonisation of the eastern half of the island of Timor, 
however, prevented complete Indonesian control of the archipelago. In 1974 the 
Armed Forces Movement in Portugal overthrew the Salazar-Caetano regime, and 
Portugal began processes for the decolonisation of its overseas possessions – 
including the under-developed East Timor which it had administered for nearly 500 
years. A number of political parties emerged in East Timor. The UDT10 proposed that 
Portugal remain in control during preparation for independence, while FRETILIN,11 
advocated immediate independence as a republic.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
imor%2C+1974-1976&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&client=firefox-
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7 Way, ed., Beale to Barwick, 25. 
8 Bernard K. Gordon, “The Potential for Indonesian Expansionism,” Pacific Affairs 36 (4), (1963): 378, 
Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia, accessed 15 December, 2015, doi:10.2307/2754684.   
9 Gordon, “The Potential," 381. 
10 União Democrática Timorense – Timorese Democratic Union. 




In the face of the threat of the growth of communism in South-East Asia, accusations 
were directed at the unfolding political consciousness in Timor, particularly against 
Fretilin. Dunn states that there was not "a shred of evidence" to support any 
insinuations of communist influence in Portuguese Timor.12  Unfavourable 
judgements concerning the ability of the Timorese to govern themselves were voiced 
by both Indonesia and Australia.13 Division of opinion was apparent in Australia 
between government geo-political interests and a level of popular concern for the 
welfare of the Timorese people, resulting in the Australian government vacillating 
between upholding Timorese political rights and siding with Indonesia. Australian 
authorities remained on the sidelines, expressing the view that it would be easier to 
negotiate the resources of the Timor Sea with Indonesia, rather than with Portugal or 
an independent East Timor.14 Australian Prime Minister Whitlam signalled to 
Indonesia that integration of East Timor into Indonesia was inevitable. 
 
Covert Indonesian operations destabilised East Timor using accusations of 
communism as an excuse for infiltration and border attacks as Indonesia prepared to 
annex the territory by force.15 ⁠ The two main Timorese political parties united in a pro-
independence coalition early in 1975. The alliance was fragile as internal differences 
as to how independence was to be achieved were not resolved. It proved susceptible 
to Indonesian subversion based on accusations of Fretilin's supposed communist 
leanings.16 The parties split and a two-week war (August-September 1975) resulted in 
                                                            
12 James Dunn, "Communist Influence in Fretilin prior to the 1975 invasion," East Timor Action 
Network (ETAN), July 29 1998, accessed October 30, 2017, 
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13 Dunn, East Timor, 93. 
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15 Dunn, East Timor, 53. 
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the deaths of at least 1,500 people. The victorious Fretilin ⁠ party declared East Timor 
an Independent Republic on 28 November 1975.  
 
US President Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger had been in Jakarta for meetings with 
President Suharto on 6 December 1975, and discussed the impending invasion. 
Successive Australian governments validated the invasion as they worked to 
strengthen Australia's relationship with Indonesia (and with Asia generally). The 
policy of supporting Indonesian government policy continued with increasing 
determination at diplomatic levels, and the provision of arms and training to the 
military further underscored Australia's position. The following years saw repeated 
calls by the UN for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops. The record shows that 
Australia repeatedly voted against such withdrawal. ⁠17 
 
Some Australians were also victims of the invasion, about which subsequent 
Australian governments have made little effort to protest or find the truth. On 16 
October 1975 five Australian based journalists were killed at Balibo, a border-town in 
East Timor, by Indonesian troops in order to prevent them from reporting on 
Indonesian military operations preparing for the invasion.18 Another Australian 
journalist reporting on the situation, Roger East, was murdered on the day after the 
invasion, 8 December 1975. The deaths received wide coverage in Australia and were 
the subject of much public disquiet and conjecture. Denial and inaction characterised 
the official response to the killings during the Indonesian occupation and despite 
                                                            
17 United Nations, UN General Assembly Votes on East Timor (General Assembly Resolutions 1975-
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numerous inquiries over the subsequent thirty years.19 In 2007 a NSW Coroner's 
Inquiry found that the five in Balibo were murdered by the Indonesian military.20 As 
will be discussed, the Australian Federal Police were given the task of pursuing those 
named as responsible, but have since determined that there is not enough evidence to 




The Australian Government's 2000 publication Australia and the Incorporation of 
Portuguese Timor 1974-1976 contains many of the relevant documents concerning 
the events at the time of the invasion, and presents the government's rationale for its 
decisions and actions. As will be shown, with few exceptions the record neglects or 
obscures negative Australian actions towards East Timor regarding the invasion of 
East Timor and the prior deaths of the "Balibo Five". In so doing, it obscures 
Australian complicity in Timor’s persecution and betrays the unconscious influence of 
mimesis in the relationship between Australia and Indonesia.  
 
Understandably, the history of this fraught period was one of enormous complexity 
for the Australian government because of foreign policy difficulties faced at that time, 
especially the Vietnam War. Difficult choices had to be made between conflicting 
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interests, and the Australian response to these world problems was compounded by 
the internal political upheaval of the removal of the Labor Prime Minister towards the 
end of 1975, and the installation of a caretaker Coalition government, followed 
closely by a general election. Nevertheless, the written record of Australian 
involvement in the events concerning Portuguese Timor must be subject to scrutiny. 
This is required because Australian decisions and actions resulted in complicity with 
the forces which brought to the neighbouring Timorese people suffering and death on 
an horrific scale.  
 
The importance of Australia and the Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976 
consists in its status as a collection of major government documents with a Foreword 
by Alexander Downer, the Foreign Minister at the time of its publication. Its purposes 
are stated in the foreword:  
to provide readers...with a clearer understanding of the development of 
Australian foreign policy during this critical period and to go some way towards 
answering the many questions of those who have been concerned to obtain the 
truth about Australian official thinking and action in relation to the Indonesian 
incorporation of East Timor and the deaths of the Australian-based journalists 
there.22   
 
The book is composed of nearly 500 government documents which were released in 
2000, before the usual 30 years had expired for the publication of Commonwealth 
files. Its introduction is a concise summary of the events of 1974 to 1976, but it also 
contains the reasons for the selection of the cables and other primary source material 
within it, and explains their early release. Furthermore, the book contains a section 
titled Australia, Indonesia and Portuguese Timor 1945-1974, containing unnumbered 
notes, reports and memoranda from those times, prefaced by an overview. 
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The reasons given for the early release of the documents are stated as the desire to 
counter possible leaks from the Department of Foreign Affairs which the Introduction 
to the collection claims could have given an inaccurate picture of events.23 The writers 
explain the criteria for their selection of documents as their "significance to policy 
formation or key issues", and to demonstrate the historical complexities.24 In this 
regard, there is emphasis on the great volume of material, the layers of debate, and the 
limitations of documents to convey clearly the intricate nature of the events. Mention 
is made of intelligence material not released, missing files and promises of the 
availability of further files through the National Australian Archives. The human 
emotions (such as frustration and fatigue) of government officials at the time are 
described. There are mentions of accusations and demands by Indonesian officials,25 
the pressures of changes in staff of Embassies and outbursts of angry relatives of the 
Balibo Five.26 Indications appear of the dilemma of attempting to balance human 
rights, such as self-determination, with the "desire to maintain close relations with an 
Indonesia willing to subvert those principles in Portuguese Timor."27  
 
Nevertheless, the abundance of careful and comprehensive explanations of the 
Australian position suggests that justification for decisions was seen to be required for 
reasons other than explanations for the early release of the documents. Clearly, the 
book serves as an effort to vindicate the Australian government's position on the 
Indonesian invasion and the events concerning the Balibo Five. Indeed, the 
Introduction states: 
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The purpose of this action is not to challenge strongly held views, nor to blunt 
criticism. Rather the hope is that publication of this volume, together with 
early public access to all the relevant material, will permit a more measured 
appreciation of the bases on which recommendations on policy and decisions 
were made, provide a fuller context for material which has hitherto been made 
public, and in general replace speculation with greater knowledge.28  
 
Thus the publication seeks to explain the Australian position and policies surrounding 
the Indonesian invasion. It hopes that, as a result, readers would understand the 
complexities more completely. Interpreting this material from a Girardian perspective, 
however, provides a way of "seeing through the violence" but not in a form intended 
by the publication itself. Instead, the documents can be understood as an expression of 
what Girard terms the "romantic lie", material which presents the events in a way 
which "reflect the presence of a mediator without ever revealing it."29 As discussed in 
Chapter Two, the "romantic lie" describes texts oblivious of their own mimetic 
dependence and rivalry. Relationships, decisions and actions are presented as though 
from autonomous self-sufficiency. The writers of the Australian documents 
demonstrate their ignorance of the influence which the mediator, in this case 
Indonesia, wields. "The mediator remains hidden precisely where his revelation is of 
the utmost significance, in the existence of the author himself..."30  
 
Using this text, the chapter now proceeds to an overview of events, and then to a 
discussion of the Australian involvement in the Indonesian invasion of Portuguese 
Timor. The record of decisions and policies is interpreted as a "romantic lie".  
                                                            
28 Way, Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation, 1. 
29 René Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1965), 17. 
30 Girard,  Deceit, Desire and the Novel, 20. 
 
 162 
Australian knowledge of Indonesian desires  
The Indonesian expansionist mentality and desire to control the whole archipelago 
was apparent for decades, and was known by Australian governments. It took no great 
leap of imagination for Australia to reflect on the attractiveness of Portuguese Timor 
to Indonesia in the light of that nation's acquisition of West New Guinea in 1962, its 
hostility towards Singapore and its opposition to the creation of Malaysia between 
1962 and 1966.31 Consequent Australian dilemmas regarding Portuguese Timor were 
summarised in the introduction to Australia and the Incorporation of Portuguese 
Timor 1974-1976:  
From 1962 to 1965 the Australian Government faced the difficulty of resisting 
Indonesian aggression against Portuguese Timor without being seen to support 
Portuguese colonialism, or alternatively, trying to encourage an end to 
Portuguese rule in Timor without encouraging any precipitate action by 
Indonesia.32  
 
In 1962 an internal submission entitled Australian Attitude in Event of Indonesian 
Aggression determined that Australia could not help Portugal should a situation of 
Indonesian incursion arise, and proposed United Nations intervention.33 In 1963 the 
United States advised Canberra that Indonesian activities were already in train,34 and 
that there was no doubt that President Sukarno wanted control of Portuguese Timor.35 
Canberra stated that there was "no practicable alternative to Indonesian sovereignty" 
but that the use of arms would be unacceptable.36 Thus in the early 1960s there was a 
level of Australian realisation of Indonesian aspirations. 
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Nevertheless, in March 1963 the Portuguese Prime Minister António Salazar wrote to 
Prime Minister Menzies that the Indonesian government had on more than one 
occasion indicated that they "do not entertain any desire to possess Portuguese Timor" 
and that they declared lack of interest in securing Portuguese Timor.37 Menzies 
answered in October 1963 that such a denial of claims on the territory should no 
doubt be seen alongside Indonesia's declaration of support for all anti-colonial 
movements, including any which may occur in Timor.38 Menzies also commented that 
he had "no illusions about Indonesian tactics."39 Suspicions concerning Indonesian 
intentions were not allayed by Indonesian assurances, so Australian officials observed 
that involvement of the United Nations would make it more difficult for Indonesia to 
take "unilateral, violent action."40  
 
Adding to the intrigue, in 1963 there was reference to "a continuing expansionist 
sentiment among Indonesian leaders" and the opinion was reported that Timor's 
eventual "recovery" by Indonesia was a common belief among Indonesian leaders.41 
Such attitudes suggested Indonesian disappointment with the amount of territory 
apportioned to it upon independence, and its opinion that neighbouring regions 
contained oppressed and enslaved peoples awaiting the independence which 
Indonesian support could bring.  
 
In November 1964, Canberra advised Washington of evidence that Indonesia may 
have been on the verge of taking some form of action against Portuguese Timor, but 
by way of "only covert operations, the framework for which has already been 
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established."42 It was thought that Indonesia may attack "in response to a trumped-up 
plea for help."43 The cable contains the phrases "aggressive anti-colonial policy" and 
"likely attack."44 The Introduction to Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of 
Portuguese Timor comments that by the early 1970s Indonesia was no longer seen as 
a threat, and yet alludes to Indonesia's willingness to "subvert" the principles of self-
determination in Portuguese Timor.45     
 
Both Indonesia and Australia adopted ambiguous positions on East Timor during the 
time when Suharto was President from 1967 to 1998. In May 1974 Australian 
Ambassador Richard Woolcott stated that the Indonesians wished to avoid any 
appearance of having designs on Portuguese Timor which they feared could make 
neighbours suspect any political action as a desire to expand their territory.46 But just 
one month later, the appraisal of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta was "that 
Indonesian thinking on the possibility of taking over Portuguese Timor is well 
advanced, to the point of ascertaining likely local Indonesian reactions in the 
immediate area."47 Four weeks after that, it was known that a recommendation was to 
be made to President Suharto to "mount a clandestine operation in Portuguese Timor 
to ensure that the territory would opt for incorporation into Indonesia."48 Australian 
officials were concerned that President Suharto might circuitously indicate to Prime 
Minister Whitlam that Indonesia was thinking of "guiding developments in 
Portuguese Timor through covert activities,"49 thus making Australia complicit. 
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Officials also knew that official Indonesian thinking entailed the belief that it would 
"not be difficult to influence the result of a plebiscite in Portuguese Timor."50  
 
Thus the Indonesian desire to incorporate Portuguese Timor strengthened in resolve 
over two decades, despite its many disclaimers. The purge of communists from 
Indonesia in 1965 and the heightened fear of communism in Indonesia and Australia 
fuelled this desire further, and finally gave it justification. From the early years of the 
Indonesian Republic, therefore, Australia faced the dilemmas associated with 
opposition to a take-over by force, yet maintained the desire to comply with what 
appeared the only way forward, given a realpolitik reading of Indonesian intentions. 
Australian authorities showed awareness of this situation but demonstrated the 
approach that was to characterise Australian responses in the decades to come. That 
approach was a reluctance to challenge Indonesian expansionism despite suspicions as 
to the probable manner of attaining it.   
 
The Australian connections with the Indonesian invasion had thus been remotely 
established through prior realisation of Indonesian desires since the 1960s. Occasional 
diplomatic reports and conjecture had not elicited from Australia any clear 
denunciation or warning about any consequences of Indonesian movement against the 
rights of the colonising power Portugal. There was no statement concerning the 
possible effects of change, violent or otherwise, on the Timorese people, except for 
occasional references (in the context of worldwide decolonisation) to self-
determination. Australian knowledge of Indonesian desires was evolving into support 
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for the seizure of Portuguese Timor, an expression of the dependence on Indonesia 
which was to characterise future decades. 
 
Indonesian covert operations before invasion 
Lack of any Australian challenge to the increasing clarity of Indonesian intentions 
indicated the existence of Australian compliance with Indonesia which deepened in 
succeeding decades. Such willingness to agree in action with Indonesian desires – 
despite statements of opposition to the use of force – compromised Australia 
markedly as Indonesian authorities strengthened plans to incorporate Portuguese 
Timor. In the 1970s the Indonesian government furthered the cause of its desired 
integration of the territory through a two-edged programme of political and military 
intrigue. This programme progressively embroiled Australia.  
 
Indonesian diplomatic overtures to Australia and Portugal in late 1974 and early 1975 
accompanied a simultaneous but covert program of destabilisation of Portuguese 
Timor, taking advantage of internal Portuguese upheaval and its rapid withdrawal 
from its colonies. Having done little to prepare the Timorese people for these swift 
and extensive political challenges, Portugal was unable to address the unrest as the 
Timorese began to deal with the problems and possibilities which faced them. James 
Dunn comments: 
Indonesia was two-faced. Publicly, the Indonesian government was calling on 
Portugal to restore order in East Timor, while privately, having encouraged the 
disorder, they were pressing Lisbon to allow them to intervene. The Indonesians 
were also quietly obstructing Portuguese attempts to restore the situation 
through mediation.51  
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After meetings between Portugal's President Costa Gomes and an Indonesian 
delegation in Lisbon on 14-15 October 1975, the Indonesian government reported that 
they had reached a consensus with the Portuguese on integration as the best outcome, 
while referring to the East Timorese people’s right to a voice on their future.52 At the 
very same time the Indonesian government's process of destabilisation to influence 
Timor's new politicians to support incorporation was underway.53 When it was 
apparent in early 1975 that Timorese resistance to that idea was too strong, plans for a 
military solution were set in train. The resulting campaign named Operasi Komodo 
included covert military preparations, complete with a rehearsal for an invasion on the 
beaches of Sumatra in February, and the spreading of disinformation, particularly 
through Indonesian and foreign media.54 An associated intelligence campaign, 
Operasi Flamboyan, was devised and directed within the Department of Defence and 
Security from October to December 1975.55 The Indonesian government lied about 
the presence of its troops on the border, claiming that any military in that area were 
Timorese fighting other Timorese. In truth, Indonesian troops were assembling in 
preparation for an invasion.56 This Indonesian duplicity was echoed by Australia, as 
discussed below. 
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Prime Minister Gough Whitlam's influence on the invasion of Portuguese Timor 
displayed a style of leadership which demonstrated a lack of discernment and 
consultation and left a legacy which remains controversial. When elected in 1972 he 
took the role of Foreign Minister as well as Prime Minister. Despite relinquishing the 
lesser portfolio in November 1973 he continued to control foreign policy closely and 
acted as Foreign Minister when his appointee Don Willesee was overseas.  
 
An impossible Australian position regarding Portuguese Timor was formulated by 
Whitlam when he stressed a preference for integration, with "obeisance" to self-
determination57 (later expressed as "lip-service" by the Ambassador to Indonesia, 
Richard Woolcott).58 Foreign Affairs Minister Willesee, on the other hand, was more 
in favour of actual self-determination, and worked to convince Indonesia that the 
outcome of such a process could be lived with and need not imply instability. Urging 
caution and the importance of giving time to resolve the difficulties Willesee stated: 
"Their (Portuguese Timor's) future should be decided by an act of self-determination 
recognised by the world."59 Nevertheless, Whitlam's approach prevailed so 
comprehensively over Willesee's that the Timor policy was not discussed formally, 
even in the Labor Cabinet.60  
 
The extent of Australian involvement in the preparations for the invasion is clear in 
the record of two meetings between Prime Minister Whitlam and President Suharto in 
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Indonesia, on 6 September 197461 and in Australia on 4 April 1975.62 During these 
meetings Suharto emphasised his concern for Indonesian and regional security and 
claimed that Indonesia, having "no territorial ambitions" would not seek to colonise 
others and "would never contemplate" such a thing as an invasion.63 He told Prime 
Minister Whitlam that there were two alternatives: either Portuguese Timor became 
incorporated with another country or it became independent. The latter option was 
problematic in his view, as he felt the territory was not economically viable and 
would have to enlist external support. He voiced the fear that as the territory's only 
possible interest to others would be political, communist countries such as China or 
the Soviet Union might intervene. In that case, he said, Timor would become "a thorn 
in the eye of Australia and a thorn in Indonesia's back."64 This attitude was the public 
rationale and private motivator for Indonesia to act, supported by Australia and the 
US.  
 
Whitlam was of the opinion that Portuguese Timor should become part of Indonesia, 
while stating the view, as did President Suharto, that the incorporation should happen 
in accordance with the properly expressed wishes of the Timorese people.65 Both 
leaders expressed the principles of decolonisation. At the same time, both knew of the 
covert methods underway to ensure Indonesian aspirations were realised. 
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Contradictory policies    
It was believed that Australia's fundamental desire for security would be fulfilled by 
cooperation with the Indonesian quest to solve its problem with Timor. The question 
arises as to the effect this dependence on Indonesia had on Australian policies and 
operation. It is apparent from Australia and the Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 
1974-1976, as well as in subsequent historical commentaries, that the Australian 
policy of acquiescence to the Indonesian desire for control of the territory had two 
contradictory features. In the first place, Australia echoed Indonesia's proclamation of 
acceptance of the Timorese right to decide their future, and publicly stated its belief in 
the right of all people to self-determination, in accordance with the international thrust 
towards decolonisation and independence which became the norm after World War II. 
At the same time, however, the obvious desire of Indonesia to assimilate Portuguese 
Timor outweighed the importance of the principle of self-determination under Labor 
and Liberal governments alike. Prime Minister Whitlam's personal opinion was that 
East Timor should become part of Indonesia, on the proviso that the people would 
choose that course of action in a process of self-determination.  He told Suharto that 
he expected his view to prevail in government.66  
 
Government cables indicate the Australian officials' belief that the public interest was 
best served by the pragmatism of aligning policy with that of Indonesia.67 This was 
expressed as: "there are circumstances in which our principles need to be tempered by 
a realistic assessment of our long-term national interest."68 Thus it was seen that there 
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was importance in "weighing carefully Australia's long term interests against short 
term frustration and disappointment."69  
 
Balancing these interests meant that the incorporation of Timor with Indonesia was 
found preferable to allowing the possibility of Timorese independence. This was 
based on a biased, pragmatic and ultimately incorrect judgement of Australia's long-
term interests. It was the support of a larger power given to a colonising power 
victimising a smaller group. Australian dependence on Indonesia exemplifies the 
process of mimesis, that is, that desire is not autonomous but rather arises in relation 
to the other. In this case, the Australian support for Timor’s integration increased as 
Indonesia asserted itself, mutually reinforcing each other’s desire for "security" 
despite the detrimental effects on Timor. The strategic reasons given to justify this 
support were a cover for this mutually reinforcing relationship, which solidified both 
parties’ over-arching desires for security and territory (which themselves had been 
imitated from each one’s colonial models, UK, USA and The Netherlands).  
 
To maintain support for Indonesia, the Australian position was composed of two 
irreconcilable elements: that the Timorese people should be allowed to determine 
their future but that they should choose integration.70 This contradictory reasoning 
appears in Woolcott's April cable to Foreign Minister Don Willesee:  
While we support the principle of self-determination and while we certainly 
could not condone the use of force, the prime minister still does not want to 
encourage the emergence of an independent East Timor and he believes that 
continuing public emphasis on self-determination, at this stage, is likely to 
strengthen pressures for independence.71  
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Testimony to the impossibility of meeting both requirements, neither Whitlam nor 
Suharto raised the problem of which objective would prevail in the likely event that 
the two opposite aims could not be reconciled, although both leaders voiced distrust 
of a process of self-determination.72  
 
Such a weak policy burdened Australia with further dilemmas concerning the means 
which Indonesia was prepared to use to gain its desired outcome. In June 1975 
Ambassador Woolcott voiced awareness of the extent of the force which Indonesia 
was considering when he alluded to "the seeds of further trouble."73 Australian 
officials thence juggled an official policy of supporting self-determination while 
hoping for Timor's integration with Indonesia. This stance resulted in a position that 
when Indonesia invaded, the government would condemn the force used, but accept 
the outcome. The fence-sitting indicates Australian dependence on Indonesian desires 
and friendship. Contradictory policies were preferable to challenging the dependent 
relationship. 
 
Placating the Australian public and Indonesia 
As well as trying to balance contradictory policies, the Australian government also 
had to balance Australian domestic expectations with Indonesia's preferences in the 
lead-up to the invasion. Whitlam stated that proceedings towards Indonesia's desired 
option take place "in a way that would not upset the Australian people."74 Woolcott 
wrote to the head of the Department of Foreign Affairs Alan Renouf:  
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It is worth recording-for limited distribution only-that the Prime Minister put 
his views on this subject frankly in the following way: "I want it incorporated 
but I do not want this done in a way which will create argument in Australia 
which would make people more critical of Indonesia".75  
 
Whitlam's nod to self-determination was an empty gesture and nothing more, yet such 
double talk was echoed when the Coalition formed government in December 1975. 
Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock expressed "deep regret" at the Indonesian invasion, 
while in the same message acknowledging the "gravity of the problems posed for the 
Indonesian government."76 Ultimately Canberra had to acknowledge that its policy of 
support for self-determination was incompatible with forced integration, so further 
manoeuvring was required. The Introduction to Australia and the Incorporation of 
Portuguese Timor summarises the decisions officials took to play a double game.77 
They chose to pursue a course of outward non-involvement rather than openly 
favouring incorporation with Indonesia, while at the same time operating behind the 
scenes to moderate Indonesian fears of an independent East Timor. They also 
promised Timorese leaders that Australia would accept any result of a genuine act of 
self-determination.78 Australian officials discussed alternatives with Indonesia,79 and 
enticements for Portugal to remain,80 and considered the effects of any invasion on 
relations with Australia.81 Yet, none of these actions mitigated the implicit support 
given to Indonesia.  
 
One of the most infamous phrases associated with Australia's dilemmas regarding 
East Timor was written by Ambassador Woolcott. He acknowledged that his support 
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for the inevitable takeover by Indonesia leaned towards pragmatism rather than 
principle: 
Basically, this situation is Portugal's – not Indonesia's – fault. Given this 
Hobson's choice, I believe Australia's interests are better served by association 
with Indonesia than by independence. I know that what I am writing is 
pragmatic rather than principled; but that is what national interest and foreign 
policy is all about, as even those countries with established ideological bases 
for their foreign policies have acknowledged. Let us not play the role of the 
naive conscience of Asia, seeking to preserve our virtues by placing the fig 
leaf of self-determination - when we know it is unlikely to happen anyway - 
over the geopolitical realities of the situation. Inevitably Timor will be part of 
Indonesia.82   
 
The statement is a supposedly hard-headed statement of foreign affairs policy but 
indicates the belief that the national interest is best served by values only when they 
are unchallenged or serve economic or political objectives. In other words, Woolcott 
advises subjecting cherished Australian independence to agreement with Indonesia for 
the sake of the "national interest". The same reference to pragmatism over principle 
was also used by Woolcott in a cablegram to Canberra one month beforehand, again 
preferring association with Indonesia rather than exercising independence, but in the 
context of the greater ease of negotiations over the Timor Sea border.83 Australian 
independence was thus secondary to gaining the security believed to be afforded by 
such association, and the benefits which would follow maritime border negotiations.  
Despite qualified support for the Indonesian desire to subsume East Timor, the 
Australian government was subjected to some indignity. It endured the ignominy of 
Indonesian accusations while endeavouring to support the Indonesian position. 
Indonesian government officials summoned Foreign Minister Woolcott on 7 
September 1975 to protest alleged reports of Australian assistance to Portugal which 
they said, erroneously, was tantamount to recognising Fretilin as a de facto 
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government, claiming that Australia was acting "contrary to Indonesia's interests."84 
Australia was accused of being the only country in the region "acting in a way which 
could be unhelpful to Indonesia and the region's long term interests" and were 
"victims of a Portuguese plan", referring to that nation's "duplicity."85 Just days later, 
Australia was said to have refused to co-operate with Indonesia to restore law and 
order in Timor.86 Thereafter further complaints were issued by Indonesian officials to 
their Australian counterparts with anger and agitation. They referred to Australian 
street demonstrations as illustrations of Australian opposition. They accused 
Australians of fighting with Fretilin. They denounced attitudes of the Australian 
media and lack of concern for refugees in Indonesian Timor.87 Australian officials 
were reduced to discussing the political implications of food aid to Portuguese 
Timor.88  
 
Such responses by Indonesia suggest a sense of paranoia in its desire to acquire the 
territory, and an irrational perception that Australia may pose obstacles to its 
acquisition, in this way becoming a mimetic rival for the possession of the island. The 
Australian mimetic response was to agree, acquiesce and cooperate. The result was a 
policy direction distinguished by duplicity, compromise and complicity that caused 
disagreement in government and division in the population. It fundamentally 
indicated the domination of Indonesia as the model for the Australian desire for 
security. Ultimately, Australia's 1975 pragmatism brought serious challenges to the 
relationship with Indonesia when Timor-Leste eventually gained independence.  
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Further complications ensued from the Australian lack of resistance to Indonesian 
desires. Australia was being drawn into complicity with Indonesia through Australian 
officials' knowledge of what was happening. Indonesian officials were informing 
Australians at the Embassy in Jakarta by July 1974 that covert operations were 
underway in Portuguese Timor to manipulate Timorese opinion. Robert Furlonger, the 
then Ambassador to Indonesia, wrote regarding the provision of such sensitive 
information: "We are, in effect, being consulted."89 Ball and McDonald detail how 
Australia was repeatedly told of sensitive Indonesian actions by Indonesian officials 
as well as by persons in the Indonesian Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS).90 Furthermore, Australia was receiving information from the United States on 
the situation. Toohey and Wilkinson show that documents which were the accounts of 
the situation given to the US President Gerald Ford each day revealed "that the US 
knew that Indonesia had been conducting a covert paramilitary campaign against East 
Timor for over a year before the full-scale invasion in late 1975."91 In September the 
US knew that there was to be a three-pronged attack on the north coast involving two 
battalions attacking Dili and supported later by 6,000 infantry who would drive in 
from West Timor.92 On 14 October Indonesia planned to have the units move into 
Portuguese Timor in uniform but without insignia and using old Soviet weapons to 
evade recognition as Indonesian military.93 Advice to President Ford clearly stated the 
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Indonesian duplicity of denial of intervention, placing responsibility on Portugal and 
the Timorese, while increasing its covert operations in Timor.94   
 
Australia was privy to much of this information. Toohey and Wilkinson comment: 
"Under intelligence-sharing arrangements with Australia, a large part of this 
information was passed on to Canberra."95 Reinforcing advice from the United States, 
Ambassador Woolcott relayed to Canberra his knowledge of the planning for the 
invasion, including numbers of troops, time and place of attacks, and the fact that the 
Indonesians would be dressed as Timorese.96 Dispensing with official reports of 
widespread Fretilin control of Timor,97 Woolcott wrote of Indonesia's determination 
to incorporate Portuguese Timor, regardless of any international criticism.98 Official 
Australian imitation of Indonesian desires was clearly stated by Woolcott: 
An example of the Indonesian Government's confidence that the Australian 
Government understands and is sympathetic with its objective of integration is 
the extent to which it keeps us informed of its secret plans.99  
 
The Minister for Defence in 1975, Bill Morrison, later said that Australia:  
...had received too much detailed information, thus creating a situation that the 
Australian Government knew more about these events than the Indonesian 
Foreign Minister or the Indonesian Ambassador. Hence, as a matter of 
protocol, they kept up the pretence of not knowing.100   
 
Australian mimetic dependence on Indonesia and corresponding complicity in its 
actions was comprehensive indeed. 
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Australian Mimetic Dependence 
Australian imitation of Indonesian desires  
Shared complicity in the invasion, even acknowledging the vastly different roles taken 
by Australia and Indonesia, indicates mutual dependence. Both nations reinforced 
each other's desires through imitation in the operation of mimetic attraction and 
dependency, Australia complying with Indonesia, and Indonesia displaying the need 
for Australian acquiescence to its plans. Each nation also desired the economic 
benefits to be gained by an Indonesian takeover: Indonesia would control of more of 
the archipelago, and Australia would enjoy easier negotiations regarding the resources 
of the Timor Sea.101 The Indonesian desire to subsume Portuguese Timor became the 
desire of Australian governments as a means of maintaining a positive relationship 
with Indonesia and benefitting from consequent political and material security. 
 
Crucial Australian decisions and actions during the invasion of Portuguese Timor not 
only betrayed the Australian imitation of Indonesian desires, but consequent imitation 
of Indonesian procedures. As has been outlined, Australian and Indonesian 
judgements on the future of Portuguese Timor were comparable, with both leaders 
voicing identical concerns. At the same time, each nation undertook positions which 
were internally contradictory. Indonesian diplomats pronounced on the necessity of 
international involvement, while covertly destabilising the situation. Similarly, 
Australian officials declared support for Timorese self-determination but 
compromised that position with the precondition of integration. Thus, the ‘rational’ 
policy positions of each country were in effect merely complex cover for underlying 
desires for security and territory. 
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The Australian government's dilemma consisted in mitigating public opposition while 
trying to give least offence to Indonesia. Choosing both positions resulted in 
ineffectual pronouncements about the violence of the Indonesian incorporation 
alongside declarations of understanding and support for Indonesian problems. In 
Girardian terms, these public Australian positions functioned unconsciously as 
"myths". They were used by the government to justify to the population the 
maintenance of support for the Indonesian desire to acquire Timor in the hope of 
possessing resulting security. At the same time they attempted to legitimise the means 
of that possession – the violent take-over of Portuguese Timor. 
 
Moreover, the subversive Indonesian operations preceding the invasion were known 
to Australian officials via United States' intelligence and as a result of Indonesian 
disclosures to Australian Embassy staff in Jakarta. In spite of that, the Australian 
government allowed matters to take their course. One of the effects of this passivity in 
the face of Indonesian determination involved the deaths of the Balibo Five, a matter 
which has not yet attained resolution, and which is detailed further in this chapter. The 
overarching Indonesian desire to incorporate Portuguese Timor, as well as the 
duplicitous methods used, was imitated by Australian docility and agreement, which 
assured the desired strategic, economic and political security. The act of violent 







Mutual mimetic dependence  
The similarity of desire between Australia and Indonesia resulted in a reciprocal 
relationship which blurred the distinctions between them. The CAVR report 
summarises: "It ...seems to have been Woolcott's view that it should be the overriding 
objective of Australian policy simply because it was the overriding objective of 
Indonesian policy."102  Girard's insight applies: "Internal mediation triumphs in a 
universe where the differences between men are gradually erased."103  
 
Subsequent historical interpretations generally agree that Whitlam gave Suharto "the 
green light" to invade Portuguese Timor.104 In this respect the CAVR Report 
comments: "For all his reservations, there is evidence that the views Whitlam 
expressed do seem to have strongly influenced the Indonesian decision that there was 
no alternative to incorporation."105 His reasons for supporting the integration of 
Portuguese Timor were the territory's supposed lack of political and economic 
viability, and its vulnerability to the designs of more powerful states. In other words, 
his opinions were almost identical to Suharto's, indicating the extent of official 
Australian agreement with Indonesian desires.  
 
But despite evidence of Indonesian designs on Portuguese Timor over decades, 
Indonesian officials indicated that it was Australia which was the catalyst for their 
decision to invade. In October 1974 the Australian Ambassador to Portugal, Frank 
Cooper, reported that Ali Moertopo, the head of the covert Special Operations project 
for Timor, had told him that a meeting between President Suharto and Prime Minister 
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Whitlam in September had convinced Indonesia that integration of Portuguese Timor 
was the only solution:  
Ali said that until Mr Whitlam's visit to Djakarta, they had been undecided 
about Timor. However the Prime Minister's support for the idea of 
incorporation into Indonesia had helped them to crystallise their own thinking 
and they were now firmly convinced of the wisdom of this course.106  
 
These claims of "crystallisation" of the thinking of Indonesian officials after 
Whitlam's visit – and the contention that incorporation of Timor had dawned upon 
them as a result – demonstrate the relationship of mimetic dependency between the 
two nations. While these comments seem at odds with evidence of prior Indonesian 
desires, they serve to show the fluid state of the relationship. “Crystallisation” is a 
sophisticated way of saying that Australia had further stimulated the Indonesian 
government officials towards integration and that Australia would not act as a block 
(or scandal) to the achievement of such a desire. The comments may well have served 
to allay Indonesia's concerns of negative reaction to an invasion, but they also 
constituted a further subtle means of involving Australia, with the suggestion that the 
determination to incorporate Portuguese Timor was a result of Whitlam's attitudes and 
words. By claiming that, having previously been undecided, the Australian Prime 
Minister's "support for the idea of incorporation" had helped the Indonesians to see 
"the wisdom" of such action, Indonesia reversed the roles of model and subject in 
mimetic dependence. It situated itself in the place of the desiring subject, with 
Australia as the mediator.  
 
Thus the Australian mimetic dependence on Indonesian desires was complete enough 
to reflect itself back to the Indonesians, strengthening the mutual mimetic 
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dependence. Girard refers to such reciprocity in stating that it is "synonymous with 
the ability that humans have to increasingly imitate one another while at the same 
time completely misapprehending the fact that they are doing so."107  Both Australia 
and Indonesia became models for each other, their similar attitudes to the take-over of 
Portuguese Timor reflecting the shared desire for the mutually perceived good of 
shared political and economic interests. In the case of both nations the influence of the 
other resulted in similar effects on judgement: "From the moment the mediator's 
influence is felt, the sense of reality is lost and judgement is paralysed."108 While 
Indonesia was the perpetrator of the physical invasion, Australia was deferential to its 
designs. Shared desires manufactured a shared judgement as to the future of the 
eastern half of Timor and its people. 
 
The die was cast. The invasion of Portuguese Timor began at dawn on 7 December 
1975. Indonesian troops launched a massive attack on the capital Dili from sea and 
air, looting, raping and killing indiscriminately. Many civilians were killed and many 
fled with Fretilin forces into the mountains. Simultaneous attacks occurred in Baucau 
to the east and Liquiça to the west of Dili. Thus began the occupation of East Timor 
by Indonesia which lasted for twenty-four years. Apart from some subdued initial 
comments opposing the invasion which soon lapsed from official commentary, the 
Australian position on the Indonesian invasion grew steadily into one of support, as 
will be demonstrated in the next chapter.  
 
                                                            
107 René Girard, Battling to the End: conversations with Benoît Chantre, trans. Mary Baker (East 
Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2010), 57. 
108 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, 4. 
 
 183 
The "Romantic Lie" 
The servility of the Australian support of Indonesian desires occurred in the events 
themselves, and is mirrored in official accounts which the Australian government has 
made available for public consumption. As discussed, the official record in Australia 
and the Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976 supplies evidence for these 
conclusions in the cables and other primary source material contained therein, 
exemplifying Girard's theory of the "romantic lie". Australian governments and their 
officials believed they were acting autonomously on behalf of the Australian people, 
taking independent decisions for national security, balancing the many and varied 
competing influences, and thus ensuring Australian sovereignty and security. The 
communications express the policies of the Australian Government as though they 
were the incisive and dispassionate product of policy realists.  
 
Yet the text of the official record betrays a largely unconscious imitation of the model 
Indonesia. In realpolitik terms, while Australia was aware that it needed Indonesia 
and the US for security in the face of the unfolding communist influence, in its 
historical record that dependency is veiled. The official record resembles the tale of 
Don Quixote who "effectively abandons any independent judgement of his own."109 
Girard's interpretation of Cervantes' story shows Don Quixote basing all his desires on 
a fictional knight, Amadis, imitating knightly exploits in a vain attempt to become 
something which he was not, the epitome of chivalry. Girard recognised that 
Cervantes understood the human surrender of mimetic dependence, expressing that 
realisation in the character of his novel who relinquishes the choice of his own 
desires: "the individual's fundamental prerogative."110 Significant Australian historical 
                                                            
109 Kirwan, Discovering Girard, 17. 
110 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, 1. 
 
 184 
documents demonstrate a similar Australian surrender of independent judgement in 
regard to historical decisions and actions. The policies and actions through which 
Portuguese Timor was sacrificed to regional concerns are recorded in a way which 
betrays the Australian inability to comprehend the scale of its dependence on the 
desires of Indonesia, and the terrible suffering in which it became complicit as a 
result. The Australian documentary record of its involvement in the Indonesian 




Identification of the Australian documentary record as a "romantic lie" is particularly 
demonstrated by investigating the record of Australian deaths during the invasion. 
Again, the events demonstrate the dependence of Australian governments on 
Indonesian good favour, and the record illustrates the lack of Australian perception of 
that dependence. The presence of Australian-based journalists in the border town of 
Balibo introduced the problem of the murders not only of Timorese, but of Australian 
residents and nationals. The deaths of the so-called "Balibo Five" exemplify how the 
Australian government sacrificed the lives and truth of the deaths of its own citizens, 
alongside the many Timorese who died, for its coveted security and relationship with 
Indonesia. Discussion of the inquiries and the documentary record concerning the 
events at Balibo demonstrate the incapacity of Australia to acknowledge the force of 
its mimetic dependence on Indonesia. 
 
Briefly, two of the journalists attempting to report on the Indonesian invasion of 
Portuguese Timor in 1975 were Australian citizens, Greg Shackleton and Tony 
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Stewart. The other three were Australian residents, Gary Cunningham from New 
Zealand, and Brian Peters and Malcolm Rennie from Britain. All were working for 
Australian media companies. The five were murdered and their bodies burned by 
Indonesian military on 16 October 1975 in the Timorese border town of Balibo, to the 
west of Dili. A journalist operating independently, Roger East, was shot on the Dili 
wharf on 8 December, the day after the invasion. There was no Australian 
government challenge to Indonesia over the deaths of its residents and citizens, 
murdered while carrying out the tasks of their employment. Moreover, the record 
indicates increasing rather than diminishing Australian compliance, as can be seen in 
the outcomes of the investigations which occurred in subsequent decades. The 
responses of Australian governments and their agencies to the evidence complete the 
picture of abject subservience to Indonesian desires and the mob mentality of the 
invasion. The extent of that chosen subjection has resulted in a culpable variant of 
"romantic lie", where Australian governments ignore and defy the outcomes of their 
own legal processes. Girard's concept of the romantic lie presupposes some level of 
unconsciousness of mimetic dependency (as has been outlined in the Australia-
Indonesia relationship). The case of the Balibo Five, however, provides evidence for 
some awareness of this dependency in the strategic way that the Australian 
government sought to protect Indonesia and the official relationship between the 
governments of each country. This awareness came about because of complicity in 
the invasion – both governments knew they had to obscure and minimise anything 
that could cause the invasion to be questioned. Thus, the awareness only operated on a 
certain level – on the level of moral complicity that threatened the attainment of desire 
and the relationship that enabled this attainment. Each government still thought they 
were pursuing a "rational" policy, although each was heavily dependent on the other 
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for such policy. The way in which the Balibo Five deaths were handled signalled the 
tenor of Australian dealings with Indonesia in the subsequent twenty-four year 
occupation: neglect and obscuration of evidence to deflect attention from a 
burgeoning moral insight, the innocence of the victims of Indonesian violence. 
 
Inquiries into the deaths of the Balibo Five 
Inspired by this moral insight, there have been major inquiries and reports on the 
deaths of these men in attempts to determine accountability.111 In 1976 there was a 
report from the Australian Embassy in Indonesia, followed two decades later in 1996 
and 1999 by two reports by Tom Sherman, Chairman of the National Crime 
Authority. The International Commission of Jurists held a Colloquium on the matter 
in 1997 and there was an investigation by the United Nations in 2000. A classified 
report by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security was submitted to the 
Australian government in 2002. In 2005 the CAVR stated "the five journalists were 
not killed in crossfire or as an unfortunate side-effect of the Indonesian operation to 
take Balibo." It announced "that its own findings support the case for further 
investigation of the elusive truth of this matter."112  
 
Subsequently in 2007 the NSW Coroner held an inquest into the death of Brian Peters 
which interviewed new witnesses, revealed previously unseen intelligence 
information, had the power to compel evidence, and demonstrated a high level of 
judicial independence and impartiality.113 The inquest found that Peters (and by 
association his four companions) was murdered by the advancing Indonesians "to 
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prevent him from revealing that Indonesian Special Forces had participated in the 
attack on Balibo."114 The journalists were not accidentally killed, as had previously 
been offered in official explanations. The perpetrators of the murders were named as 
members of the Indonesian Special Forces, including Major-General Benny Murdani, 
Colonel Dading Kalbuadi, Cristoforo da Silva and Yunus Yosfiah.115  Murdani died in 
2004 after a career as ABRI Commander from 1983 to 1988 and in government.116 
Kalbuadi died in 1999, having been significant in the invasion and in his subsequent 
military career. Of the lower level officers, Silva and Yosfiah returned to normal life, 
the latter having been promoted in the military and gaining high government positions 
in civil life.117 After an eight-month inquiry by the NSW State Coroner, the matter 
was formally referred to the Attorney-General's Department, which charged the 
Australian Federal Police (AFP) to launch the investigation which began on 20 
August 2009.118  
 
For the next five years the AFP conducted the investigation. In the latter part of that 
time period discussions concerning jurisdiction,119 progress of the case,120 the status 
of witnesses,121 and instances of Indonesian refusal to cooperate,122 were undertaken 
in Australian Senate Committees. Then suddenly on 20 October 2014, the Australian 
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Federal Police, in a statement made in answer to a question asked by a reporter in the 
context of the 39th anniversary of the murders, announced that its investigation had 
ceased.123 The statement read: 
The AFP has exhausted all reasonable avenues in investigating the 
circumstances surrounding the death of the journalists....The AFP intends 
closing its investigation into this matter.124   
 
Thus the policing body of the Commonwealth of Australia decided to end the 
investigation despite the comprehensive and conclusive findings of the latest of the 
many investigations and the naming of persons of interest. While harm to the 
relationship between Australia and Indonesia may have been minimised as a result of 
this decision, the Indonesian nationals responsible for the murders of Australian 
civilians committed in the name of the Indonesian military outside a theatre of war 
have not been brought to justice.  
 
 
Behind the decision of the Australian Federal Police to cease investigation lies the 
same spectre of offending Indonesia which lay at the back of the Australian position 
regarding the invasion and occupation. Seen in the context of the extraordinary 
lengths to which Australian governments and their agencies have gone to ignore the 
findings of the coronial inquest, and in the clear lack of justice applied to the Balibo 
Five, their families and the Australian public, it is clear that the subjection of 
Australia to the mediation of Indonesia is very strong. The Balibo Five saga shows 
that Australian actions, as well as the official documentation of those actions, reflect 
the presence of the mediator, Indonesia, and the complicity of Australia in support of 
Indonesia in violence. Successive Australian governments' failures to these residents, 
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a situation which persists to the present day, indicate the depth of the Australian 
enthralment by the model, Indonesia. 
 
Claims to independence as well as concern for truth and justice regarding the deaths 
of its own citizens and residents were eroded for Australia in the face of the need to 
imitate its model and partner in security. An interpretation based on Girard's mimetic 
theory draws the veil away, showing the strength of the influence of mimesis. 
Australia is shown to be Indonesia's dependent partner, endeavouring to protect 
Indonesia from accusations that could threaten its moral standing. 
 
Challenges to the Australian "Romantic Lie" 
Munster and Walsh 
The efforts of writers, activists, journalists and others to present honest interpretation 
of the facts have challenged the official Australian attempts to conceal government 
dealings in the invasion of Portuguese Timor. One major early episode of truth-telling 
occurred in late 1980. George Munster and Richard Walsh drew together selections of 
the written advice to governments given by senior Australian public servants in a 
variety of international situations, including that of Portuguese Timor. They attempted 
to publish them in a book called Documents on Australian Defence and Foreign 
Policy 1968-1975. Within 24 hours of the publication of extracts in newspapers, the 
Commonwealth of Australia issued injunctions against the authors and distributors, 
and succeeded in denying further publication via Copyright Law. Two years later 
Walsh and Munster published an abbreviated version as Secrets of State which 
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contains the Introduction to the banned book.125 In it they comment on some advice 
given to government as "widespread pretensions to official expertise" which caused 
them relief on occasions when such advice did not become policy. They stated, 
however, that "this was because the Australian government had neither the capacity 
nor the opportunity to intervene in the course of events."126 The truth of this 
judgement is borne out by the Australian unwillingness to confront Indonesia over its 
invasion of Timor. Australia did not intervene even when Indonesian plans were 
obvious, as has been discussed. Australia's lack of capacity or opportunity to mediate 
was not absolute. Its potential and possibility for diplomatic challenge – at the very 
least – was overridden by its mimetic dependence on Indonesia which drove policy in 
regard to East Timor. 
 
The government hoped that its 2000 publication of Australia and the Incorporation of 
East Timor would allay the population's concerns at government decisions and actions 
regarding East Timor. Walsh and Munster had demonstrated that Australian policy as 
an episode "when misleading analysis was associated with misdirected action."127 
Referring to the invasion of East Timor they state: "The Australian part fell 
somewhere between ineffectuality in heading off the invasion and complicity in 
encouraging it."128 They mention a Foreign Affairs paper written in October 1975 
which termed the Timor problem "essentially trivial compared to the importance of 
retaining good relations with Indonesia's rulers."129 The document in which the Timor 
question is described as "essentially trivial" is not included in the government 
collection discussed in this dissertation. 
                                                            
125 Walsh and Munster, Secrets of State, vii, viii. 
126 Walsh and Munster, Secrets of State, viii. 
127 Walsh and Munster, Secrets of State, viii. 
128 Walsh and Munster, Secrets of State, ix. 
129 Walsh and Munster, Secrets of State, ix. 
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Munster and Walsh's books join those of other Australians critical of the Australian 
position on East Timor that show Australian government actions to have been 
unprincipled, self-serving and complicit. These publications demonstrate Australia's 
accommodation of Indonesian desires, decisions and actions, demonstrating a 
complicity which was directed against an innocent victim, the Timorese people.  
 
Moral insights in documents 
Intriguingly, there are some slight allusions to a more realistic appreciation of the 
Australian dependence on Indonesia and to alternative policy approaches in the very 
collection of documents under discussion. These illustrate Girard's reference to 
"chinks and cracks" in texts of historical persecution, through which the face of the 
victim was seen.130 Among the most notable are comments by the Australian 
Ambassador to Portugal at the time, Frank Cooper, who wondered whether 
government officials had all been so mindful of the overriding importance of our 
long-term relations with Indonesia that it had "inhibited us too much in what we have 
said to the Indonesians."131 When considering the Australian government's move 
towards recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over Portuguese Timor two years later, 
he referred to his belief : 
...that our policies should not merely promote our national interests, but that 
they should also be based on certain moral principles such as respect for 
human rights and the settlement of disputes by negotiation rather than force. If 
the Government now decides to recognise what it has previously condemned 
the question many people will ask is not whether we can live with it but 
whether we can live with ourselves.132 
 
                                                            
130 René Girard, The Scapegoat, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986), 37. 
131 Way, Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation, Doc. 371 Cablegram to Canberra, 621-622. 
132 Way, Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation, Cablegram, 834-836. 
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Ambassador Cooper thus allowed the face of the scapegoated victim to emerge from 
behind the mask with which Australian governments attempted to cover their 
complicity, inadequacy and dependence. 
 
Furthermore, a summary of the events in East Timor up to the UN ballot in 1999, in 
the Introduction to Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation, includes a distinctive 
paragraph which hints at some recognition of the enormity of the results of Australian 
dependence on Indonesian desires: 
Almost twenty-five years after its integration with Indonesia, and after a 
formal vote to end that integration, East Timor remains a divisive and emotive 
issue in the history of Australian foreign policy. The complex and difficult 
policy issue has been overlain by individual tragedies: first the deaths of six 
Australia-based journalists in circumstances never fully nor satisfactorily 
explained; later the broader tragedy of a people suffering under a more 
repressive regime than the policy-makers of the 1970s could reasonably have 
envisaged; and, most recently, by acts of post-referendum brutality and 
destruction. The issue is further overlain, for many Australians, by guilt: a 
belief that a people close to Australia's doorstep have had their wartime 
kindnesses and suffering on Australia's behalf repaid by betrayal.133  
 
The use of such words as brutality, emotive, destruction, divisive, deaths, repressive, 
tragedies, suffering, betrayal and guilt in this one short passage give it a flavour not 
found anywhere else in the source materials in this book. It may be argued that the 
nature of government cables and policy statements are not the place for reference to 
human suffering. It is certainly the case that the vast majority of communications 
presented in these documents follow that lamentable line. But the fact that the 
Introduction to Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation has referred to these 
human realities, even if in one paragraph only, expresses an unease with the general 
rationalising tone of the remainder of the book. Moreover, it succinctly describes the 
failure of the Australian government and its policies regarding Timor: that Australian 
                                                            
133 Way, Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation, 1. 
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and Timorese lives were sacrificed to an immoral foreign policy that betrayed 
Australia's weaker neighbours and which did little to serve Australia's integrity and 




Australian government actions comprise one element of the events of the Indonesian 
invasion of Portuguese Timor, and documents which recount the episodes are another. 
Both are subject to mimesis. Both demonstrate the Australian inability to see that its 
desire for security mirrored Indonesia's desire for security. The possession of a 
positive relationship with Indonesia echoed Indonesia's desire for expansion across 
the archipelago. The shared desire gave strength to opposition to the common enemy 
of communism. At the same time,  however, the threat of communism was used by 
both powers as an excuse for the scapegoating of their inconvenient neighbours, the 
Timorese people, who could be blamed for providing the conditions for a potential 
incursion of communism in the region, and so, could be justifiably invaded and 
colonised.  
 
Australian government actions leading up to the Indonesian invasion testified to 
contradictory policies, undue influence of Indonesian Embassy officials, secrecy, 
passive compliance with aggressive Indonesian intentions, and actions which are 
imitative of those of Indonesia. Coupled with a fear of upsetting the lucrative markets 
and cultural sensibilities of its neighbour, Australia operated with ambivalence 
towards Indonesia, prizing the relationship which was perceived to guarantee 
                                                            
134 Girard, The Scapegoat, 37. 
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Australian security and stability. The obstacle to the achievement of Australian desire 
was Portuguese Timor. The half-island appeared as a political and geographical 
anomaly within the Indonesian archipelago and was perceived variously as a 
communist problem, an unstable threat, and an economic opportunity. The challenges 
to regional and global security at that time, as well as domestic problems such as the 
dismissal of Whitlam as Prime Minister, markedly influenced decisions affecting 
Portuguese Timor. The effects of communism in the post-war period were significant 
in the development of this situation. Indonesia believed its security could be assured 
only if Timor did not become independent – a view fundamentally influenced by its 
perception of communism.135 It was agreed by Indonesia, Australia, the US and other 
powers that a victim – Timor – had to be sacrificed to ensure order over against 
communism in the region. 
 
The authors of the Australian written record selected, reported and omitted material 
with similar trust in their individual and collective independence. The result shows 
Australia in thrall to Indonesia in the events of the Timorese history, and ignorant of 
the force of mimesis operating in the relationship, thus displaying the documents as 
examples of the "romantic lie". The documents try to present Australian governments 
as autonomous entities, but they end up showing Australia as dependent, lacking in 
the independence and fairness so honoured and prized as Australian characteristics. 
There is little appreciation of the effects of Indonesia's mimetic influence on 
Australian identity.  There is no appreciation of the effects of that Australian 
dependence on the Timorese people. Indonesia's presence as mediator of the 
Australian desire for security is therefore reflected in the documents, but is not 
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revealed.136 The following chapter deals with the situation of mimetic dependence 
which continued for the next twenty-four years, as Australian governments complied 
with Indonesian attempts to absorb the Timorese people, displaying and perpetuating 






                                                            




THE OCCUPATION  
OF EAST TIMOR 
 
Introduction  
Previous chapters have shown that East Timor fulfilled the conditions of scapegoating 
as described by René Girard, being considered expendable in relation to the conflict 
between Australians and Japanese during World War II and to the expansionism of 
Indonesia in the post-war years. In the latter case, prospects regarding the Timor Sea 
resources contributed markedly to the decisions taken by Australian governments.  
 
In this chapter, the twenty-four year Indonesian occupation of East Timor is discussed 
in the light of the policies embraced by successive Australian governments which 
continued to support the Indonesian government's desire to control the territory. 
Throughout this time Australian actions demonstrated a dependency on Indonesian 
desires regarding East Timor. These were expressed in a series of measures which 
included the continuation of contradictory policies. Hopes of consolidating regional 
supremacy and stability were coupled with the prospect of financial gain from the 
resources of the Timor Sea. The pursuit of both advantages was argued to coincide 
with Australian "national interest". The Timorese people were therefore abandoned by 
official Australian policies in favour of what was perceived as the greater good in the 
achievement of a desire for security (initially against communists), and sacrificed to 
that end. Yet, in their refusal to acquiesce to the Indonesian takeover, the East 
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Timorese people became an obstacle to the realisation of the desires and designs of 
their neighbours – a "scandal" in Girardian terminology, though in a positive moral 
sense, that prevented the achievement of the violent sacrifice of the Timorese to the 
desires of Indonesians and their allies.  
 
This chapter demonstrates that Australia's initial mimetic dependency on Indonesia at 
the invasion developed into an abiding complicity during the occupation.  
Furthermore, East Timor was not only the scapegoat of its neighbours at that time, but 
it has continued to be the scapegoat of the texts presented as the official Australian 
history. The focus of the chapter is on official versions of events during the 
occupation, with an analysis of the most well-known massacre, the Santa Cruz 
massacre that occurred in 1991. In the second part, a case study concerning 
Monsignor da Costa Lopes and ex-Prime Minister Whitlam is undertaken. It 
demonstrates the nature and extent of the scapegoating of East Timor during the 
occupation. Drawing on Girard's criteria for scapegoating, this case study is an 
example of attempts to address ongoing crises besetting Australia's relationship with 
Indonesia through its deflecting blame for the upheavals onto convenient and credible 
scapegoats.  
 
Summary - Indonesian Occupation (1975-1999) 
The Indonesian occupation of East Timor lasted from the invasion on 7 December 
1975 to the weeks following 30 August 1999, the date when the Timorese people 
voted overwhelmingly for independence rather than for the offer of special regional 
autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia. Throughout this twenty-four year period 
the territory was under Indonesian control, primarily through the presence of the 
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Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) which consisted of the army, 
navy, air force and the police. In 1999 the police force was separated from the armed 
forces, leaving the military as the Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia, or TNI), whose purpose was to achieve "the political objectives 
of pacification and integration."1 The methods used were designed to subjugate the 
population and to overcome its resistance to Indonesian control, a regime of violence 
affecting every level of Timorese society. Falintil2 – the armed wing of the resistance 
– withstood by means of a guerrilla campaign against ABRI/TNI during the 
occupation. There was a clandestine network throughout the countryside, towns and 
villages that covertly resisted the occupation, funnelled information to the 
international solidarity movement, and supported the armed resistance.  
 
Subjected to numerous forms of state-sanctioned violence, the majority of the 
Timorese people lived in fear. The presence of Timorese informers brought suspicion 
to relationships and interactions, sowing discord in communities large and small.3 
Further, the ABRI/TNI paid and trained Timorese militias as an extension of its reach, 
terrorising the population. Consistently supported by ABRI/TNI, these groups 
exercised violence with impunity, thus depriving the people of the protection of law 
and the exercise of justice. The civil administration was also subordinate to the 
purposes of the Indonesian government via the military and the police, becoming 
another means of social control.4 
                                                            
1 Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Timor-Leste (CAVR), Chega! The Report of the 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Timor-Leste (CAVR)  (Dili, TL: CAVR, 2005), 
4.1.1. 
2Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste – The Armed Forces for the National 
Liberation of  East Timor. 
2 Max Stahl, Massacre among the graves, Tapol Bulletin, No 108, (December 1991): 6, 8, accessed 
April 6, 2016, http://vuir.vu.edu.au/26096/ 




Among the many studies of the recent history of East Timor, the Report of the 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Timor-Leste (CAVR) is the 
most comprehensive with regard to the occupation. It was commissioned by the 
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and presented 
its findings to the Timorese government and the United Nations in 2005.5  As part of 
its thorough investigation of all parties to the conflict in East Timor, it reports on the 
deaths and other violations committed by Timorese against Timorese from 1974 as 
well as on the Indonesian violence through to 1999.6  
 
The CAVR Report advises that the number of conflict-related deaths from 1974 to 
1999 was between 102,800 and 183,000, comprising an estimated 18,600 killings, 
most of which occurred between 1975 and 1980, with over 2,500 killings in 1999.  
The deaths of 84,200 people were due to hunger and illness caused directly by 
occupation-related events.7 Using a variety of estimates, however, Staveteig proposes 
a higher death toll to that of the CAVR, stating: 
My best estimate of excess mortality in East Timor during the Indonesian 
occupation is 204,000 persons (± 51,000) either due to direct violence or else 
indirectly, perhaps as a result of hardships encountered when they were 
forcibly displaced by the Indonesian army.8  
 
It is unlikely that the actual death toll will ever be known. What is clear, however, is 
that a significant proportion of the Timorese people died violently and from unnatural 
causes under the regime. President Suharto held office for twenty-three of the twenty-
                                                            
5 Commission, CAVR, 205, 46. 
6 This even-handed approach strengthens the report's claim to impartiality and opposes claims that 
investigations into Timor's suffering are anti-Indonesian. The findings are presented in measured tones, 
focussing on the facts as far as they could be established systematically and scientifically. 
7 Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Timor-Leste (CAVR), Chega! The Report of the 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (CAVR), Executive Summary. (Dili, TL: 
CAVR, 2005): 44. 
8 Sarah Staveteig, How Many Persons in East Timor Went 'Missing' During the Indonesian 
Occupation?: Results from Indirect Estimates, Interim Report IR-07-003 (Laxenburg, Austria: 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis [IIASA)]), 23. 
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four years of the occupation. Serious violations occurred during the first years after 
the invasion followed by a pattern of relatively low-level but consistent violence for 
the next two decades. The CAVR Report discusses the extra-judicial killings, 
intimidation, torture, arbitrary detention, sexual violence and political trials which 
were used to quell opposition, punish victims and terrorise the population.9 Human 
rights abuses affected both individuals and groups. Furthermore, massacres 
accounting for the deaths of hundreds of people each at Lacluta (1981), Kraras (1983) 
and at the Dili Santa Cruz cemetery (1991) have been documented, and – in the case 
of the Dili massacre – filmed.10 Indonesian military personnel, either acting alone or 
in collaboration with Timorese militias and auxiliaries, were found to be responsible 
for the overwhelming number of killings, rapes and incidents of torture.11  
 
The early years after the invasion saw tens of thousands of people fleeing to the 
mountains, but the military assaults against them as well as the impossibility of 
maintaining a food supply caused many deaths and eventually surrender.12 Massive 
dislocations organised by ABRI prevented access to farms and gardens and caused 
illness and starvation. Over half of the Timorese people experienced one or more 
displacements from their homes, lasting for short periods of one month to extended 
periods of time, with the average displacement time of nearly four years.13    
 
The famines of 1978-1979 caused the deaths of thousands of people and ensured that 
food production and distribution remained precarious throughout the 1980s.  Annual 
                                                            
9 Commission, CAVR Executive Summary, 45. 
10 Joseph Nevins, A Not-So-Distant Horror: Mass Violence in East Timor (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2005) 30; Geoffrey Robinson, If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die: How Genocide Was Stopped 
in East Timor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 57; James Dunn, East Timor: A Rough 
Passage to Independence, 3rd ed. (Double Bay, NSW: Longueville Books, 2003), 333-334. 
11 Commission, CAVR Executive Summary, 44-46. 
12 Commission, CAVR Executive Summary, 77. 
13 Commission, CAVR Executive Summary, 44. 
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forced marches by the military known as the "fence of legs" continued for at least four 
years, beginning in 1981.14 This exercise was designed to flush out the resistance by 
forcing tens of thousands of Timorese males to march in lines ahead of soldiers. The 
Timorese returned to their villages debilitated after days and weeks in the human 
chains. Adequate crops were not planted during these times, resulting in widespread 
food shortages in the succeeding months.15 Clandestine resistance against the 
occupation continued, however, renewing itself with new generations of Timorese 
youth and being supported by the general population.16 The armed resistance engaged 
in combat with the Indonesian military, remaining a viable guerrilla force for the 
whole of the occupation. 
 
Australian policy during the Occupation 
With this brief summary, I turn to examine the Australian government's position with 
regard to the occupation, particularly the Santa Cruz massacre. Australian government 
documents stated that Australia's consistent official position was to uphold the 
Timorese right to self-determination.17 This is countered by voluminous evidence to 
the contrary, as discussed throughout this chapter.  
 
To begin with, the Australian voting pattern on the issue at the United Nations and 
continued military assistance to Indonesia indicated support for the Indonesian 
annexation. The Australian support for the annexation continued from 1975 to 1999. 
Gough Whitlam, the Labor Prime Minister in 1975, tacitly endorsed Indonesian 
                                                            
14 John G. Taylor, Indonesia's Forgotten War: The hidden history of East Timor (Leichhardt: Pluto 
Press, 1991), 204. 
15 Taylor, Indonesia's Forgotten War, 117-119. 
16 Commission, CAVR, 4.1.1. 
17 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, (DFAT), East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An 
Australian Policy Challenge (2001), 13. 
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claims to sovereignty. The Liberal-Country Coalition Government under Malcolm 
Fraser (1975-1982) that succeeded the Whitlam Government publicly supported 
Indonesian claims.18  Despite the Labor Opposition's earlier condemnation of the 
annexation,19 its government under Bob Hawke (1983-1991) maintained the 
Australian government's support of Indonesia.20 The next Labor government under 
Paul Keating (1991-1996) actively sought to strengthen the relationship with 
Indonesia and pursued closer ties with the Indonesian military. Keating spoke of 
President Suharto's New Order government as "beneficial"21 and opposed allowing 
human rights to get "in the way of the relationship between Australia and 
Indonesia."22 The succeeding Coalition government led by John Howard (1996-2007) 
continued the policies of the previous decades. Howard described Suharto as a "very 
skilled and sensitive national leader,"23 while his deputy Tim Fischer said that Suharto 
"was perhaps the world's greatest figure in the latter half of the 20th century."24  
 
A major political disruption of this consensus came when the Opposition spokesman 
on Foreign Affairs, Laurie Brereton, was successful in bringing a change to Labor 
Party policy regarding East Timor. In 1998, the Labor Party reversed its policy to one 
                                                            
18 Clinton Fernandes,  Fracturing the bipartisan consensus (UNSW Canberra: ADFA website, School 
of Humanities and Social Sciences – East Timor), accessed 13 November 2014, 
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19 John Waddingham, "Australia's new Labor government, March 1983," Timor Archives: Clearing 
House for Archival Records on Timor, accessed 30 May, 2016, 
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20 Michelle Grattan and Russell Barton, "Switch will spark row in Labor Party," The Age (June 6, 
1983), accessed September 2, 2017, 
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21 Peter Hartcher, "Jakarta leaves Keating at the altar," The Sydney Morning Herald, April 24, 1992: 
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22 Tony Wright, "Jakarta joy as PM backs off human rights," The Sydney Morning Herald, October 27, 
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23 Michael Millett and Louise Williams, "PM defends soft line on Indonesia," The Sydney Morning 
Herald, September 18, 1996: 1. 
24 Gordon Fenney, "Soeharto a 20th century great," The Sydney Morning Herald, May 15, 1996: 9. 
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of support for self-determination for the East Timorese people.25 The resignation of 
Suharto in May 1998 and the accession of his replacement B.J. Habibie accompanied 
growing agitation for change in East Timor itself. Increased international support for 
the Timorese people, particularly after the Santa Cruz massacre, included massive 
Australian resistance to government policy. The Coalition government moved towards 
accepting the increasing international consensus on the need for significant change, 
with John Howard’s writing to the Indonesian President at the end of 1998 suggesting 
a development of the President's recent offer of autonomy which would include 
discussions with the East Timorese leaders. Howard emphasised in the letter,  
however, that "Australia's support for Indonesia's sovereignty is unchanged",26 and 
declared that an autonomy package "would allow time to convince the East Timorese 
of the benefits of autonomy within the Indonesian republic."27 Even after Suharto's 
resignation, Australia’s official position of favour towards the Indonesian annexation 
of East Timor was constant. Nevertheless, President Habibie reacted unexpectedly to 
Howard's letter and to the increasing international pressure by allowing an act of self-
determination in East Timor. Finally, after the Timorese comprehensively rejected the 
option of autonomy within Indonesia in favour of independence in the August 1999 
referendum, the Australian military undertook leadership of the United Nations' 
peace-keeping force as the Indonesian military withdrew. 
 
 
                                                            
25 Clinton Fernandes, The Independence of East Timor (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2011), 
183-188. 
26 DFAT, East Timor in Transition, 181. 
27 DFAT, East Timor in Transition, 182. 
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The relationship between the scapegoat and the text 
As demonstrated in previous chapters, narratives of East Timor's recent history 
display its role as the scapegoat of its neighbours. Girard's insights into scapegoating 
have a double application, as victims inhabit the role of scapegoat both in the 
circumstances of their sacrifice and in the myths recounting the process. As discussed, 
Girard describes the scapegoating process as existing in the mythic representations of 
ancient persecutions and in cases of collective violence in more recent times. Though 
they lack the supernatural element that guarantees unanimity, modern texts of 
persecution mirror the ancient tales in that these texts have the same fundamental 
principle: the exoneration of the actions of those who participated in the killing or 
expulsion of the scapegoat – either as the mob or its supportive spectators. In Chapter 
Four the World War II record was seen as a collection of texts of persecution. Chapter 
Five demonstrated that Australian texts were expressions of the "romantic lie" 
through which the Australian mimetic dependence on Indonesia was obvious. This 
chapter focuses on Girard's claim that not only are the fortunes of scapegoats 
described in texts, but that texts themselves can be the means of scapegoating victims. 
Girard distinguishes between narratives in which scapegoating is clearly present in the 
plot and those in which the scapegoating principle is concealed:   
Before invoking the scapegoat in connection with a text we must first ask 
whether we are dealing with a scapegoat of the text (the hidden structural 
principle) or a scapegoat in the text (the clearly visible theme). Only in the 
first case can the text be defined as one of persecution, entirely subjected to 
the representation of persecution from the standpoint of the persecutor.28 
 
Girard's designation of a scapegoat in the text applies to the range of publications 
produced by most authors on the subject. The narrative of death and destruction 
clearly conveys the victimisation of East Timor. Such commentators identify that the 
                                                            
28 René Girard, The Scapegoat, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
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Timorese people were being persecuted by the Indonesian regime and present them as 
innocent victims, displaying the requirements of the traditional scapegoat. They 
incurred the blame apportioned to all scapegoats, but not because of any crimes as 
such, except that of resisting the interests of the powerful. In Girard's terms the role of 
scapegoat applied because East Timor possessed the "characteristics of a victim."29 
Portuguese Timor fulfilled the physical criteria of one that is small and vulnerable.30 
Its supposed susceptibility to the influence of communism and the consequent threat 
to the region strengthened the case against the Timorese people, delivering them as a 
scapegoat to be sacrificed for the greater good. It is clear in this range of texts that in 
the interplay of geo-political realities, the Timorese people were violently subjugated 
to the interests and fears of more powerful parties. 
 
East Timor: the scapegoat of the text 
However, Girard's designation of scapegoat of the text is apparent in documents and 
commentaries issued by the Australian government. Texts that undertake the task of 
scapegoating have the concealed character of traditional myths, described by Girard 
as "rationalisations or disguised accounts of an original act of violence, the truth of 
which the group needs to conceal or displace from itself."31 The Australian official 
need to ignore or disguise the violence done to the Timorese required the production 
of texts written from its own standpoint: that of a persecutor. The structure of such 
texts does not report the reality of the victim, but becomes itself a means of 
victimisation. 
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30 Girard, The Scapegoat, 18. 
31 Michael Kirwan, Discovering Girard (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2004), 39. 
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An example of East Timor as a scapegoat of the text appears in the government's 
account of its statements and actions at the end of the occupation. The narrative in 
question is East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge, 
published by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.32 Its significance lies in its 
presentation to the Australian public of an official account of the Australian 
government's involvement in matters concerning East Timor from 1998 until August 
2000. It devotes 160 pages to the changes in East Timor after the fall of President 
Suharto and the accession of President Habibie in 1998, and discusses the role of the 
Indonesian military and their Timorese militias. It is concerned with the Australian 
role in the referendum of 1999 and the United Nations Mission in East Timor, 
particularly with the humanitarian response and the establishment of the International 
Force for East Timor (INTERFET) which oversaw the initial restoration of peace and 
accompanied the United Nations in the preparation for independence in 2002. A 
further 112 pages of East Timor in Transition are Annexes comprising selected 
Australian government and United Nations documents and letters.  
 
Although brief, an initial chapter entitled The Historical Context is the government's 
historical analysis of the Australian involvement in events prior to the referendum, 
and forms the background for the remainder of the book. It is presented by the 
government to the Australian public in a readable and accessible form which requires 
little research capability or access. It can therefore be regarded as the government's 
preferred vehicle for popular information concerning the official Australian position. 
While information from other chapters in the book is used in this dissertation where 
appropriate, concentration on this chapter is required for a detailed appraisal of the 
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government's own summary of its historical policies and actions. An examination 
finds that it is composed of material and interpretation that is often characterised by 
lack of balance, and where embellishment, omission and deflection of blame are used 
to justify successive Australian governments' policies of support for Indonesia's 
occupation of East Timor. The chapter exemplifies Girard's designation of the 
scapegoat of the text, as is now discussed. 
 
It must be acknowledged that, contrary to the greater part of the content being 
discussed, there are two sentences in the Historical Context chapter which recognise 
in a positive way the role of the East Timorese people in the last years of the 
occupation, namely:  
It (the separation from Indonesia) called for enormous discipline and restraint 
on the part of East Timor's pro-independence leaders in the face of serious 
provocation. Above all, it required the East Timorese people themselves to 
demonstrate inspirational courage and determination, in the face of violence 
and intimidation, to insist upon their right to exercise a choice about their 
future.33   
 
Similarly, the Foreword acknowledges that the Timorese people "achieved self-
determination and have taken the first steps on their path to nationhood."34 These two 
instances are notable for their positive commendation of the Timorese people. 
 
Authorship and balance 
Regrettably, the remainder of The Historical Context raises serious questions, the first 
of which concern the writers' conflicts of interest, and the lack of balance brought to 
the document as a result. The Foreword to the complete book East Timor in 
Transition is signed by Foreign Minister Alexander Downer who gave the research 
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task to the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Dr Ashton 
Calvert. According to Downer, Calvert "put together a strong team of departmental 
officers who had worked on East Timor over the period."35 As Clinton Fernandes 
points out, the book therefore was not produced by DFAT's Historical Documents 
Project, but by officers who had worked on the East Timor issues. He comments:  
In other words, those who had implemented policy were assessing their own 
performances within the covers of a book they themselves had written, using 
material they had themselves selected.36  
 
As East Timor issues have affected Australian foreign policy in diverse and 
compromising ways, it is obvious that more independence and historical expertise in 
its authorship would have benefitted the production of this official Australian 
document. Those generating this document had personal experiences with the issue 
under examination which seems to have contributed to the bias, distortion and lack of 
balance which places it in the category of a "text of persecution". 
 
The statement of the aim of East Timor in Transition, signed by Alexander Downer, is 
similar to that of Australia and the Incorporation of East Timor discussed in the 
previous chapter. This document was written "to make available a full and balanced 
account of Australia's response to the extraordinary foreign policy challenge of East 
Timor in the past two and a half years," with "a balanced analysis of the major 
thematic issues" of the situation.37 Underlining the assertion that balance was a main 
aim, it is stated that the writing team drew from public sources as well as "in a 
representative and balanced way" from key diplomatic reports, including "extensive 
reporting from our diplomatic missions and official records of the high-level 
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exchanges that were pivotal in informing and implementing Australian policy".38 
While a single chapter could not be expected to comment on all the challenges which 
Australian governments faced during that period, the claims of balance which apply to 
the whole book should surely apply also to the presentation of the historical 
background. As the following evidence shows, the claim of balance is questionable, 
and the credibility of the authors, including the government, is weakened. 
 
Features of "The Historical Context" 
The account of the Australian involvement in recent Timorese history in East Timor 
in Transition is a vehicle for the continued scapegoating of East Timor by the 
Australian government. In trying to justify the government’s actions, East Timor is 
subtly positioned as a scapegoat of the text, deserving of the Indonesian regime’s 
repressive behaviour. This is shown in the extent of distortion and bias in descriptions 
of the events, and embellishment and exoneration regarding Indonesian and 
Australian policies. The chapter's treatment of the Santa Cruz massacre of 1991 is 
outrageous in its bias and distortion of facts. Events of 1999 are presented in ways 
which soften or absolve the Indonesian military and their militias. 
 
The account of the Santa Cruz massacre 
The event during the occupation that brought international exposure to the occupation 
was the Santa Cruz massacre. On 12 November 1991, a Catholic Mass was said in the 
parish church of Motael in Dili in remembrance of independence supporter Sebastião 
Gomes who had been killed two weeks previously. Hundreds of mainly young 
Timorese attended the Mass, and immediately afterwards made their way to the Santa 
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Cruz cemetery in a customary funeral procession, joined by others on the way. They 
displayed banners which they had been making in anticipation of a visit by 
Portuguese officials, calling for freedom and the intervention of Portugal, and 
denouncing the Indonesian regime. At the cemetery, the Indonesian military fired on 
the crowd in a sustained attack, leaving many dead and wounded. Film of the incident 
was smuggled out to Britain, and its broadcast across the world became a catalyst for 
eventual Timorese independence at the end of the decade. The Indonesian government 
admitted to 50 dead, while the CAVR Report puts the death toll at 271, with 250 
listed as missing.39 Hundreds of people were subsequently arrested and detained, and 
execution of the wounded was reported to have occurred over the following days.40 
There were trials of those involved in the massacre, but the penalties imposed on the 
perpetrators were minor in comparison to those given to organisers of the 
demonstration.41 Many families were unable to find the remains of their loved ones.42  
 
Distortion 
The treatment of this event in East Timor in Transition is an example of the historical 
background chapter’s distortion through embellishment, deflection of blame, and 
omission. From the outset the facts are distorted. The chapter states:  
When the much-anticipated visit of a Portuguese parliamentary delegation was 
cancelled by Portugal at late notice in October 1991 in protest over restrictions 
on their party, youths from pro-and anti-integration groups clashed in Dili, 
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leaving one dead on each side. They were Sebastião Gomes from the pro-
independence group and Alfonso Gomes from the pro-integration side.43  
 
The "restrictions on their party" refers to Indonesian displeasure at the presence of 
certain journalists of whom it did not approve.44 The comment evades the problem of 
Indonesian strictures on journalistic freedom, and responsibility for the cancellation is 
placed (at least in part) onto Portugal. There is no mention of the role of the military 
or of provocateurs – of whom the anti-independence youth was one. These relevant 
details do occur, however, in the CAVR document which reports:  
Towards the end of October the military's harassment of activists in Dili 
escalated, culminating in a raid on the Motael Church on 28 October. The raid 
left two dead, an East Timorese "intel" and a clandestine activist, Sebastião 
Gomes Rangel whose funeral was held the next day."45  
 
The account in East Timor in Transition of the actual massacre that occurred two 
weeks after this incident consists of five paragraphs. In the first two there is mention 
of two soldiers being stabbed by the demonstrators on the way to the Santa Cruz 
cemetery, but a similar (relatively minor) assault on one of the independence 
supporters by a man in camouflage uniform during the march is omitted.46 There is 
reference to the military's subsequent account and that of Indonesia's National 
Commission of Inquiry, which detail a report of the demonstrators engaging in rock 
throwing, firing a shot, waving knives and throwing a grenade. At the end, the 
account adds the qualification, "there is no independent corroboration of this."47 
Nevertheless, the relatively lengthy inclusion of these minor unverified accusations 
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against the demonstrators in the brief Australian account raises questions about the 
balance stated as one of the aims of the document.  
 
There is a pattern in the chapter of giving similar significant space to minor details 
while omitting more important features. Comparison of the document's treatment of 
the Santa Cruz massacre with that of the 1994 report of a United Nations' Special 
Rapporteur, Mr Bacre Waly Ndiaye, demonstrates this distortion.48 Ndiaye considered 
all available accounts, including those provided by the Indonesian military, police and 
Commission of Inquiry.49 Contrary to the Ndiaye report, the Australian document 
omits the non-compliance of Indonesian authorities to supply requested military 
reports on the incident.50 It omits that security agencies knew about the demonstration 
days beforehand,51 that the military persons who were injured were not in uniform,52 
and that their injuries were sustained one kilometre from the cemetery and one hour 
before the killing of the demonstrators.53 East Timor in Transition relates that gunfire 
was heard for two or three minutes, and then sounds of gunfire for another twenty 
minutes, while the Ndiaye Report states that "sporadic shooting was heard throughout 
the city and in neighbouring villages during the rest of the day, and possibly during 
several days."54 A major conclusion of the Ndiaye report was:  
The procession that took place in Dili on 12 November 1991 was a peaceful 
demonstration of political dissent by unarmed civilians; the claims of some 
officials that the security forces had fired in self-defence and had respected the 
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principles of the necessity and the proportionality of the use of lethal force are 
unsubstantiated.55  
 
The inclusion in the Australian version of the few minor instances of disruption by the 
demonstrators may have been an attempt to give the "balanced" account claimed as 
one of the aims of the document. Such emphasis on these unsubstantiated events 
alongside omission of others, however, is clearly unbalanced.  
 
The Ndiaye Report presents a comprehensive sequence of facts, giving appropriate 
weight to the actions of both demonstrators and military during the procession and on 
arrival at the cemetery, whereas the Australian account merely summarises the police 
and military accounts, mentioning the Ndiaye report only in reference to the numbers 
killed.56 In the interests of the balance which the Australian publication was designed 
to address,57 it is unfortunate that details which excuse the military's response are 
included, while the greater number of details testifying to their disastrous over-
reaction are omitted. Such omission serves to lessen the Indonesian responsibility for 
the violence in the eyes of readers unfamiliar with the facts. It contributes to the 
overall tenor of the chapter as being a text of persecution which confuses 
responsibility and deflects blame from Indonesia. 
 
The third of the five paragraphs in the historical background chapter of East Timor in 
Transition detailing the Santa Cruz massacre is an account of the killings, arrests and 
subsequent deaths over following days, while the fourth paragraph relates the problem 
of ascertaining the exact number of deaths and gives a fair summary of the various 
opinions. Neither of these paragraphs attempts to soften the facts. 
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The fifth paragraph, however, continues the generally indulgent approach to the 
perpetrators of the violence. It maintains that the Santa Cruz massacre caused a 
reversal in an otherwise improving situation where "goodness, tolerance, liberality, 
self-expression, a better deal and peace" were now unfortunately lost.58  The chapter 
states: 
The shock and anger caused by the tragedy refuelled the resentment felt by 
ordinary East Timorese towards the security forces and the failures of 
Indonesian rule. It extinguished the hopes of many that some good could come 
from Indonesia's administration. It marked the end of a relatively tolerant 
period in East Timor and the loss of influence of those who had championed 
the more liberal regime. It meant that the newfound right to self-expression 
was again lost and that the prospect for achieving a better deal for the East 
Timorese through peaceful means was as remote as had ever been.59  
   
It was not the "shock and anger" that refuelled resentment among the people. It was 
the massacre of at least 271 young people at a peaceful demonstration. The assertion 
of a breakdown of progress resulting from the killings insinuates some blame on the 
part of the Timorese. There appears to be no sense of irony in the statement that "the 
newfound right to self-expression was again lost", when the massacre occurred at a 
demonstration found by the United Nations Special Rapporteur's report to be orderly.  
 
There were trials of those involved in the event, but the penalties imposed on the 
perpetrators were minor compared to those given to organisers of the demonstration. 
Ten Indonesian military persons were tried for disciplinary offences and were 
sentenced to prison for up to eighteen months. Most served time under house arrest 
and were released before the expiry of their sentences. East Timorese organisers of 
the protest, however, were jailed for at least five years, and some were given life 
sentences.60 Strangely, East Timor in Transition omits any reference to these 
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sentences imposed after the Santa Cruz massacre. Instead, the 1995 trial of Indonesian 
soldiers who killed six civilians in Liquiça and who received prison terms of up to 
four and a half years is cited. East Timor in Transition presents this as proof that 
progress towards justice was underway in cases of human rights offences by TNI 
personnel.61 Hence the Australian document extols Indonesian human rights progress 
some years after the Dili massacre, but omits the unjust treatment of Timorese 
connected to the massacre that is the actual subject of the passage. The focus is clearly 
to put Indonesia in the best possible light. It also suggests an effort to present 
evidence of improvements which might justify the political and diplomatic approach 
towards Indonesia taken by Australia over many years.  
 
Bias and Embellishment   
The section following the account of the Dili Massacre continues to read as an 
apologia for Indonesia.62 One paragraph points to the "oppressive military presence" 
as the cause of the Jakarta administration's inability "to win the minds and hearts of 
the East Timorese people." Yet there is a sense of frustration and a suggestion of 
blame in the mention of the antagonism of the young towards the incorporation of 
Timor into Indonesia, and the loss of hope that they would have been the generation 
which "embodied the benefits of Indonesian association".63 The paragraph continues, 
"the post-1975 generation became arguably (Indonesia's) single greatest liability."64 
The unwillingness of the youth to be "a vanguard of Indonesia's aspirations in the 
territory" is then linked to "Fretilin's decision to take advantage of youth sentiment in 
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the development of its clandestine front."65 The thrust of these statements puts the 
blame on the Timorese. The paragraph applies effort, goodwill, and benefit to the 
Indonesian involvement, while antagonism, liability and clandestine are used of the 
Timorese youth and taking advantage is used of Fretilin, clearly a biased use of 
language.66 
 
There follows the statement that in the early part of the 1990s it was recognised that 
"a new and more sensitive approach" was needed.67 A lengthy list of Indonesian 
proposals is described as designed so that the Timorese "could exercise a greater 
degree of influence over their own affairs" which, the paragraph states, were finally 
vetoed by President Suharto. The failure of the administration in the 1990s to advance 
any "creative solutions" is linked to the assertion that it was the security approach 
which "in the final analysis, lay at the heart of Indonesia's policy failure in the 
territory." This summation of the problem in the document is only partially true. 
Surely, more fundamental to the problem than lack of "creative solutions" was the 
very existence of Indonesia as an illegal administering power in East Timor, ruling 
with brutality and impunity. Thus the official Australian account of a highly 
significant event in the history of East Timor emerges as one which manipulates facts 
to put those responsible for the killings in a positive light and to insinuate blame on 
the part of Timorese youth. East Timor is a scapegoat of the text. 
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The account of the 1990s 
Exoneration 
In presenting the background to the final stages of East Timor's gaining of 
independence in 1999, East Timor in Transition embellishes or dilutes accounts of the 
operation of Indonesian agencies. There is a suggestion of heroism in the reference to 
"the Indonesian leadership's courage to accept international assistance to restore 
order."68 Yet the CAVR Report describes the same situation thus: "Frantic diplomatic 
activity took place.....to put pressure on Indonesia to fulfil its security obligations or 
consent to an international force to restore security."69 Furthermore, while East Timor 
in Transition states it was obvious that the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) 
directed and supported the Timorese militias,70 it maintains that "the extent and nature 
of TNI's collusion with and support for the militia is impossible to determine" and that 
"there was no clear indication whether the abuses were sanctioned or ordered by 
headquarters or other commanders."71 Nevertheless, when UN Security Council 
members visited Dili on 11 September 1999, their finding the situation to be calm 
indicated a high degree of overall control by the TNI, and demonstrated that security 
could be maintained when required.72  
 
The influence of the TNI on the militias is documented in the CAVR report.73  It notes 
that militia groups had existed before Indonesia invaded, but were increasingly 
recruited and controlled by the TNI, sometimes under duress, but often with the 
promise of money, drugs and prestige. Training intensified in 1998 and 1999, with the 
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military attending militia inaugurations and providing arms. Australian claims that the 
level of Indonesian military oversight of the militias was "impossible to determine" 
are therefore questionable. Nevins claims that through agreements for intelligence 
sharing with the United States, Britain, Canada and New Zealand, the Australian 
government knew "that the Indonesian military - including the senior command 
structure - was responsible for organising, arming and directing the militia 
violence."74 Both Toohey and Wilkinson's exposition of government knowledge of 
the invasion, and Collins and Reeds' revelations of pro-Indonesian bias in Australian 
intelligence services underline the knowledge which Australian governments have 
had over the decades concerning the East Timor situation.75 Fernandes demonstrates 
that not only were the militias part of the Indonesian government's systematic 
campaign to deflect onto the Timorese blame for the mayhem, but that the Australian 
government's repeated excuses and denials provided the military with welcome 
support.76 That East Timor in Transition understates official Indonesian connections 
to the militias and omits the international pressure on Indonesia in favour of mention 
of its "courage" are examples of the document's general tendency to portray the 
Indonesian government and its agencies in a positive light. 
 
Similarly, the chapter highlights any positive actions of the Australian government. 
Nevins comments that states are usually selective in the facts they present, preferring 
exaggeration of the good while ignoring poor decisions and outcomes.77 East Timor in 
Transition is an example of this tendency, presenting Australia and particularly its 
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Foreign Minister Alexander Downer as "increasingly concerned" about deteriorating 
conditions in East Timor,78 initiating consultation with East Timorese leaders,79 and 
applying "consistent pressure" to Indonesia.80 Even as late as 1999, however, Downer 
was maintaining the traditional Australian government support for Indonesia, 
claiming that connections between the Indonesian military and the Timorese militias 
were not Indonesian government policy. He stated that any involvement by the 
military in abuses was the fault of "rogue elements", and declared that the Indonesians 
"will behave in a responsible way. They have made that clear to me."81 While 
Downer's statements may have been judged to be politically important to maintain 
Indonesian support of the referendum at the time, there is no admission in East Timor 
in Transition of this, or that any historical Australian action, seen in hindsight, was 
deficient. There is nothing which approximates to the statement made by Gareth 
Evans, Australian Foreign Minister from 1988 to 1996, on the continued Australian 
training of Indonesian military: "I am one of those who has to acknowledge...that 
many of our earlier training efforts helped only to produce more professional human 
rights abusers."82 
 
Australian support for the Indonesian position on East Timor (and its continued desire 
for Indonesian favour) is reflected in the Australian official record of the events. It is 
clear that the record exemplifies "texts of persecution", where those responsible for 
scapegoating are exonerated and the victim continues to be blamed. East Timor in 
Transition makes East Timor a scapegoat of the text. 
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Australian Complicity in the Scapegoating of East Timor  
Examination thus far of an official Australian history of the background to the end of 
the Indonesian occupation has found that Australian policy leaned consistently 
towards support of the Indonesian position. An apparent tendency to distort the record 
in Indonesia's favour has been demonstrated. The Australian documentary record 
shows that East Timor was considered as a dispensable entity in the pursuit of other 
interests. Greenlees and Garran express the general consensus: "Remaining on good 
terms with Indonesia was crucial to Australia's interests"83 In relation to the treatment 
of East Timor, Scott points to the Australian tendency "to protect its relations with 
Indonesia as it had done instinctively for twenty-five years."84 James Dunn states that 
the violence in East Timor "is a shameful story of conspiracies against a small and 
vulnerable people, an account marked by deceit, hypocrisy, mendacity, and plain 
irresponsibility."85  
 
Challenging Indonesia and Australia's determination to pursue and protect their 
interests, East Timor was found to be an obstacle to the realisation of their desires. In 
this way, East Timor became a scapegoat to the extent that the people resisted efforts 
to conform to the Indonesian agenda. The people of East Timor were sacrificed by 
Indonesia, with Australia's tacit cooperation, in realpolitik decisions taken to gain 
favour, wealth and security. East Timor was the victim of Australian desire for the 
security offered by its compliant relationship with Indonesia. The text of the official 
Australian history continues the scapegoating. 
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Key aspects of the Australian support for Indonesia are now discussed as examples of 
acts by which Australia followed the lead of Indonesia and participated in the 
scapegoating of East Timor. The subsequent record needed to be obscured by the 
government because Australia clearly participated in the marginalisation and 
scapegoating of East Timor in support of Indonesia. For example, the swift bestowal 
of Australian de jure recognition of Indonesian sovereignty, support of Indonesia in 
the United Nations, continuance of military ties, and negotiations over oil and gas 
resources in the Timor Sea show this complicity. Significantly, the maintenance of 
two contradictory positions by Australian governments – that they claimed to support 
Timorese self-determination while concretely supporting Indonesian sovereignty – 
throughout the twenty-four year occupation of East Timor underscores that complicity 
by trying to cover up it with reference to principle.  
 
Recognition of Indonesian Sovereignty 
Added to its attempts to exonerate Indonesia and by association, Australia, East Timor 
in Transition emphasises the claims of Australian authorities that humanitarian 
concerns were the basis of the support of the Indonesian position. It states: 
In January 1978, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrew Peacock, 
announced that the Government had decided to accept East Timor as part of 
Indonesia. Peacock said that the Government, like most Australians, deeply 
regretted that the events in East Timor since August 1975 had caused so much 
suffering, noting that humanitarian issues arising from the issue continued to 
be of major concern. Peacock said that the basis for this position was that 
Indonesian control was effective and covered all administrative centres.86 
 
Following the internal discussions of the authorities of the time as contained in 
relevant cables, further reasons are advanced for Australian recognition of Indonesia's 
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control, such as family reunion for Timorese refugees87 and the re-building of East 
Timor. It was claimed that these issues required Australia to deal with Indonesian as 
the administering power. Therefore, Indonesian sovereignty was "a reality with which 
Australia had to come to terms."88 The document states: 
Both Coalition and Labor governments regarded Indonesia's control of East 
Timor as a reality that needed to be managed and considered that this was best 
done in the context of a strong bilateral relationship with Indonesia. With such 
a relationship, it was more likely that Indonesia would listen to Australia on 
the hard issues, including East Timor.89  
 
East Timor in Transition depicts Australia as pursuing "its concerns for the human 
rights and economic development of the East Timorese" in a "constructive and 
effective manner" as a result of the relationship with Indonesia.90 Moreover, the 
document claims that Australia championed the human rights of the Timorese people 
to the extent of making concerns known at every level of the Indonesian 
administration, stating: 
....the government's concerns over human rights violations were conveyed 
clearly and consistently to Indonesian officials at all levels, from the President 
down to the local military and police commanders on the ground in East 
Timor. So too was Australian pressure for troop reductions in the territory.91   
 
Further:  
In the context of development assistance, Australia consistently urged the 
Indonesian authorities to adopt policies in East Timor that would promote the 
welfare of the East Timorese and, in particular, to promote and protect 
internationally accepted standards of human rights.92  
 
Unfortunately, there is no evidence supporting these claims in East Timor in 
Transition. There are no references to any ministerial letters, statements, reports or 
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discussions with the Indonesian authorities concerning these claims of efforts to 
protect human rights. On the contrary, the Australian voting record at the United 
Nations, the recognition of Indonesian sovereignty and the government's embellished 
historical account indicate that the human rights of the Timorese people were not a 
high priority, as discussed below. Significantly, Australian governments' singular 
failure to achieve any successes regarding the human rights of the East Timorese 
people is finally deflected onto Indonesia, with the statement: "Australia had hoped 
for more influence than it was ever able to achieve."93 
 
United Nations: Australian voting and argument  
Australian governments consistently upheld the Indonesian incorporation of East 
Timor in the United Nations. Between 1975 and 1982 the United Nations General 
Assembly annually condemned the violence and called for an act of self-
determination to be held in East Timor. Australia voted in favour of the resolution in 
1975, abstained for the next two years, and voted against the resolutions for the 
following five years.94 East Timor in Transition omits to mention the Australian 
voting record. Instead there is a statement which places responsibility onto other 
states and the United Nations itself: "The General Assembly 1975-1982 adopted 
resolutions on the question of East Timor each year from 1975 to 1982, although by a 
declining majority of votes."95 Admission of the Australian government's lack of 
support for East Timor was thus minimised and deflected onto others. 
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In March 1982, ex-Prime Minister Whitlam visited East Timor for three days, 
reporting on his return that all was well in the territory.96 Later that year and a few 
days before the annual United Nations General Assembly vote on resolutions 
regarding East Timor, he appeared before the United Nations Special Committee on 
Decolonisation, and stated: "It is high time that the question of East Timor was voted 
off the United Nations agenda and ceased to preoccupy and distract the nations of 
South-east Asia and the Pacific."97 Thus the man who had been Prime Minister and in 
control of the Foreign Affairs portfolio in the time leading up to the invasion 
attempted to conceal the effects of actions for which he had more responsibility than 
any other Australian. In his status as a high profile ex-Prime Minister held in great 
esteem by large sections of the population, he had the means to influence the Labor 
government of the time. Instead, he chose to continue to support the policy that 
disregarded the rights of the Timorese people, treating their concerns as a distraction. 
 
Military assistance to Indonesia 
Australian government claims of concern for the human rights of the Timorese people 
in East Timor in Transition are further challenged by the continuing military 
assistance provided to Indonesia by Australia for the greater part of the occupation. 
The CAVR Report notes the Whitlam Government's initiation of a defence co-
operation program with Indonesia in July 1972 (providing aircraft, training and 
intelligence cooperation), which was renewed and increased by the Fraser government 
in 1975. That aid was provided on condition that it not be used in East Timor nor for 
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internal repression.98 It is intriguing that such a stipulation was made, and that it was 
seen to be necessary to make it. Apparently the weaker partner in the relationship, 
Australia proved to have little control over Indonesia's use of aid and military 
hardware and training.99  
 
After the Dili massacre the United States and some members of the European Union 
introduced partial embargoes on the provision of arms and military training to 
Indonesia.100 Despite suspending some forms of aid at this time, Australia still 
emerged as the Indonesian military's leading provider of training.101 For the years 
1994-2000, an average of 200 Indonesian defence personnel received training each 
year. In 1993 Indonesia's Special Forces Command (Kopassus) began training in 
Australia.102 Gunn notes that Australian claims that such training helped to sensitise 
trainees to human rights was proved wrong in East Timor.103  
 
Regrettably, East Timor in Transition makes no mention of the levels of military aid 
to Indonesia during the time that East Timor was under Indonesian military control. 
On the contrary, it is stated that there was "Australian pressure for troop reductions in 
the territory."104 Even accepting that this occurred, there are again no references 
provided, nor any indication as to the content of such "pressure". 
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One of the more astounding tasks of East Timor in Transition was that of explaining 
the contradictory Australian position of support for the principle of Timorese self-
determination while facilitating its opposite – agreement with Indonesian sovereignty. 
East Timor in Transition maintains that "through to 30 August 1999, Australia's 
position was that the people of East Timor had yet to exercise their right to self-
determination."105 That assertion of constant Australian support for the East Timorese 
people's right to decide their own future was not supported by Australian government 
practice throughout the twenty-four year occupation, as has been detailed. It was also 
not supported by the letter of Prime Minister Howard to President Habibie dated 19 
December 1998 which appears later in the book. In this letter, Howard states: "It has 
been a long-standing Australian position that the interests of Australia, Indonesia and 
East Timor are best served by East Timor remaining part of Indonesia."106 The 
Australian government's claim in East Timor in Transition that Australia consistently 
upheld the Timorese people's right to self-determination is obviously false. 
 
Clearly, government efforts to maintain two opposite positions simultaneously are a 
feature of the history. Such efforts were on display at the time of the 1975 invasion, as 
discussed in Chapter Five, when Australian lip-service to self-determination 
accompanied support for the seizure of East Timor. Little change from that position 
appears in this 2000 account of Australian involvement in East Timor's fortunes. The 
maintenance of such a contradictory position resembles that of the Indonesian 
government's claim of statement of support for a peaceful Portuguese decolonisation 
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of Timor.107 This claim was made three days before the invasion, with its troops 
standing ready for attack. Similarly, the Australian government claimed it had always 
supported the principle of Timor self-determination while actively facilitating 
Indonesian sovereignty.  
 
Timor Sea resources  
Australian recognition of Indonesian sovereignty was closely bound up with 
negotiations over the Timor Sea resources. De facto recognition of Indonesian 
sovereignty occurred after the invasion and was followed by official de jure 
recognition in January 1979.108 In 1985, official acceptance of the sovereignty of 
Indonesia over East Timor was confirmed.109  
 
In 1974, the Australian Government considered the "geo-political sense" of having 
Portuguese Timor incorporated into Indonesia, which would "help confirm our seabed 
agreement with Indonesia...and induce a greater readiness on Indonesia's part to 
discuss Indonesia's ocean strategy."110  At the same time, it was stated: 
we should be careful not to be seen as pushing for self-government or 
independence for Portuguese Timor or for it to become part of Indonesia, as 
this would probably be interpreted as evidence of our self-interest in the 
seabed boundary dispute rather than a genuine concern for the future of 
Portuguese Timor.111   
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In August 1975, on the eve of the invasion, Richard Woolcott stated that the closing 
of the gap in the sea border (which had been agreed in 1972 with Indonesia) could be 
more easily negotiated with Indonesia than with Portugal or an independent 
Portuguese Timor.112  
 
Following the invasion, East Timor in Transition reports the motivation of Australian 
authorities to recognise the Indonesian incorporation of East Timor. Although the 
invasion is lamented, the recognition of the incorporation was connected to maritime 
boundary negotiations: 
On 15 December 1978, Peacock signalled that Australia would give de jure 
recognition to the Indonesian takeover, with the commencement of 
negotiations over the delimitation of the seabed boundary between East Timor 
and Australia early the following year. Peacock said that Australia had to face 
the realities of international law in conducting seabed negotiations and that 
this did not mean the Government condoned Indonesia's method of 
incorporating East Timor.113   
 
It must be recognised that the Timor Gap Treaty signed with Indonesia in 1989 was a 
breach of the obligation for states to not recognise territory acquired by force.114 Yet 
Simone King quotes a legal opinion that reference to East Timor in the Treaty as "the 
Indonesian Province of East Timor" constituted one of the highest forms of de jure 
recognition.115 East Timor in Transition defends the Australian position by pointing 
out that some thirty other nations also recognised Indonesian sovereignty over time, 
either explicitly or by signing treaties which recognised the entity "Indonesia" as 
defined in Indonesian law.116 Nevertheless, none of these nations negotiated with 
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Indonesia over material benefits relating to East Timor as did Australia. The force of 
Australia's legal recognition of an annexation constantly regarded as illegal by the 
United Nations is thus cushioned in East Timor in Transition by association with 
other nations' lesser acts of recognition, all of which, however, lacked the particular 
legal ramifications of Australia's de jure recognition. It is ironic that Australia was 
concerned to observe international law in relation to the Timor Sea while accepting 
the illegal occupation of East Timor.  
 
The dependency of Australia on the Indonesian desire to subsume East Timor 
extended to imitation of tactics and willingness to present inconsistency and 
contradiction as acceptable policy. The voting record at the United Nations and 
continued military assistance demonstrate Australian subservience to Indonesian 
desires, serving Australian need for regional security. The negotiations over the Timor 
Sea signal the Australian awareness that complicity in persecution and dependency on 
large power can be profitable.117  
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Features of Scapegoating in Australian Complicity 
Crisis, Crime and Criteria for the Scapegoat  
In order to demonstrate Australia's role regarding East Timor in greater detail, and 
with regard to Girard's insights into scapegoating, a case study is analysed. It concerns 
Monsignor da Costa Lopes, the Catholic Church's Apostolic Administrator of East 
Timor from 1977 to 1983. 
 
Girard identifies consistent features, or stereotypes, that recur in the mythic 
representations of ancient persecutions and in modern cases of collective violence. 
Firstly, in these accounts of persecution, there are social crises which threaten the 
peace and stability of communities. Secondly, accusations are made against a person 
or group to identify a crime, which is interpreted as the origin or exacerbation of the 
crisis. Thirdly, some person or group displaying suspect features is blamed, becoming 
the scapegoat upon whom is heaped responsibility for the crime. Scapegoats are 
usually chosen because of their credibility as victims, and whose marginality serves to 
protect the accusers. Since the scapegoat caused the crisis, he/she/they must then be 
held accountable to restore equilibrium. The three initial stereotypes of persecution 
are the crisis, the crime, and then the criteria for the selection of the victim. The 
killing or expulsion of scapegoats is the fourth of Girard's stereotypes, that is, the 
unanimous collective violence done to the victim to reinstate communal stability, and 
the fifth is the peace or order that is established or restored following the scapegoating 
violence.118  
 
In a general sense, one can identify these features in the East Timor situation:  
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1) a security crisis caused by communism and Portuguese colonisation had arisen;  
2) accusations were made that the East Timorese could not be self-governing and 
were supportive of communism;  
3) certain features about East Timor (marking it as marginal and blame-worthy) were 
identified or supposed, such as its small size, communist leanings, and inability to be 
politically and economically self-sufficient;  
4) violence was perpetrated against East Timor by the Indonesian government, 
supported by Australian and the US, supposedly to prevent a communist threat; and,  
5) following this violence, a type of order or control was given to East Timor and 
international relations regarding East Timor although this order was protested against 
and resisted.119 
 
More specifically, Girard's categories of crisis, crime, and criteria for the choice of 
the victim are observable when considering the high profile public incident in 
Australia relating to East Timor which involved Monsignor da Costa Lopes. In this 
case, the crisis being experienced by Australian governments was the possible 
destabilisation of the relationship with Indonesia resulting from Australian people's 
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Case Study:  Monsignor da Costa Lopes 
Crisis 
Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes had been appointed to administer the diocese of 
Dili in 1977.120 Rather than include the diocese in the Indonesian Bishops' Conference 
upon the resignation of Bishop José Ribeiro, the Vatican undertook direct control, and 
appointed Lopes as Apostolic Administrator.121 He held the post until his forced 
resignation in 1983.122 During his tenure, famine took hold in Timor in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s as the Indonesian military attempted to gain control of the territory.123 
In efforts to weaken their resistance, ABRI forcibly moved people and deliberately 
destroyed their crops, livestock and food stores, thus depriving them of the means of 
subsistence.124 The CAVR report notes that the people "were positively denied access 
to food and its sources."125 In particular, forced displacement into crowded 
resettlement camps (where restriction on movement to find or grow food was 
enforced by the military) resulted in starvation and death of "horrendous proportions" 
especially in 1978 and 1979.126 
 
International aid agencies received reports of famine as early as April 1977 and a visit 
by foreign ambassadors in September 1978 raised further awareness. Humanitarian 
relief was controlled, however, solely by the Indonesian military which refused entry 
to agencies until September 1979.127 Such access was granted once the military 
believed that the bulk of the population was under control and that the resistance was 
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significantly weakened.128 By that time, 300,000 people (55% of the population) were 
found to be seriously malnourished.129 Delegates from the International Red Cross 
described the situation "as bad as Biafra."130 News and photos of the starvation stirred 
Australian agencies into action which included ongoing discussion of Australian 
policy.131 While the ensuing aid program relieved the famine considerably,132 the 
long-term effects on the Timorese population were immense. The huge death toll in 
such appalling circumstances brought further individual and communal sorrow and 
trauma. The social upheaval of continual displacement, threat and starvation for 
political purposes violated the people's rights, traditions and lifestyle.133 
 
Subsequently Bishop John Gerry, the Secretary of the Australian Bishops' 
Conference, wrote a letter to Monsignor Lopes on 11 November 1981 asking for 
information and advice concerning the situation in East Timor.134 Bishop Gerry 
specifically enquired about the social and political situation, types of assistance 
required, and what stand the Australian Church agencies should take, referring to the 
"expected famine over the New Year."135 Lopes' reply on 19 November 1981 
described the Timorese situation as "tragic", wrote of atrocities committed in Lacluta 
where he claimed that five hundred Timorese were killed, and referred, as Bishop 
Gerry had done, to the "expected famine".136 The publication of the contents of Lopes' 
letter moved Australian and international agencies to prepare to gather and send aid to 
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the territory as they had done so recently in the late 1970s.137 Dormant popular 
opposition to the Indonesian invasion surfaced again in large sections of Australia in 
the face of further news of famine, fuelling antagonistic sentiment to government 
policies.   
 
It was in this context that Gough Whitlam and the journalist Peter Hastings undertook 
a three-day visit to East Timor to survey the situation. They gave a press conference 
in Jakarta on March 5, 1982, before returning to Australia. As will be detailed, 
Whitlam then launched a ferocious campaign of attack against Monsignor Lopes 
which lasted for months.  
 
The genesis of the visit illustrates the crisis inherent in the Australia-Indonesia 
relationship in regard to East Timor. During the interview, Whitlam refused to say on 
whose invitation he had made the trip, claiming that while he and Hastings travelled 
with the Jakarta representative of the International Red Cross, he didn't know "how all 
the arrangements were made."138 Whitlam later admitted, however, that he was 
briefed by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and that he called 
on President Suharto and the acting Foreign Minister in Jakarta before returning to 
Australia.139 Pat Walsh (later an advisor to the CAVR) maintained that the visit was at 
the invitation of the Indonesian government as a way of weakening an Australian 
Senate Inquiry into East Timor which was to be conducted around that time. He 
referred to reports that "Indonesian Embassy officials in Canberra expressed their 
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extreme sensitivity about the forthcoming Senate Inquiry."140 Such sensitivity no 
doubt signalled to the government that the desired equilibrium in the relationship with 
Indonesia could again be at risk. Walsh also maintained that a further reason for the 
visit was to discredit Lopes, designed to throw doubt on the adverse reports on the 
situation emanating from the Catholic Church and to erode the Timorese people's 
confidence in the Church and its "focus for nationalist sentiment."141 A weak Senate 
report and doubtful accounts of the situation in East Timor would lessen the 
newsworthiness of Timor, thereby averting a further crisis in the relationship with 
Indonesia. As a self-styled "elder statesman"142 Whitlam would also benefit from a 
reduction in negative accounts of the outcome of the Indonesian incorporation in 
which he had played an influential part. Such a social crisis required a resolution with 
an appropriate scapegoat, thus diverting attention from the complicity of the 
Australian state in the outcomes of the Indonesian annexation.  
 
Crime 
Australian governments had already failed to address the real crime - the treatment of 
the Timorese people - demonstrating that the maintenance of the relationship with 
Indonesia remained more important than Timorese lives. Along with the media, the 
government was satisfied to comment on the tragedy of a possible impending famine 
without reference to the cause.  
 
Whitlam, too, averted his gaze from the system which had already decimated the 
people and which threatened another famine. He had evaded the consequences of his 
short-sighted approach to the Timorese question when in office, neglecting to use his 
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considerable political strengths and the international standing of Australia to attempt 
to mediate. In this instance he chose to address the mention of famine and atrocity in 
the letter by Monsignor da Costa Lopes rather than the cause of the problem. The 
tenacity of his denunciation ensured that, far from being a catalyst for further 
investigation of the possible famine, public focus was pointed towards the letter and 
its writer, who was painted as villainous and malign.   
 
At the press conference in Jakarta on 5 March, Whitlam discussed Lopes' reply to 
Bishop Gerry's suggestion of an expected famine. Throughout the interview Whitlam 
repudiated the claim of such an event and accused Lopes of knowing about 
negotiations for adequate Australian assistance when he wrote to Bishop Gerry. 
Whitlam stated: "I cannot understand or explain how the Monsignor came to send that 
misleading and cruel letter, or why in a word the Monsignor perpetrated this wicked 
act."143 In an ABC interview later that month Whitlam repeated his claim that 
Monsignor Lopes was a liar, and declared his view that Lopes suffered from an 
identity crisis upon realising that "Indonesia is now doing much more for the people 
of East Timor than the Portuguese ever did."144 Whitlam signalled the real cause of 
the crisis as he apportioned blame:  
this alarmist, inaccurate letter to the Australian Bishops.... has done a great 
deal of harm to relations between the Australian and Indonesian governments, 
and the Australian and Indonesian peoples.145  
 
Further, he alluded to social disquiet as a result of the letter in Australia, and blamed 
Lopes: 
The Monsignor has distressed hundreds of thousands of Australians who 
responded generously when the last news came out over two years ago about a 
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famine in East Timor and the effect that that had on the health, now and for 
the future, of so many of the population. And one expects that humane, 
charitable people in Australia would have responded to his assessment.146  
Thus Whitlam attributed to Lopes the crime of falsely warning of starvation, thereby 
precipitating damage to the relationship between Australia and Indonesia and causing 
Australians distress. The fundamental crime of the atrocities against civilians 
committed by the Indonesian military was ignored.  
 
The language Whitlam used in the series of interviews and in an article he wrote for 
the Bulletin in March 1982 is extreme. Describing Lopes' letter as "cruel" and 
"wicked", and its writer "malicious" and "mendacious" as well as using the 
unqualified designation "liar", is extraordinary.147 Such language is not only 
immoderate or intemperate; it is irrational when seen in the context of the actual state 
of peril, prolonged suffering and violent deaths of people to whom the letter refers. 
Whitlam's actions and statements are aptly summed up with a statement from Girard: 
"It is undeniably and universally true that the less rational the persecutors' conviction 
the more formidable that conviction becomes."148 
 
For months Whitlam pursued the matter. His denouncement of the Bishop's supposed 
crime was equalled only by his lavish praise of the system responsible for the 
situation of the Timorese people:  
I am convinced that what the Indonesian Government is doing in East Timor 
... is visibly beneficial ... There's no denying the evidence of one's eyes. There 
are new schools, including secondary schools, there are new or reconstructed 
hospitals and dispensaries. There are now many more kilometres of asphalt 
road, and there is proper provision for increasing the amount of food.149  
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Despite the effort to extol the Indonesian occupation and thereby redeem his own part 
in its genesis, Whitlam's excessive language of accusation betrays him as 
collaborating with persecution. As Girard explains: "in historical persecutions the 
conviction is not so overwhelming as to conceal its character and the process of 
accusation from which it stems."150  
 
Whitlam was embroiled in a crisis in which he had played a leading role. He 
attempted to diffuse the crisis by diverting attention away from the famine and 
occupation with the accusation of the crime of false reporting. His visit to Timor and 
consequent statements denying the oppression reveal him to be compromised by his 
own past, producing a series of texts of persecution found in the transcripts of the 
interviews he gave and in his writings.  
 
These texts are not important simply in regard to Whitlam's record, but because they 
became the means of diverting attention away from Australian complicity in the main 
cause of the famine – the illegitimate coloniser, Indonesia. For instance, while 
admitting some Indonesian "bungling", a Sydney Morning Herald editorial in January 
1982 extols Jakarta's "enormous and largely unremarked efforts...in the fields of 
health, education and agriculture."151 It refers to the danger posed by "Australia's 
nagging, relentless criticism of the Timor affair."152 The editorial declares that the 
"real point at issue is that East Timor has become a running ulcer in Australian-
Indonesian relations."153 Thus Monsignor Lopes' claims about possible starvation 
became a vehicle for media support of government policy on East Timor, exoneration 
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of Indonesian rule and belittling of public criticism. No doubt such reports were 
comfort for Mr Whitlam and for those who fully accepted the incorporation of East 
Timor as being the best situation for all concerned. Gunn refers to sections of the 
Australian press and government who were willing, as Whitlam was, to champion 
Indonesian rule in Timor. As evidence they broadcasted their limited experience 
gained in rare and brief visits.154 Thus, with the media focus on the credibility of 
Monsignor Lopes' claims, any Australian responsibility regarding the underlying 
causes of the problem was ignored while East Timor was again blamed for causing 
disruption to the Australia-Indonesia relationship. 
 
Criteria for the selection of victim 
The third of Girard's features of persecution is that of the reasons for the choice of a 
particular victim. The credibility and marginality of traditional scapegoats are fulfilled 
in the selection of Monsignor da Costa Lopes. While foreigners, the poor, someone 
with a physical abnormality such as colour of skin, or ethnic or religious minorities 
are obvious targets for scapegoating, Girard adds another marginal group to the list: a 
rich or powerful person, or a leader.155 Monsignor da Costa Lopes matches well some 
of these criteria. He was the leader of a marginal group, while also being a non-white 
foreigner to a mostly white Australia. He was a de facto spokesman for the Timorese 
while also being the official leader of the Catholic Church in East Timor, the only 
institution which existed there besides the Indonesian military and government 
agencies. His was a place of privilege and power, which he used to advocate for a 
beleaguered people facing extraordinary threat to their culture and their lives. Under 
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Monsignor Lopes' leadership, the Church symbolised succour and hope to the 
Timorese. As its increasingly outspoken leader, he became a focus for the Timorese 
and a target for the Indonesians and their supporters, including Australians. His stand 
for his people and their welfare in the exercise of his office marked him out as a 
threat, one who would not comply with the accepted norms of behaviour required by 
the Indonesians or the political expediency of Australian governments. 
 
Further, the process of scapegoating Lopes included discrediting his opinion and 
experience as well as attacking his authority. For example, Lopes' comments from the 
pulpit on the people's suffering were denigrated by Whitlam as "what he described as 
a homily."156  Whitlam always used inverted commas when referring to him as "the 
Bishop", thus underlining his lesser status as an Apostolic Administrator despite his 
work and responsibilities being identical to that of a Bishop.157  
 
Violent Scapegoating and Peace Restored 
The continuing disturbance in Australia over the Lopes affair points to substantial 
underlying guilt and anger concerning the Timor situation. Distracted by Whitlam's 
attacks, the media concentrated more on the words of Monsignor Lopes than on the 
issue of possible famine to which he was referring, to the extent that the Australian 
Council for Overseas Aid requested a retraction by the Sydney Morning Herald 
concerning claimed misreporting of the Monsignor's words.158 Australian unease was 
thus sublimated into more academic questions concerning the truth or otherwise of 
particular statements. Nevertheless, Lopes' warnings about famine were vindicated, 
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with, for example, a 1984 report that stated "the threat of widespread famine...is 
intensifying."159 Yet after Whitlam's criticism of him and the adverse publicity given 
to Indonesia as a result of the Monsignor's words, Indonesian military personnel 
pressured the Papal Envoy to Indonesia to advise the Vatican to remove Lopes and in 
1983 he was forced to resign.160 Girard's fourth feature is here evident: the 
scapegoating of Monsignor da Costa Lopes was complete. The accusations were 
primarily conveyed through the media and back-room politics, but the effect was a 
coerced and violent expulsion. As a result, the relationship between the Australian and 
Indonesian governments was rescued from a crisis, and was restored, for a time, as 
harmonious and ordered. Lopes’ experience clearly demonstrates Australian 
complicity in scapegoating East Timor, particularly in the government and media, to 
support Indonesian occupation. 
 
Conclusion  
The bedrock of Australian policy in the region for the 24 years of the Indonesian 
occupation of East Timor was the desire to cement a positive relationship with 
Indonesia, to the detriment of both the Timorese people and to Australian claims to 
fairness and independence. The policies required Australian official responses to 
massacres, famines, asylum seekers, the Timor Sea resources and UN resolutions that 
are now seen as unprincipled and culpable. Australian government publications on the 
events sought to minimise negative opinion of Indonesia and Australia. They are 
"texts of persecution" and thus continue to scapegoat the Timorese people. 
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Conclusion to Section Two 
In this section of the dissertation, an interpretation of the history of East Timor from 
1975 to 1999 using the insights of René Girard demonstrates the victimisation of a 
small and relatively powerless people. Chapter Four demonstrated that East Timor 
was sacrificed by Australia to larger security goals against its enemies, beginning a 
pattern of behaviour that would extend to the end of the 20th century.  Furthermore, 
the role of texts in Girard's theories of scapegoating has shown East Timor to be 
written out of the much-cherished war history of Australia, as discussed in Chapter 
Four. The Australian performance at the time of the invasion, investigated in Chapter 
Five, allows for Girard's designation of the "romantic lie" to show the extent of 
Australian mimetic dependence on Indonesia. In Chapter Six, investigation of the 
government document East Timor in Transition demonstrates also that a text can itself 
be an instrument of persecution. Through the distortions brought by bias, omission 
and embellishment, this official government account of history has continued the 
scapegoating of East Timor.  
 
Australian involvement in this history raises questions about Australian self-
perception, and stands in contrast to Australia’s later support of East Timor. The next 
section considers the change in the Australian position in relation to East Timor in 
reference to Girard's insights into conversion, showing how the relationship between 
Australia and East Timor as well as Australia and Indonesia changed as popular 






CONVERSION TOWARDS THE VICTIM 
 
Introduction 
The previous section applied a Girardian interpretation to the record of significant 
Australian policies, decisions and actions during historical events concerning East 
Timor. This last section of the thesis uses Girard's insights to interpret the responses 
of Australian civil society and government at the close of the occupation in 1999. The 
relationship between the official Australian change of policy in the late 1990s which 
enabled a practical government response, and the influence on that change exerted by 
domestic response to the suffering of the Timorese people invite investigation as they 
display a major and rapid change in the Australian relationship with East Timor.  
 
This change provokes important questions: How did an issue which had been of 
constant concern to relatively few for many years evolve into comprehensive 
Australian government intervention? To what extent did the actions of civil society 
affect change of government policy? What influence did the Timorese people have on 
Australia? How does a Girardian analysis throw light on Australian actions?   
 
The section discusses the political and moral influences that caused change, and refers 
to the lack of accountability for the crimes against humanity which had been 
committed throughout the occupation. Most importantly it sees the inspiration given 
by the Timorese people as the catalyst for the Australian conversion which 
accompanied the events of the end of the decade of the 1990s. Through lack of 
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revenge, nonviolence and forgiveness, the Timorese people demonstrated the 
response to violence which Girard sees as the only way that violence can be 
overcome.  




Chapter Seven describes ways in which Australian civil society influenced and was 
affected by events concerning the Timorese people. First, the principled and long-
standing efforts of Australian solidarity groups, to which the inspiration provided by 
the Timorese people was crucial, are considered as part of the international movement 
of support of East Timor. The contribution of the Catholic Church is considered here. 
Second, the advocacy of civil society is seen to have reached a critical mass as the 
violence against the Timorese people became the focus of media and government 
attention, revealing the Timorese people as victim, not only of the military regime, but 
of decades of Australian collusion. Third, discussion then focuses on the influence of 
civil society on government decisions, concluding that political manoeuvring merged 
with popular outrage to cause momentous regional change. This indicated a 
movement towards the victim by the Australian government and people that 




The end of the Indonesian occupation 
The vote for freedom 
The conclusion of the long sacrifice of East Timor occurred in the final months of 
1999.  Following Indonesian President Habibie's announcement in favour of a 
plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the Timorese people regarding their status, an 
agreement between the UN, Portugal and Indonesia on the process was signed in New 
York on 5 May 1999. After formal establishment by the Security Council in June, the 
United Nations Assistance Mission for East Timor (UNAMET) received enthusiastic 
international support, including from the Australian government.1 Preparations for the 
referendum were undertaken swiftly, accompanied by increasing military-inspired 
militia violence within the territory, as it became apparent that the vote would likely 
be in favour of independence from Indonesia.2 International diplomacy tried to 
balance justice and appeasement as reports of intimidation and massacres filled news 
reports.  
 
On 30 August 1999, the Timorese people voted for freedom from Indonesian rule 
with a registered voter turn-out of 98.6%. Despite intimidation and violence they 
delivered a result of 78.5% in favour of independence. Once the result of the vote was 
announced on 4 September, violence against the population increased, resulting in the 
withdrawal of the unarmed UN staff to the UN compound in Dili, while Timorese 
across the districts who had worked for the UN were left to the mercy of the militia.3 
The fury of the Indonesian military and their Timorese proxies resulted in over 1500 
                                                            
1 James Dunn, East Timor: A Rough Passage to Independence, 3rd ed. (Double Bay, NSW: 
Longueville Books, 2003), 347. 
2 Dunn, East Timor, 354. 
3 Dunn, East Timor, 360. 
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deaths and the decimation of the infrastructure.4 Killings, looting and burning 
accompanied the forcible removal of 150,000 people to West Timor. Difficult 
international diplomacy accelerated – involving Australia and the United States. After 
weeks of destruction, these negotiations resulted in a UN intervention which took the 
form of the International Force for East Timor (InterFET), authorised and despatched 
under the leadership of Australian Major General Peter Cosgrove. InterFET arrived in 
East Timor on 20 September 1999, three weeks after the ballot, and at its height 
comprised 5,000 Australian troops among 11,000 from across the world. On 25 
October, the Indonesian Parliament annulled the 1976 incorporation of East Timor as 
its 27th Province. The UN then established a Transitional Authority (UNTAET) 
charged with the task of guiding East Timor towards building itself as a nation.5  
 
There were no Australian InterFET deaths as a result of the military aspects of the 
intervention. Residue of the diplomatic tensions between Australia and Indonesia 
remained, including some distrust (although trade, investment, education and military 
cooperation continued or resumed) and Prime Ministers and Presidents subsequently 
engaged with each other on state visits. The alliance between the governments of the 
two nations weathered the storms of 1999, the relationship re-established itself. In 
contrast, the effects on the Timorese people were devastating, adding to the numbers 
of people tortured, murdered or traumatised throughout the previous decades.   
 
                                                            
4 Bob Breen, Mission Accomplished: East Timor (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, no date), 18-19. 
The InterFET assessment of damage ranges from minimal (Lolotoe) to 50% (Remixio) with most 
places upwards of 60%/ Los Palos in the east (70%), Suai (south) and Balibo (west) both at 95%, and 
the capital Dili assessed at 100%. 
5 Dunn, East Timor, 362. 
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Political motivations for change 
After a twenty-four year occupation, Indonesia relinquished control of East Timor. 
Complex international and internal political realities contributed to this reversal of 
Indonesian policy. In turn, those changes required major shifts in Australian policy in 
Timor's regard. 
 
Chief among the causes of the Indonesian change was the demise of the Suharto 
regime in 1998 in association with the Asian financial crisis. The democratic reforms 
of Suharto's successor President B.J. Habibie then introduced major changes affecting 
the status of East Timor.  Compliance with Indonesian preferences had been the 
hallmark of the Australian side of the relationship, which suggests that in whatever 
way Indonesia chose to deal with East Timor, either by giving special autonomy to 
the territory or jettisoning it, then Australia would feel obliged to agree. The 
Australian government seemed largely to follow Indonesia's lead, a move which had 
the added political benefit of addressing a situation which had been causing 
Australian domestic dissent. Thus, in noting new policy openness in Indonesia under 
Habibie, the Australian government was able to subtly shift policy in favour of East 
Timor while avoiding overt destabilisation of its relationship with Indonesia.  
 
Changes in Australian policy   
Prime Minister John Howard had written of his realisation early in 1998 that the new 
President Habibie looked on Timor as "a costly drag."6 This realisation influenced 
                                                            




subsequent Coalition policy.7 Howard was also aware of the growing appetite of the 
Australian population for a resolution to this problem:  
There was a new president, with a new attitude on an old and troubling issue 
for many Australians; taking advantage of such opportunities to pursue change 
was what practical advances in foreign policy was all about.8  
  
Whether the "old and troubling issue" would have been addressed had there not been 
a new president with new attitudes is a matter of conjecture. The situation was fraught 
with political and regional dangers for Howard's government. On the one hand was 
the desire to continue to build a positive relationship with Indonesia, and on the other, 
the increasing "domestic dissent" over Timor was offering electoral provocations. 
 
Hugh White reported the government's key policy objectives regarding East Timor 
which were enunciated in the first part of 1999: 
the relationship with Indonesia was more important to Australia than the future of 
East Timor, so that we should avoid outcomes which damaged or jeopardised that 
relationship,9  
and  
the relationship with TNI was especially important, because of its expected role in 
Indonesia's political future, so special care should be taken to protect that 
relationship.10  
 
Retaining the advantages of the friendship of Indonesia, however, regardless of 
Timorese matters, was complicated by the new challenges of relating to a changing 
government under President Habibie. Additionally, Australia had to consider its 
relationship with the powerful military bloc which retained many seats in the 
                                                            
7 Howard, Lazarus Rising, 340. 
8 Howard, Lazarus Rising, 341. 
9 Hugh White, "The Road to INTERFET: Reflections on Australian Strategic Decisions Concerning 
East Timor, December 1998-September 1999," Institute for Regional Security Vol. 4 No. 1 (Autumn 
2008): 74, accessed September 5, 2017, 
 https://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/vol4no1White.pdf 
10 White, "The Road to INTERFET," 74. 
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Indonesian parliament and exerted major influence.11  In fact, the Australian 
government's own preference was for East Timor to remain part of Indonesia, a desire 
expressed as late as 1998-1999, which indicated official willingness to allow the 
occupation to continue. This was illustrated when President Habibie offered an 
autonomy package to East Timor in July 1998 that signalled an impending change. 
Howard wrote to Habibie in December of that year, reiterating Australian support for 
Indonesia's sovereignty, and stating that the interests of all concerned "are best served 
by East Timor remaining part of Indonesia".12 Howard had suggested that Habibie 
avoid "an early and final decision" on self-determination by arranging for the deferral 
of a referendum on East Timor's status "for many years."13 Interestingly, Howard's 
mention in the letter of the Matignon Accords in New Caledonia may have suggested 
"the implicit correlation drawn between French colonialism and Indonesia's 
occupation of East Timor."14 Thus it could well have been judged by Habibie as an 
affront to Indonesia's long-claimed opposition to colonial rule, and thus an insult. One 
month later, Habibie announced the startling decision that the Timorese would be 
offered a choice between autonomy within Indonesia or independence.15 
 
 
In keeping with past practice Australia attempted to maintain the appearance of 
support for Indonesia. At the same time it endeavoured to avoid anything which might 
jeopardise the means by which East Timor could repudiate Indonesia, thus honouring 
the other prong of the Australian contradictory stand, that of support for Timorese 
                                                            
11 White, "The Road to INTERFET," 74. 
12 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, (DFAT),  East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An 
Australian Policy Challenge (2001), 181. 
13 DFAT, East Timor in Transition, 182. 
14 Grayson J. Lloyd, "The Diplomacy on East Timor", in Out of the Ashes: Deconstruction and 
Reconstruction of East Timor, ed. James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo Soares, (Adelaide: Crawford House 
Publishing, 2000), 88. 
15 Don Greenlees and Robert Garran, Deliverance: The inside story of East Timor's fight for freedom 
(Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2002), 103. 
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self-determination. Such a position required similar duplicity to that of previous years, 
where excusing, explaining or ignoring Indonesian practice in East Timor occupied 
Australian governments. This was accomplished, for example, in relation to the 
attacks by the Indonesians and their militias against independence supporters, where 
the Australian government repeated its constant excuses for Indonesian actions. 
Nevins states: 
Publicly the Howard government – despite overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary – continued to pretend that the violence perpetrated by pro-
Independence forces was not the result of official policy in Jakarta or within 
the military high command but, instead, was the work of 'rogue elements'.16  
 
Australian government support for Indonesian policies and actions continued, 
ensuring that the position of East Timor was consistently seen as that of the obstacle 
to the Australian-Indonesian partnership. East Timor was the "pebble in the shoe",17 
the problem to be solved, and thus, the victim. 
 
A major development which influenced government and emboldened the solidarity 
movement was the reversal of Labor Party policy. Labor changed its position in 
January 1998 in favour of "a process of negotiation through which the people of East 
Timor can exercise their right of self-determination."18 Thus the government had to 
juggle its compromised policy in the face of two challenges: that of the speed of the 
Indonesian changes with which the Australians officially did not agree, and that of 
                                                            
16 Joseph Nevins, A Not-So-Distant Horror: Mass Violence in East Timor (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2005), 121. 
17 The phrase "pebble in the shoe" was used by Ali Alatas, Indonesia's Foreign Minister 1988-1999, 
who subsequently wrote the book The Pebble in the Shoe: the diplomatic struggle for East Timor. The 
phrase has also been associated with Gareth Evans, Australian Foreign Minister (1988-1996), regarding 
his comments about the Santa Cruz massacre and his role in the Timor Gap agreement. See 
https://newmatilda.com/2010/02/02/pebble-gareths-shoe/  




political and popular championing of the Timorese cause. White maintains that 
Howard's change of tactic: 
was to ensure that Australian policy was not 'left behind' by moves in Jakarta, 
especially as the Labor opposition had already started to move away from the old 
consensus on that policy and was more actively advocating changes in East 
Timor's status.19  
 
Kelly comments that both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, "did not seek East 
Timor's independence by accident or mistake – their aim was to remove the main 
obstacle to better ties with Indonesia."20 Thus changes of policy did not indicate any 
fundamental change in the relationship with East Timor. Officially, that relationship 
continued to be an expression of Australia's dependence on Indonesia, regardless of 
reversal of the measures taken to implement that dependence. 
 
It can be seen that the change in Australian policy was in large part a realpolitik set of 
decisions made to ensure the continuance of a positive relationship with Indonesia in 
view of the immense political developments in Indonesia itself. The Australian 
decisions involved calculations that the best way to remain in favour with Indonesia 
in the long term was to steer alongside the shifting political and economic landscape, 
and to manoeuvre policy in line with changes in Indonesia, even if that meant risking 
short-term relational strain. Thus the victimage mechanism which had governed the 
Australia-East Timor relationship for decades was played out to the end. The plight of 
the victim East Timor was subordinate to the status and good name of the perpetrators 
of the violence. The Australian desire had been to secure its relationship with 
Indonesia, a desire which had required complicity in the occupation of East Timor. 
                                                            
19 White, The Road to INTERFET," 73. 
20 Paul Kelly, The March of Patriots: the struggle for modern Australia (Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne 
University Press, 2011), 514. 
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Australia was now embroiled in a complex situation in which, again, it was the 
Timorese people who suffered. 
 
 
The question arises as to what extent the Howard government desired a just outcome 
for East Timor. Publicly, government pronouncements consistently upheld the 
practice of supporting Indonesia's position. Nevertheless, it is true that in the name of 
Australia, the Howard  government responded to the changing circumstances in 
Indonesia in a manner which was positive towards East Timor's prospects of freedom. 
Such support was viewed by many in Indonesia as unwarranted interference and put 
some pressure on the relationship, as has been noted. However, there was no initiative 
on East Timor's behalf on the part of the Coalition government, even by way of mild 
diplomatic challenge, as is clear from official historical documents. Instead, political 
manoeuvring in the late 1990s was largely in response to changes which the 
Indonesian administration had themselves set in train so unexpectedly. 
 
Nevertheless, I argue that both the Labor Party's break with bipartisan tradition and 
the Coalition's policy change was influenced heavily by the unrelenting campaign of 
ordinary Australians to see justice done. The growth of significant features of 
Australian support - advocacy and welfare- influenced more and more Australians 
who pressured both government and opposition for change. Media interest and 
improving communications revealed the extent of the mayhem. As the image of the 
victim East Timor became clearer, Australian people's pressure increased to an extent 
that past political certainties could not withstand it. A consideration of this successful 





The popular support for the Timorese cause – expressed, for example, in Australian 
domestic dissent concerning the Indonesian occupation - was motivated by the actions 
of civil society groups and actors who kept the Timorese cause alive in the public 
imagination through consistent advocacy. International civil society's support for the 
Timorese people took many years to grow and consisted of the efforts of a small 
number of dedicated citizens across the world who worked to make the suffering of 
the Timorese people known.21 Australian solidarity movements were integral to this 
support. The influence of civil society was a crucial element in the changes which 
occurred.  
 
Naidoo and Borren summarise civil society as "the arena, outside the state and the 
market, which is created by individual and collective action to advance shared 
interests."22 Such shared interests can serve the general good or be designed to benefit 
a minority. These groups can contain a variety of ideological positions, such that they 
do not necessarily "speak with one voice."23 Ciobanu states that the diversity of vision 
and values in these groups gives them strength. "This diverse spectrum of associations 
points toward one of the essential features of civil society, its pluralistic nature, since 
no group claims to represent the interests of the whole."24 
                                                            
21 Carmen Budiardjo, "The International solidarity movement for East Timor: a weapon more powerful 
than guns," Tapol, 17 May 2002, accessed 5 October 2016, http://www.tapol.org/news-and-
reports/press-statements/international-solidarity-movement-east-timor-weapon-more-powerful; 
Fernandes, The Independence of East Timor, 91-97. 
22 Kumi Naidoo and Sylvia Borren, "Civil Society," in International Development: Ideas, Experience, 
and Prospects, ed. Currie-Alder, Bruce, Ravi Kanbur, David M. Malone, and Rohinton Medhora, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, Oxford Scholarship Online, 2014): 6, accessed 30 September 2016,  
doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199671656.003.0047. 
23 Naidoo and Borren, "Civil Society," 2. 
24 Monica Ciobanu, "Civil Society," in Encyclopedia of Activism and Social Justice, ed. Gary L. 
Anderson & Kathryn G. Herr, (Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications, Inc., 2007): 2, accessed 




Sets of shared values give civil society its "normative character", enabling people 
from various geographical and group bases to transcend their limitations for the 
common good.25 Motivated by concepts of justice, civil society can exercise the key 
democratic function of challenging the structures of power, particularly on behalf of 
those who suffer disadvantage.26 In the context of shared appreciation of universal 
human rights, both "religious" and "secular" groups and people can unite for common 
purposes.27 International support for East Timor demonstrated these values. The 
CAVR report also identified particular characteristics of the civil society solidarity 
with East Timor, which included nonviolence, favouring principle over strategy, 
cooperating with government and business when appropriate, being non party-
political, and welcoming contributions from many people.28  
 
International support for East Timor  
While the civil society movement of support for East Timor was consistent (though it 
waxed and waned), the 1990s saw a resurgence of concern. The international publicity 
surrounding the Santa Cruz (Dili) massacre in 1991 brought the issue of Timor 
forcefully into the public domain. Seminars and conferences linked people from a 
range of nations who worked together and established solidarity groups to share 
information and devise strategies for the support of East Timor.29 Gatherings of some 
influential persons continually called on Indonesia to observe the United Nations 
resolutions on East Timor and challenged governments to cease the arms trade with 
Indonesia. Support groups were established and strengthened in various nations, 
                                                            
25 Ciobanu, "Civil Society," 2. 
26 Naidoo and Borren, "Civil Society," 8; Ciobanu, "Civil Society," 2. 
27 Ciobanu, "Civil Society," 3. 
28 Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Timor-Leste (CAVR), Chega! The Report of 
the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Timor-Leste (CAVR), (Dili, TL: CAVR, 
2005), 7.1.6.430. 526. 
29 Commission, CAVR, 7.1.6.487. 
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including Portugal, Britain, the United States, Japan, The Philippines, Canada, New 
Zealand, Ireland and Indonesia itself. Amnesty International and other NGOs 
consistently issued reports about the human rights situation in East Timor, while 
solidarity groups such as the influential East Timor Action Network (ETAN) 
continued support for East Timor for decades.30 In 1994 the Asia-Pacific Coalition for 
East Timor (APCET) was established, coordinating solidarity across Asia, despite 
opposition from Indonesia and some other ASEAN nations.31 Importantly, it 
challenged the notion that East Timor had no support in Asia.32 Despite limited 
memberships, networking among such groups increased their effectiveness.  
 
Inspired by the nonviolent resistance of the Timorese people (to be discussed in detail 
in Chapter Eight), an increasing number of people across the world organised to 
support them and protest against the repressive Indonesian occupation. The growing 
international support was substantially motivated by the moving evidence of the 
victimisation of the Timorese which gradually began to seep out of the territory.33 
There was also a shift in official government positions during the 1990s. For example, 
the US administration finally took a sympathetic interest in Timor in the late 1990s, 
acknowledging its tardiness in providing the leverage which its position in the world 
could have given had there been the political will.34  
 
The organisation of international solidarity to raise awareness of the Timorese 
situation was pivotal in its eventual success. The response to the Santa Cruz massacre 
                                                            
30 See http//:www.etan.org 
31 Commission, CAVR, 7.1.6.485. 
32 Commission, CAVR, 7.1.6.485. 
33 For example see Tapol Bulletin, No 108, December 1991, accessed April 6, 2016,   
    http://vuir.vu.edu.au/26096/ 
34 Arnold S. Kohen, From the Place of the Dead: The epic struggles of Bishop Belo of East Timor 
(New York: St Martin's Press, 1999), 290. 
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is the most significant example of this awareness-raising, and is often discussed as a 
turning point in public consciousness regarding Timor, influencing the international 
solidarity movement markedly. The filming of the atrocity by Max Stahl was crucial 
to international understanding of the situation as it was the first time that visual 
evidence of the Indonesian military oppression victimisation of the Timorese people 
was broadcast.35 The testimony of two American journalists present, Allan Nairn and 
Amy Goodman, also helped to bring the facts to light.36 The world-wide transmission 
of the images of the Timorese fleeing the bullets in the cemetery vividly displayed the 
victim targeted by the persecutor. The stark horror of the incident recorded on film is 
a faithful presentation of persecution and attests to the ingenuity of Girard's analysis 
of the victim mechanism.37 The subsequent denials and minimisation of the massacre 
were incapable of concealing the truth of the unadorned film: the violent persecution 
of the victim. 
 
One of the most notable international acts of civil resistance to the violence in East 
Timor occurred in Britain in 1996, where four women disabled a British Aerospace 
Hawk aircraft.38 They prepared their action over months and, after damaging the 
aeroplane, they left a statement of opposition to the use of such equipment in East 
Timor, providing a video of the bombing of Timorese villages using British-made 
aircraft and weapons. They then surrendered to the authorities. Significantly, at their 
trial they were found not guilty by reason of destroying property in order to prevent 
                                                            
35 Greenlees and Garran, Deliverance, 22. 
36 Rodney Tiffen, Diplomatic Deceits: Government, Media and East Timor (Sydney: University of  
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37 René Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, trans. S. Bann and M. Metteer 
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Freccero (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 27. 
38 Angie Zelter, "Civil Society and Global Responsibility: the Arms Trade and East Timor," in 




worse destruction. This incident and trial again showed the intensifying recognition of 
East Timor as the victim of powerful forces, particularly among Western nations.  
 
Describing civil society's contributions to the resolution of the conflict over Timor-
Leste at the independence celebrations in May 2002 in Dili, the UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan stated that such support was "critical."39 The culmination of the 
involvement of international civil society was seen in the oversight of the UN 
sponsored ballot undertaken by nearly 2,300 observers, the majority from non-
government organisations. The CAVR Report notes that they:  
represented a multitude of citizens in many countries for whom the ballot, as for 
the East Timorese people, climaxed a struggle of epic proportions and 
demonstrated again the importance and capacity of principled people's power in 
world affairs.40   
 
The growing international consensus on the status of East Timor as victim underlay 
this triumph of principle. Girard contrasts the present-day preoccupation with victims 
with the  disregard towards them detected in previous societies. "Examine ancient 
sources, inquire everywhere, dig up the corners of the planet, and you will not find 
anything anywhere that even remotely resembles our modern concern for victims."41 
It is true, states Girard, that the modern world makes more victims than ever before, 
but at the same time it is one that saves more victims than ever before.42 He attributes 
the solicitude for victims to the dawning realisation of the innocence of the scapegoat 
resulting from the Gospel account of Christ's life and death. The very reproaches 
human beings now make towards themselves because of continual scapegoating are 
evidence of the success of the Gospel message of appreciation of the victim. The 
                                                            
39 Commission, CAVR, 7.1.6.430. 
40 Commission, CAVR, 7.1.6.499. 
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concern for the victim unleashed by Christ is universal and is in the process of 
overtaking the world. It was this "timeless moral imperative"43 that was evident in the 
response of so many people worldwide to the victim, East Timor. 
 
Australian solidarity as expression of conversion 
Australia's unique relationship with East Timor 
While part of the international movement of solidarity, Australian support of East 
Timor took on a particular significance and tone compared to that of other nations, 
especially given the proximity and connection to East Timor. It was often remarked 
that Australian government involvement had contributed to the widespread death and 
suffering of the Timorese people in two different historical eras. The realisation that 
tens of thousands of Timorese died as a result of their harbouring of a few hundred 
Australian soldiers during World War II remains a heartfelt and singularly poignant 
element which can evoke feelings of shame and guilt. Understandably, the subsequent 
complicity of Australian governments in the Indonesian invasion and occupation were 
interpreted by many as a complete betrayal of proven friends. Australians therefore 
had an unparalleled responsibility towards the Timorese people, one which was 
highlighted by the solidarity movement and was an on-going point of sensitivity 
amongst many Australians, and was evidenced in the protests of 1990s in favour of 
the Timorese.  
 
The shared history of the two peoples motivated a growing number of Australians to 
take the Timorese situation to heart. Many personal links were established between 
Australians and Timorese, including the almost 10,000 people born in East Timor 
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who were living in Australia towards the end of the 1990s. Almost all of those had 
escaped from the Indonesian regime.44 With such a strong Timorese presence in the 
community, Australians had further cause to play a prominent role among the 
international supporters of East Timor, and rose to the occasion. The CAVR Report 
states that Australia was "the principal centre of civil society support" at the time of 
the invasion.45  
 
Thus the gradual yet relentless appreciation of the revelation of the victim mechanism 
influenced Australians regarding East Timor. Political bipartisanship and public 
apathy could not withstand the truth of the victim, and fell away as the collective 
awareness of the victim grew. This awareness and the compassionate actions arising 
from it in Australia are now briefly described. 
 
Solidarity groups 
Of the dozens of solidarity groups operating in Australia during the occupation, there 
were some that were specifically formed to address the East Timor situation, while 
others were existing associations that took up the East Timor cause, in keeping with 
their rationale.46 The people involved were characterised by their determination to 
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uphold the right to self-determination of the Timorese people and to raise awareness 
of the unjust situation in Timor. The cause demonstrated that people could work with 
others across cultural, political and religious divides for a greater good. Nonviolence 
was taken as a given.  
 
Solidarity groups emerged from different experiences and backgrounds, 
demonstrating the broad nature of the movement. An important group was the 2/2 
Commando Association. Remembering the loyal service of the Timorese people 
towards them in 1942, its members worked to support the people materially and to 
advocate for justice. Another was the Australia-East Timor Association (AETA) 
which was formed in 1974 to support self-determination for East Timor. Active in 
Melbourne and Sydney, its members lobbied governments on behalf of the Timorese 
people for decades. Additionally, certain trade unions lent valuable and consistent 
support, as well as the group Parliamentarians for East Timor which continually 
expressed the concern of members of both government and opposition about 
Australian policy.47 A variety of other partnerships and circles across Australia 
established themselves as years passed, also calling for justice and providing 
succour.48 Some of the associations continued for years, while upon independence 
others ceased operation or were subsumed into other groups.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
Australian Groups that included a focus on East Timor included: 
APHEDA - Union Aid Abroad; Action for World Development; Australian Campaign against the 
Arms Trade; Australian Catholic Relief (later Caritas); Australian Coalition for East Timor; 
Australian Council for Overseas Aid; Australian Council of Churches; Australian Forum of 
Human Rights Organisations; Australian People for Health, Education and Development Abroad; 
Campaign against Militarism; Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (replaced by 
Australian Catholic Social Justice Council); Community Aid Abroad; International Commission of 
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Those who were members of such groups and supported East Timor reflected the 
diversity of Australian society: activists, teachers, taxi drivers, nuns, academics, 
journalists, housewives, bishops, aid workers, human rights advocates, lawyers, 
priests, nurses, politicians, ministers, trade unionists, students, soldiers and others. 
The strength of these advocates was that they were  involved in a variety of ways on a 
diversity of fronts, many networking and lobbying in Australia and internationally.49 
Practical compassion towards the victim was expressed particularly through advocacy 
for justice, aid and welfare, and efforts to heighten communication between the 
Timorese and the outside world.  
 
Advocacy 
The support groups across Australia worked diligently to influence political decisions 
relating to the Timor question during the occupation. Letters to newspapers strongly 
criticised government policy from the beginning. Four returned soldiers of the 2/2 
Commandos wrote to the Sydney Morning Herald a few months before the invasion in 
1975 expressing "grave concern" at the events unfolding in Portuguese Timor, fearful 
that Australia would "turn tail and allow avoidable disaster to occur."50 Similar 
opposition to government policies continued to be expressed throughout the next 
quarter century, mainly by private citizens. Articles for newspapers and journals, and 
the production of newsletters and periodicals became sources of information and 
education for sections of the community, although they were rarely pursued by the 
mainstream media. Access to information increased in the 1990s and significant 
materials was published by organisations such as the Melbourne-based East Timor 
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49 Commission, CAVR, 7.1.6.450. 
50 D. O'Connor, A.C. Thompson, G.C Hart, A.D. Stevenson, "Australia's debt to the Timorese," The 
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Human Rights Centre, Oxfam, Caritas Australia, AETA, the East Timor Relief 
Association (ETRA), Minority Rights Groups International, and Diocesan Catholic 
Commissions for Justice and Peace. Support groups also lobbied politicians and 
church leaders. These groups developed opportunities for public speaking at schools, 
church and civic groups, service clubs and rallies to raise awareness. Particularly 
towards the end of the Indonesian regime they were involved in the organisation of 
large demonstrations, marches, and prayer vigils and services.  
 
 
A number of individuals were outstanding in their support during the occupation 
years.51 For example, one covertly entered the territory to interview people including 
Timorese resistance fighters.52 The opposition of others to the Australian government 
made them subjects of ASIO surveillance.53 Moreover, members of the families of the 
Balibo Five mounted consistent advocacy on behalf of the Timorese and against the 
Indonesian invasion and occupation, which gave Australians their own collective 
connection to the destruction of life in Timor.54  
 
Welfare and Aid 
As well as advocacy, the material needs of the Timorese people were of concern to 
their supporters. Among the first examples of solidarity was that undertaken by the 
Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) which negotiated shipments of food 
                                                            
51 "Jude Conway," Companion to East Timor, UNSW Canberra: ADFA School of Humanities and 
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Western Made Tragedy (Sydney, The Left Book Club, 1992): 55-60. 
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2010, accessed January 27, 2015, http://quadrant.org.au/magazine/2010/03/crumbs-of-compassion/ 
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aid to the territory a few days before the invasion.55 Church agencies such as 
Catholics in Coalition for Justice and Peace (CCJP) gained valuable information 
through its networks and disseminated it to raise awareness. Difficulty of access to the 
territory after the invasion prevented sustained welfare projects, as the whole of East 
Timor was closed to the world for fourteen years from 1975.56 International assistance 
was provided for a time, however, when news of the famines of the late 1970s was 
broadcast. The 1990s saw greater opportunity to provide material assistance, and 
especially after independence some Australian groups implemented beneficial 
programmes, many of which continued for years. Such assistance paved the way for 
current focussed programmes of support in which Australians continue to engage 
through official aid channels and through local government, NGOs, and civic and 
church groups with Timorese partners.57   
 
Although Australian governments began to contribute to the Timorese people's 
welfare after independence, the most critical Australian assistance to the Timorese 
population was provided when they needed it most – that is, during the occupation. It 
was civil society which provided that succour, through personal support, political 
advocacy and welfare. Australian civil society cooperated to alleviate human 
suffering and attempted to educate others as to the injustice of the situation, but it 
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often seemed insignificant in the face of the control of the Indonesian regime, and was 
conducted in defiance of their own government.  
 
Communication 
Alongside material support and agitation for justice, important Australian civilian 
communications efforts occurred early in the occupation. A few communists and trade 
union members, a parliamentarian and a couple of other intrepid Australians 
(including some of those who had tried to deliver food) assisted the Timorese by 
receiving and transmitting Fretilin radio messages.58 This communication was the 
Timorese Resistance's only link to the outside world, as the Indonesian military 
prevented entry into and departure from the territory. Through the radio, the Timorese 
resistance begged for support and described the deteriorating situation of the 
Timorese under Indonesian rule. As a result, broadcasts from the mountains of Timor 
reached Darwin via a radio with two crystal-controlled frequencies, one for reception 
and one for a two way link.59 These Radio Maubere60 messages were relayed for two 
years to Fretilin members internationally, as well as to the United Nations, the media, 
other support groups and governments. Although members of the public came to 
listen to the broadcasts, including a Catholic Bishop, a future Governor-General, 
various Darwin residents and some Timorese people, support was not forthcoming 
from visitors in positions of power.61   
 
In 1976 the Australian government began to seize the privately owned equipment on a 
regular basis. The activists countered by replacing it and continuing to send abroad 
                                                            
58 Commission, CAVR, 7.1.6.439. 
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60 "Maubere" was a derogatory term used by the Portuguese to describe the poorer sections of the 
Timorese people, and subsequently was used by the Timorese with pride. 
61 Wesley-Smith, "Radio Maubere," 84. 
 
 265 
the reports of the people's situation, for the next two years evading Australian 
authorities to maintain the links with the suffering Timorese. The Indonesian military 
gained control of the Timorese end of the radio link in 1978, thus bringing to an end 
valuable support which allowed the voice of the Timorese people to be heard.62 The 
courageous and sustained effort to make public the dire situation of the Timorese had 
the effect of providing some information to the outside world, and remains testimony 
to the lengths to which both Indonesian and Australian authorities were willing to go 
to conceal the truth.  
 
Solidarity groups and, indeed, the whole Australian population, were denied reliable 
information on the Timor situation not only by being prevented from communicating 
with those in Timor, for example via Radio Maubere, but by government silence 
about the atrocities and destruction to which it was privy as a result of significant 
technological capabilities.63 The Australian Broadcasting Corporation, through its 
avenue Radio Australia which transmitted beyond Australia, was pressured by 
government concerning news on East Timor. Scott relates that Ambassador Woolcott 
had indicated to Radio Australia "to moderate its coverage of East Timor in a way that 
would minimise offence to Indonesia."64 He also describes the level of pressure 
exercised by government envoys. For example, that the Australian Ambassador 
Thomas Critchley in Jakarta advised that it was better to say on radio "since East 
Timor became part of Indonesia" rather than "the invasion of East Timor."65 Thus 
                                                            
62 Wesley-Smith, "Radio Maubere", 83-96;  Clinton Fernandes, The Illegal Radio Project  (UNSW 
Canberra: ADFA School of Humanities and Social Sciences -East Timor), accessed March 11, 2015, 
https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/school-of-humanities-and-social-sciences/timor-companion/illegal-
radio-project 
63 Nevins, A Not-So-Distant Horror, 120 and 240 n.25; Geoffrey C. Gunn, Complicity in Genocide: 
Report to the East Timor "Truth Commission" on international actors (Geoffrey C. Gunn, 2006), 118-
122. 
64 Scott, Last Flight Out of Dili, 59. 
65 Scott, Last Fight Out of Dili, 59. 
 
 266 
efforts of ordinary Australians to assist the Timorese by making the facts of their 
victimage more widely known were impeded by government departments and 
policies. 
 
Political Action in 1999 and Australian solidarity  
As Indonesia reeled from its political, social and economic upheaval in 1998-99, the 
Timorese people capitalised on the signals of imminent change. Large peaceful 
gatherings in East Timor itself in the latter half of 1999 were broadcast widely as the 
world's media gave more time and space to the Timor question. Danger existed in 
these displays, as Timorese leaders were more easily identified. Religious gatherings 




In the wake of the referendum and its brutal aftermath, there was a large Australian 
outpouring of anger, grief and support of the Timorese. Comment on the immorality 
of the decades-long situation accompanied the news of atrocities. Unremitting 
pressure by Australian individuals and groups evolved into massive demonstrations 
across the country in early September 1999, demanding that government do 
something to prevent the horror which threatened to engulf the Timorese people. The 
large protest rallies in Australia following the referendum were in response to the 
injustice and violence again being visited on the East Timorese, expressing the 
growing discontent of Australian civil society with established government policies.  
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procession ended at the park in Lecidere, where Bishop Belo spoke of human dignity in the context of 




The recognition of East Timor as victim in the last months of its ordeal was 
heightened by the focus on events of all sections of the media. The terrible situation in 
East Timor in the dangerous days after the announcement of the outcome of the UN-
administered ballot dominated news and commentary outlets. Images of the capital’s 
burning, footage of people being killed by machete-wielding militia, and stories of 
desperate escape to the mountains or to the UN compound presented graphically the 
revenge being meted out to the Timorese who had had the temerity to vote for 
freedom. Members of the public took to the Letters pages of both conservative and 
liberal newspapers to express the height of the general concern as well as the 
recognition of responsibility that had played on the Australian conscience for years. 
On Tuesday 7 September 1999 The Australian ran eleven letters with the headline 
"Time to Get Tough with Indonesia".67 On the same day The Sydney Morning Herald 
published twenty-four letters under the heading "Act to Stop the Slaughter".68 Many 
letters called for the Australian government to intervene militarily while a few 
opposed that view. Most letters placed the responsibility for the deaths in Timor onto 
the Indonesian military and accused the Australian government of cowardice and 
complicity not only in the wake of the referendum vote but throughout the occupation. 
Widespread voice was thus given to the case which the solidarity movement had kept 
alive for decades.  
 
On Monday 13 September 1999 The Sydney Morning Herald in its Postscript column 
described the public's reaction to the bloodbath in Timor when the result of the 
referendum was announced on 4 September: 
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The letters response to East Timor last week was quite overwhelming. To date 
there have been something like 1,000 responses. The only way to give vent to 
the feeling was to run extended sections of letters on the issue every day, 
including today. 
 
Readers were shocked, angered, saddened, appalled by the terrible, terrible 
story. But what was almost palpable was the frustration and impotence 
expressed by so many. Correspondents wanted something, anything, done to 
relieve the suffering they were exposed to through daily news reports from 
Dili. And there appeared nothing much they could do at all. Letters attacked 
the Government, specifically the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, for 
what the writers saw as hand-wringing inaction. Others concurred with their 
caution and restraint. ...But what angered readers most, it seemed, were the 
policies and the politicians whom they saw responsible for a quarter of a 
century of "appeasement" that they saw as leading to the events of today.69  
 
The extremity of the Australian response was reported similarly through all major 
media outlets, indicating that the media's usual political leanings were put aside in 
deference to the unparalleled surge of feeling for the Timorese. The moral and 
political superiority of the victim over all other considerations was thus exemplified. 
On 9 September 1999, The Australian printed a list of actions by which some 
Australians expressed their anger and frustration at the carnage. They included a 
petition from prominent institutions calling for an armed peace-keeping force; damage 
to the Perth Indonesian consulate requiring police guard; graffiti on the Melbourne 
Indonesian consulate; protesters on the streets in Melbourne, demonstrations in 
Darwin with flag burning; invasion of the DFAT offices in Brisbane; plans for a 
national day of protest; trade union actions disrupting movements of goods by sea and 
air, and delaying of passengers; and plans to ban Indonesian goods.70 A photograph of 
the words "Shame Australia !! Shame" written on the front of Parliament House 
Canberra appears.71 Interestingly, information on rallies and prayer services in every 
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capital city is given, as well as the contact information for protest to the Indonesian 
President, heads of Indonesian military, and the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, indicating that the media had taken an unprecedented role in supporting civil 
society efforts.72  
 
The influence exerted by the Timorese people's faith, courage and nonviolence was 
demonstrated vividly as the popular Australian support for them grew. Girard's notion 
of the concern for the innocent victim seemed to be on widespread and passionate 
display during September 1999. An essential stimulus for this response was the 
increased access of the population to information concerning the situation. The visual 
and descriptive accounts of the atrocities being visited on the Timorese introduced a 
relatively new reality: access of the people to information about what was happening. 
As the extremity of Timorese suffering was more widely seen, Australians responded 
with anguish. The moral imperative of responding to the suffering of the victim was 
coupled with the sense of responsibility arising from the historical relationship with 
East Timor, particularly the memories of Timorese service and loyalty in World War 
II, the resentment at the unresolved Balibo Five question and the shame of the 
unacknowledged betrayal of Timor since the invasion. Australian feelings of guilt at 
the injustices brought upon the victim enabled the population to identify the 
perpetrators of the scapegoating, and they denounced their government accordingly. 
The Australian people thus made the choice of standing with the victim rather than 
engaging in forms of vacillation or apathy which would have rendered them as part of 
a persecuting mob.73 
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The Catholic Church  
Dilemmas and Challenges 
As a powerful institution within Australian civil society, one with fundamental 
international bonds and natural religious affiliation with the Timorese people, the 
Catholic Church played a major role in the fortunes of East Timor. Two dimensions 
operated in the church regarding East Timor. Within each of the church sections of 
hierarchy and laity there were people who championed the cause of the Timorese 
people, and those who did not. These differing responses were significantly affected 
by the political and philosophical influence of communism, and the role it played in 
East Timor's fortunes. Nonetheless, the strength of the church's relationship with East 
Timor provided it with particular opportunities and responsibilities towards the people 
and was a major contributor to the success of the movement. 
 
While some significant division existed between hierarchy and laity, such division 
was also found within each of those sections of the church. There were bishops and 
priests who consistently supported the Timorese people, working with lay persons and 
groups to drive the response of the church towards greater practical compassion and 
advocacy. Some hierarchy were wary, however, just as some ordinary church 
members were split between those in favour of Timor and those who were not. Hilton 
Deakin highlights one of the church's institutional deficiencies as the absence of 
clarity about the extent of authority of Bishops' Conferences until as late as 1998. A 
bishop was responsible for comment and action from his diocese, but for the bishops 
to speak as a group before then was another matter entirely.74 
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 Smythe summarises the Church's approach thus: 
As an institution the Church in Australia cannot be said to have had a coherent 
and unified policy in respect of the people East Timor at any stage. The 
bishops themselves had different viewpoints, and various perceptions were 
evident within the ecclesiastical agencies that addressed the matter on their 
behalf or independently of them, and among the laity as a whole. Thus 
segments within the Church aligned with Australian government policy, some 
remained idle, while others were highly committed to a just and peaceful 
resolution on the issue.75 
 
The church can be seen as a microcosm of the society, displaying something of the 
same need to balance institutional realities with ideological ones. Just as the 
inspirational aspects of a nation (with all their efforts to express cherished ideals and 
values) can be challenged and even thwarted by structures originally established to 
further such ideals, so churches can also be constrained by the same problems. In 
regard to internal or external relationships which involve danger, as that between 
Australia and Timor-Leste, Robert Schreiter's comments are apt: 
Because the church mirrors society, it may find that the lines dividing society 
run right through the centre of the church....some members of the church 
choose to collaborate with an oppressive regime in order to allow for some 
public activity on the part of the church. Others choose the path of resistance 
and utter opposition to the regime, paying for their stance with imprisonment, 
exile, and even death. Sometimes church leaders side with an oppressive 
government for the sake of 'peace', while some of their own clergy and 
members choose opposition.76 
 
One of the major causes of divisions was the threat of communism. A highly 
significant influence on the Catholic Church regarding that ideology (and 
subsequently on the fortunes of East Timor) was the prominent Catholic layman, 
Bartholomew Augustine (B.A.) Santamaria.  
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Communism and "The Movement"  
Communism's aggressive atheism met fundamental philosophical opposition in the 
Catholic Church worldwide. With support from the Australian bishops, in 1941 B.A. 
Santamaria established the "The Movement", the main aim of which was to oppose 
communism. While his ideas and methods were ultimately rejected by many 
Catholics, his influence contributed to bitterness and disunity in the church at that 
time.77 The effects on the Catholic Church were serious, demonstrating substantial 
division between the bishops, on the duties concerning practical application of the 
Gospel. Questions integral to the nature of the church arose concerning its operation 
in secular society, particularly regarding advocacy for justice and the oppressed, and 
on whose authority political action by the church should take place.78  
 
Santamaria's 1957 establishment of the National Civic Council (NCC), an evolution 
of "The Movement", proved detrimental to the Timorese people. Ormonde notes: "In 
the latter half of the 1940s The Movement judged that the internal danger of 
communist revolution had receded, but that a new, more potent communist threat to 
Australia was posed by events in Asia."79 Particularly damaging was the NCC's 
regular publication News Weekly, which exerted influence on the opinions of some 
bishops and laity in relation to East Timor during the 1970s and beyond.80 Its strident 
anti-communist platform mirrored that of Santamaria whose views "were very 
influential in conservative political and church circles, and damaging for Timor-
Leste."81 He is reported to have used "every opportunity to attack Fretilin and those he 
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portrayed, often wrongly, as communist fellow-travellers."82 Walsh notes that the 
journal consistently attempted to discredit any criticism of Indonesia, to support 
unquestioningly the relationship between Australia and Indonesia, and to accuse 
Fretilin of being a virulent communist organisation.83 According to Smythe, the 
archives of News Weekly in Melbourne reveal that there was no change in the policy 
of the journal from 1974 to 1997 towards supposed connections between East Timor 
and communism.84  
 
Significantly, Santamaria had association with Father Josephus van Beek S.J., a 
Dutch-born Jesuit missionary in Indonesia, who exerted a profound influence on 
Indonesian Catholic political activists during the Suharto era. Tanter reports that Beek 
believed that the two great threats to Indonesia and the church were communism and 
Islam, and therefore he involved himself in preparations for an underground Catholic 
movement, conducting training courses for youth using disciplinary techniques 
approaching brutality.85 Trainees became devotedly loyal to him and were keen to 
report on their organisations when they gained employment. Tanter notes that Beek 
was a regular visitor to Australia, worked with Santamaria, and would have received 
funding from the National Civic Council as a sympathetic foreign source of support.86  
 
There were strong links between Santamaria and those responsible for or supportive 
of the invasion and occupation of East Timor. Attending Beek's Catholic Action 
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groups were Harry Tjan Silalahi and Jusuf Wanandi, both of whom were instrumental 
in establishing the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 1971 with 
the assistance of prominent Indonesian Catholic military men such as General Benny 
Murdani. The connections of this group to the Indonesian regime are demonstrated, 
for example, by their access to information. Ball and McDonald concur with Tanter 
that important information between Indonesian and Australian intelligence over 
Timor came through the links between the Australian Embassy in Jakarta and CSIS.87 
The resulting Australian knowledge of Indonesia's plans is described as "astonishingly 
detailed" causing "unease" in Canberra.88 The possession of such information placed 
Australia in the position of being privy to Indonesian plans prior to the invasion.89 
Thus an influential and ideologically-driven group in the Australian Catholic Church 
was closely connected with the vehemently anti-communist Indonesian regime whose 
targeted sharing of information on East Timor compromised the Australian 
government.  
  
The official Catholic Church's initial response 
The confusion and disorientation in the Catholic Church as it attempted to reconcile 
its social doctrine with the political challenges of the time affected its response to East 
Timor. Differing views existed within bodies established by the bishops to advise on 
social justice matters and to advocate in accordance with the social doctrine of the 
church. Internal church divisions were exacerbated by Santamaria's accusations that 
some of the agencies were influenced by communism.90 The difficulty of balancing 
divergent views, particularly in disagreement over government policies, engendered 
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the tendency to concentrate more on alleviating suffering than on addressing the 
causes of injustices.91 Quoting its 1997 executive director, Smythe notes that Caritas 
Australia avoided involvement with campaigns "which would only inflame the 
Bishops' Conference and enrage the government."92 Despite these difficulties, Caritas 
and other church groups increasingly collaborated with other associations which were 
contributing to systemic change, and adopted policies encouraging movement towards 
change.93 
 
The Australian Catholic Church shared in one of the most common reactions for 
churches in matters of the application of justice: that of remaining silent and unwilling 
to confront the causes. Schreiter states: 
Churches fall easy prey to this, since they are rarely the direct violators. It is often 
their silence, not their words, that makes them participants in the violation of 
those who suffer. The voices of those who suffer then become a very unwelcome 
sound to their ears because they are made uncomfortable.94  
 
Unfortunately, some church bodies acquiesced with government policy in the 1990s. 
Surprisingly, some were content to present the oppression as the fault of the Timorese 
refusal to submit.95 Smythe details the visit of a church delegation in 1998 whose 
members reported to him that they believed integration with Indonesia was in the best 
interests of the Timorese and that cooperation between the Indonesian and Australian 
militaries would have the effect of heightening the Indonesians' upholding of human 
rights. They concluded that things would be better for the Timorese if they weren't so 
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disruptive.96 This echoes the previous statement of the Apostolic Nuncio to Jakarta in 
1993 who had addressed an Australian Catholic Relief visit with similar sentiments: 
"It would be better for the Timorese to co-operate with Indonesia and become part of 
the Republic, then their troubles would end."97 Similarly, Xanana Gusmão complained 
that in 1986 he had received a proposal from the Vatican to accept safe departure 
from the country for himself and the guerrillas. Xanana had then asked the authorities 
whether the chance to leave the country extended to all the Timorese. Two years later 
he again expressed his regret that the Vatican was advising surrender.98 Accusations 
of being disruptive and uncooperative again displaced the burden of guilt onto the 
victim, the Timorese people.  
 
The Catholic Church - turning towards the victim 
Despite internal deficiencies and instances of retrogression, the recognition of the 
victim is ingrained in the church's life and doctrine. The Catholic Church's response to 
East Timor as victim was substantial, making the church an important part of the 
solidarity movement. There was consistent support for the Timorese people from 
church members and groups, including from the Vatican itself, support which became 
increasingly potent towards the end of the occupation. Amanda Wise lists the 
Australian churches' contributions to East Timor during the oppression as assisting the 
formation of Timorese-Australian communities, being politically neutral, becoming a 
"conduit" for information, and providing advocacy and welfare.99 In these ways 
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church members exercised the power of listening to and acting on the situation to 
which the Timorese testified.100 Protestant and Anglican Churches made consistent 
efforts to uphold the Timorese cause, including the many Uniting Church initiatives 
and advocacy actions.  
 
In the Catholic Church, individual lay members, religious, clergy and bishops 
demonstrated committed advocacy for East Timor, resisting the policies detrimental 
to the Timorese people. These were responsible for the church services and prayers 
which were integral to the support of the Timorese people and their cause. Important 
among these were the prayer services across the nation to mark the anniversary of the 
deaths of the young people in the Santa Cruz cemetery in 1991. The capacity of these 
liturgies to unite communities was demonstrated among both the Timorese residing in 
Australia and Australian supporters.  Additionally, the maintenance of neutrality 
towards Timorese politics was important for the furtherance of the Timorese cause. 
Australian church members demonstrated that they were not partisan and were 
comfortable with any and all of the Timorese political groupings. Timorese people 
felt their divisions deeply, particularly because of the unresolved civil conflict in 
1974-75 but, as the vast majority of them shared in the Catholic faith and worked 
alongside church and civil groups, they were able to mediate some of the differences 
and focus on the wider Timorese cause. In the same way, Australian party political 
issues were generally avoided. Observance of the generally accepted position of the 
church’s being apolitical opened a space where differences were accepted but were 
not allowed to undermine a shared Christian allegiance and the greater good of the 
common cause for Timor's rights.  
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Initiation of ventures to support the Timorese people accompanied cooperation with 
others in the Catholic Church's response. The Australian Council of Leaders of 
Religious Institutes (ACLRI)101 worked together with other church groups and 
networked with people in the wider community. Church and civic cooperation 
modelled and expressed a movement focused on a just cause, over and above 
divisions and self-centred motivations. As a result, reliable information was shared 
widely and all were able to focus on solutions and strategies rather than competing 
with each other. Moreover, the Catholic Church cooperated with many non-religious 
groups and helped to facilitate their actions. For example, Bishop Hilton Deakin was 
the Chair of the East Timor Human Rights Centre, a body which monitored the 
situation and published well-documented accounts of the effects of the occupation.102  
 
Church networks between East Timor and Australia were significant, capitalising on 
the almost identical structures of ecclesiastical organisation. Some Catholics had a 
certain ease of access to information, and therefore a responsibility to use these 
networks. While no information from East Timor was easy to transmit or receive, 
church structures enabled the sharing of information which was used to augment 
knowledge of the situation. The scope and resources of church networks facilitated 
occasional international visits of bishops, priests and members of religious 
congregations to and from East Timor, which provided significant first- hand 
information which could be used to advocate for the victims. The position of the 
Catholic Church as a "religious" organisation in Indonesia and as a significant 
international body afforded it some protection and freedom in its advocacy, although 
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its leadership had to act carefully as the regime became increasingly willing to punish 
the church (especially in the later stages of the occupation). In 1993 the Catholic 
Commission for Justice, Development and Peace in the Melbourne Archdiocese 
aligned with Christians in Solidarity with East Timor (CISET) to publish a collection 
of letters and statements from the East Timorese church, and which included 
responses made by Catholic groups, dioceses and commissions across the world.103 
The publication of such material provided further solid evidence upon which to argue 
Timor's case. The contacts made by church personnel and the information thus gained 




Internal difficulties experienced by many Catholic dioceses in interpreting the Gospel 
in favour of the downtrodden had caused some silence and inaction. However, 
particularly as the 1990s wore on, bishops, priests and people became increasingly 
vocal in supporting the Timorese. Resources of the Catholic Church were employed 
across the country in wholehearted efforts to educate Australians as to their suffering, 
to challenge governments to act, and to support the victimised Timorese people 
through practical aid.  
 
Convergence of the political and moral  
Critical mass 
The decades of determined championing of the Timorese people, which had been 
supported by the investigations and commentary of some media, had prepared the 
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way for the heightening of public outrage through the increased comment and 
reporting in the late 1990s. While the numbers of Australians who properly 
understood the Timor story had remained relatively low over the years, those who had 
awareness were often highly motivated, enabling them to respond swiftly and with 
credibility at moments of crisis, particularly during the events of 1999.  
 
The advocacy of the solidarity movement contributed to and built on the growing 
outpouring of anger, sorrow and compassion of ordinary Australians as the plight of 
the Timorese became more apparent in the 1990s. This increased popular feeling was 
accompanied by the turnaround of the Australian government as it grappled with the 
swift changes in regional politics. Constant reports of the intimidation and killings of 
the Timorese people before the referendum, and the slaughter and deportations 
afterwards, were seen in the context of the inspiration given by the Timorese people, 
their nonviolent responses and the outrage generated internationally as the situation 
deteriorated. The Timorese were seen to be truly innocent victims - both as scapegoats 
sacrificed for the "good order" of the Indonesian regime and as morally upright 
persons who acted peacefully and virtuously against enormous injustice – which 
served to heighten their appeal to the consciences of Australian citizens. The 
frustrated impotence of the Australian population was expressed forcibly in the media 
and in the streets as the Timorese people were clearly seen for what they were, the 
victim of powerful, self-interested forces.  
 
The consistent claims of activists of the brutality of the repression were then revealed 
in 1999 as credible, leading to an increase in the numbers of those repudiating the 
treatment of the Timorese and critical of government policy. The tipping point was 
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reached, where the opinion of a "consistent and inflexible minority" overrides an 
initial majority opinion.104 Studies propose that when 10 per cent of a population are 
committed to a cause, persuasive and invulnerable to opposing views, they form a 
critical mass which permeates the whole.105 Studies of non-violent resistance 
movements show that when a critical mass is reached (5-10%) that acts to oppose a 
regime (or policy) and results in the withdrawal of key supporters for that regime and 
the mobilisation of mass opinion and action, it causes major change.106 
 
Thus, influenced by a cohort of persistent activists and armed with ever-increasing 
information, the numbers supporting the Timorese cause grew exponentially. 
Chenoweth and Stephan comment on this phenomenon: 
Courage breeds courage, particularly when those engaged in protest activities are 
ordinary people, who would be conformist, law-abiding citizens under normal 
circumstances. Media coverage amplifies the demonstration effect of their acts of 
defiance.107 
 
The scale of the support of ordinary Australians was attested by Paul Kelly, who notes 
the opinion of Foreign Minister Alexander Downer's advisor Greg Hunt: "Public 
opinion probably ran at 90% that Australia had done the wrong thing by East 
Timor."108 Downer himself stated: "During my time as Foreign Minister, no foreign 
policy issue has captured the public interest in Australia more than East Timor."109  
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Accounting for change - political or popular pressure? 
There are various assessments of the influence of popular pressure on the Australian 
government's decision to intervene in East Timor in 1999, even so far as to lead the 
International Force for East Timor (InterFET) in September 1999. Some 
commentators see government action arising primarily from public pressure while 
others discount such influence. For example, Fernandes states that the Australian 
troops were "not sent in because of the goodwill of the Australian government, but 
because of massive protests that increased rapidly in both size and fury."110 Pietsch 
contradicts that position, stating that Australian involvement "was not forced on a 
reluctant government by popular pressure."111 This opinion claims that the movement 
in favour of East Timor independence lacked the strength to force a change of policy, 
given Howard's demonstrated ability to withstand public opinion. The example of the 
2003 public opposition to the invasion of Iraq is cited, which saw not tens of 
thousands, as with East Timor, but hundreds of thousands of Australians taking to the 
streets in vociferous but ineffectual condemnation of going to war.112 However, this 
comparison can be misleading as public opinion was more divided on the Iraq War, 
while it was unprecedented and nearly unanimous in its support for East Timor (as 
Alexander Downer attested).113 This large-scale support - in the midst of 
overwhelming violence in East Timor in September 1999 - demonstrated the 
Australian population’s clear identification of the Timorese as innocent victims who 
deserved liberation.  
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Geoffrey Robinson sees a fundamental link between political and moral motivations 
for action in regard to East Timor. He argues that the international intervention, 
including that of Australia, was "the result of an unusual conjuncture of historical 
trends and events."114 Indonesia's financial collapse and heightened dependence on 
international agencies was coupled with the end of the long Suharto era and the 
weakening of the military hold on Indonesian institutions and agencies. These 
developments were essential to the change of policy on East Timor. Referring 
specifically to the mayhem after the 1999 ballot, however,  Robinson cites "the 
presence of a good many observers and journalists" as crucial in bringing to 
international attention credible and widespread evidence of what was occurring, thus  
highlighting the role of civil society actors.115 These are included by him among those 
who "profoundly influenced the course of events" by "keeping the spotlight of media 
attention on Timor" and "making a compelling case for intervention."116 Robinson 
cites as pivotal to the intervention "the credibility and strength of international non-
government organisations and church networks that exerted influence on their 
governments, and mobilised popular demonstrations around the world, most notably 
in Canberra and Lisbon."117 He attributes to international solidarity at least as much 
importance as political concerns for the decision to allow the ballot.118 He also lists as 
pivotal the courage of the East Timorese people, the personal commitment to the 
process of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and the fact that Habibie's proposal for 
a referendum served his desire to win the much needed support of the international 
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community in addressing the mounting Indonesian financial crisis.119  The 
international community's desire to intervene in Timor - given the recent humanitarian 
disasters of Rwanda and Srebrenica - was also vital.120   
 
Robinson's thesis therefore concerns the conjuncture of civil society action with the 
"trends and events" with which they were intertwined. The situation in East Timor 
was indeed a matter of morality to which people world-wide and in Australia 
responded with courage and compassion, actively affecting government decisions. 
Yet the view that humanitarian concerns were responsible for moving the people and 
the government is countered by asking why such concerns did not triumph when they 
were made known in previous decades.121 For example, the death toll in East Timor 
was far greater during the starvation of 1977-1979 than in 1999 and was attested by 
the photographic evidence of journalists.122 The Santa Cruz massacre of 1991 had 
been filmed and was seen world-wide, yet that information in itself did not cause 
sufficient condemnation as to bring about change of policy.  
 
It can be concluded that the boiling point arose from the wider geopolitical realities of 
upheaval and instability in Indonesia and the international community's willingness to 
act (in a post-Cold War and post-Rwanda world) combined with the response of civil 
society through the solidarity movement that prepared the ground for a political 
response to the suffering of the Timorese people. Together, these finally broke 
political will and forced change. Moral considerations linked with an uneasy historical 
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conscience, driven by concern for the Timorese as innocent victims, worked with 
extraordinary geopolitical realities to bring resolution.  
 
Girard's anthropological insights revealed the victim mechanism as the foundation 
and bulwark of societies. As demonstrated in the case of East Timor, the revelation of 
the innocence of the victim has an opposite and unprecedented effect: recognition of 
the victim has the capacity to erode political power and structures and to bring about 
unimaginable change.   
 
Conclusion 
The inspiration for the Australian solidarity movement within the world-wide support 
for East Timor was the Timorese people themselves. Subject to the fear and 
machinations of its neighbours, the Timorese people were eventually recognised as 
innocent victims, and a majority of people actively supported them. An extraordinary 
movement of advocacy gathered momentum in the 1990s, involving people from all 
walks of life, and of radically different political and religious persuasions. The 
morality of championing the victim was seen as more important than other 
considerations, leading to influence on a changing political scene which those in 
power were unable to resist. Despite the fact that avenues of accountability became 
the norm internationally, the Timorese situation has not been the subject of the 
application of law and justice. Instead, Australians have witnessed the extraordinary 





Of particular importance to this dissertation is that the Timorese witness to Christ's 
nonviolence and forgiveness in their status as victim became the catalyst for a major 
change in the Australian perspective and approach to East Timor. Whether or not 
overt Christian symbolism, language or affiliation was present, Australian people 
were changed by the presence of the victim in their orbit – a result of the Christian 
revelation of the victim.123 They were challenged by the knowledge that they, as part 
of a persecuting nation, were persecutors. As a result of this revelation of the victim 
within Australia's own history and relationships the people played a crucial and 
irreplaceable role in changing government policy from that of persecutor to champion. 
A Girardian analysis of that response and how it effected a fundamental change in the 
Australian people is the subject of Chapter Eight. 
 
                                                            





REVELATION OF THE VICTIM 
 
Introduction  
This chapter reflects on the inspiration given by the Timorese people to the movement 
of solidarity in civil society worldwide and in Australia particularly. It discusses the 
eventual success of the core of supportive Australians and their resistance to 
government inaction and acquiescence as the movement reached a moment of critical 
mass in the engagement of tens of thousands of others. The moral considerations 
forming the basis of this solidarity converged with the political realities of the late 
1990s, forcing changes in Australian government policy on East Timor.   
 
The chapter interprets the major change in Australian support of East Timor in the 
light of Girard's insights. The unconsciousness and blindness which Girard detected in 
traditional scapegoaters were overcome, and increasing numbers of Australians saw 
through the violence in which their nation was complicit. This revelation elevated 
political concerns and popular anguish into a moment of national conversion.  
 
Two theological conclusions are drawn about the relationship between Australia and 
East Timor. First, the suffering of the Timorese gave them the position of "judge" 
with the innocent and victim Christ. The Timorese judgement on the violence done to 
them was characterised by the nonviolence and forgiveness of their Christian faith. As 
a consequence, the humanity of all involved was offered the capacity to be restored. 
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Second, the example of "positive mimesis" (in Girard's terms) provided by the 
Timorese posed a challenge which led many Australians to a more humble and 
realistic view of their nation. In the light of these conclusions, the chapter shows how 
the Australian-Timorese history can be fruitfully understood through the Gospel 
revelation of the victim, in which the forgiving victim provides a truthful lens to 
interpret violent relationships. 
 
Timorese inspiration 
The inspiration provided by the Timorese people to the rest of the world was crucial 
to their eventual freedom. The CAVR Report states: "(Civil society's interest) 
developed and acted in response to East Timorese initiatives, not the opposite."1 
Kohen refers to the importance of the courage of the Timorese people and their 
political and religious leaders in providing the leadership by which many nations were 
finally inspired to act.2 Timorese youth movements worldwide were notable in 
initiating large, decentralised networks of activists. Particularly after the Santa Cruz 
massacre of 1991 nonviolent international protests, including in Indonesia itself, 
became formidable.3 Some of the actions were peaceful sit-ins or protests in the view 
of visiting dignitaries or in foreign embassies.4 The leadership of Timorese expatriates 
contributed significantly to these movements and to the final resolution.  
 
                                                            
1 Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Timor-Leste (CAVR), Chega! The Report of the 
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conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 4. 
4 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why civil resistance works, 3. 
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Significant to the cooperation between the Timorese and their supporters was the 
greater accessibility of East Timor from 1989 when Indonesia considered that the 
people were sufficiently "Indonesianised" to allow an opening of the territory.5  The 
CAVR Report notes:  
Concerned individuals and organisations from civil society seized the opportunity 
to visit and, despite restrictions and danger, to make contact with the Resistance, 
provide material support, act as couriers both ways and to kindle renewed interest 
in their respective countries. Some 3000 foreigners are estimated to have visited 
between 1989 and 1991.6 
 
Far from advancing Indonesia's claims however, this relative openness provided more 
evidence of the oppression of the people, and the Timorese resistance movement 
therefore received greater support internationally. The refusal of the Timorese to 
capitulate ensured that worldwide support, while small, was never extinguished. The 
Timorese people's long years of suffering and their relentless resistance provided the 
impetus for the stirring of the world's conscience. The situation was seen for the 
unjust oppression it was, and the people were increasingly recognised as the innocent 
victims of immoral political alliances and intrigue. 
 
Nonviolence  
One of the most crucial aspects of the Timorese resistance was its nonviolent nature. 
This feature was consistent across the civilian population and lasted throughout the 
occupation. As the situation became better known, the Timorese nonviolent and non-
retaliatory stance demonstrated their position as innocent victim.  
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In their study Why Civil Resistance Works, Chenoweth and Stephan investigate 323 
violent and nonviolent campaigns between 1900 and 2006, finding that: "Nonviolent 
resistance campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as 
their violent counterparts."7 The authors cite the liberation of East Timor as an 
example.8 However, they state that East Timor's nonviolent resistance "grew out of its 
failed violent campaign", and further, that it "was ultimately successful in achieving 
independence from Indonesia after decades of futile violent insurgency."9 While it is 
true that the armed Timorese resistance was not successful in military terms, 
Chenoweth and Stephan's conclusion omits the symbolic role played by those 
Timorese who remained in the mountains as a fighting force, thus assisting the hope 
of freedom to inhabit the Timorese imagination. Neither do the authors refer to the 
extraordinary events of 1999 where, on the advice of the United Nations, Falintil 
fighters were ordered by their leader Xanana Gusmão to remain in cantonment areas 
even while they could see the capital Dili burn. Without any means of ascertaining the 
fate of their loved ones, the soldiers displayed the discipline that allowed the 
international community to recognise that the violence of 1999 was all coming from 
the Indonesian military and their militias, and indicating that Falintil was not 
responsible for that conflict.10  
 
While violent action was employed by the armed wing of the resistance throughout 
the oppression, the overall East Timor story remains a significant example of the 
power of nonviolence, and even within the armed resistance itself at the climax of 
Indonesian occupation. Surely one of the proudest claims the Timorese people are 
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able to make is that during the 24-year occupation not a single Indonesian civilian was 
murdered by a Timorese.11 This fact takes on extra significance in the light of the 
official transmigration program beginning in 1980 through which the government 
sought to resettle people from densely populated areas of Indonesia.12 Explanation of 
these extraordinary features of the Timorese resistance necessarily entails 
understanding the intersection between the Christian faith practised by a growing 
number of Timorese during the occupation, and the dogged resistance to that 
occupation staged by the Timorese over nearly a quarter of a century. This was 
expressed through and within the growing Timorese membership of the Catholic 
Church.13 Referring to the church in East Timor, Hodge states: 
...the Catholic Church helped to provide discursive, liturgical, pastoral, ideological 
and spiritual means by which to confront the experience of oppression, violence 
and loss and develop resistance to Indonesian occupation.14  
 
The church had the capacity to present a comprehensive and unifying rationale which 
went to the heart of the people's experience, individually and communally. This was 
acknowledged by José Ramos-Horta in his acceptance speech when receiving the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 1996. He spoke of the personnel and work of the church as 
pivotal to the people's ability to live with "the daily threats to their very existence."15 
He commented: "The people of East Timor owe almost everything to their Church."16 
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As the Timorese people embraced Christianity in increasing numbers during the 
occupation, the church formed them more and more into the body of the crucified and 
risen Christ. The Timorese increasingly identified with Christ in their sufferings, as a 
sign of hope in their struggle. They recognised God was with them and alongside 
them in their sufferings, understanding their pain, working to bring consolation and 
always faithful to the truth of their persecution. One of the most poignant examples of 
this attitude was related to me at the time. An Australian Sister who had shared 
dangerous times with a group of church workers told me that one of the women had 
quietly said to her: "Why is Jesus turning his face away from us?" This question 
hangs in the air as a thoroughly Christian response to suffering and fear, echoing the 
words of the same Jesus himself as he hung on the cross, "My God, my God, why 
have you abandoned me?" (Matt.27:45-46) It is a question filled with faith amongst 
devastating bewilderment. It salvages meaning within suffering through being in 
relation with Jesus, the fellow victim, while honouring the fundamental question 
associated with violence: "Why?" 
 
As the only local institution operating among the Timorese, the Catholic Church 
witnessed to Christ by its solidarity with the people and embodied for the people the 
focus of resistance to the other main institution, the Indonesian military. Refusing to 
leave the people to the mercies of the invaders by withdrawing to some other-worldly 
realm, the church endeavoured to support them in their endurance and nonviolent 
patience. In so doing, in William Cavanaugh's words, the church developed an 
"ecclesial counter-politics."17 As a result, people found within the church the depth of 
meaning which enabled them to unite themselves with the passion and resurrection of 
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Jesus, recognising themselves as victim with their risen Lord. This was particularly 
exemplified in the church’s Eucharistic practice in which solidarity with the victim, 
Jesus, is made real. In making Jesus really present, Daly's explanation of the purpose 
of the Eucharist is that it exists to effect an "eschatological transformation of the 
participants."18 In this eschatological reality, violence has no ultimate power. The 
eschatological perspective of God becomes what is truly real: the kingdom of love 
overcoming the regime of violence. In their nonviolent resistance to oppression the 
Timorese people exemplified this reality. 
 
Lack of revenge 
The nonviolent nature of the Timorese resistance was accompanied by a willingness 
to forego revenge. While Timorese people have shown little appetite for retaliation 
against the Indonesian people, neither Australian use of Timor for its own protection 
during the Second World War, nor its compliance with the Indonesian occupation, has 
resulted in widespread calls for Timorese revenge. This is not to deny that the 
Timorese harbour strong feelings about foreign occupiers. It expresses once again the 
courageously nonviolent resistance movement which flowered both within East Timor 
and among those who had escaped the territory. It was not abuse and threats which the 
Timorese took to Australian rallies, but doves of peace and calls for freedom.  
 
The international community has not pursued the normal channels of justice which 
have applied in other circumstances.19 The actions of the Timorese people are thus all 
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the more remarkable. Whether the international and Australian responsibility for the 
crimes against the Timorese people will be shouldered, and regardless of how much 
time that may take, Timorese decisions have already had the consequence of 
absorbing and restricting violence. In this way the people have ensured that possible 
vengeance has been curtailed and that the spiralling nature of revenge and aggression 
has not been allowed to take control. Given the mimetic nature of humans, Schwager 
comments that it is absolutely necessary not to resist evil with evil (which the New 
Testament particularly emphasises).20 Girard maintained that this highly ethical 
command points to "the only way possible to break out of the vicious circle of 
mimesis and violence."21  
 
The reciprocal nature of revenge exemplifies its mimetic character. The mechanism 
involves the blaming and punishing of another, with the likely result that the other 
will retaliate, only to be met by an answering violent response. In regard to East 
Timor this cycle of revenge has not eventuated. This has occurred not only because of 
Timor's weak geopolitical position, but also because of the hard spiritual lessons 
learned over 24 years of Indonesian occupation and 400 years of Portuguese 
colonisation. The willingness of the Timorese to suffer in the cause of justice and 
their unwillingness to avenge themselves were key. This contrasts markedly with the 
capitulation of nations to violent mimesis which is apparent in history, of which the 
20th century is a devastating example.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
"Indonesia and East Timor: Against Impunity, For Justice," APSNet Policy Forum, April 24, 2008, 
accessed 25 October 2016, http://nautilus.org/apsnet/indonesia-and-east-timor-against-impunity-for-
justice/ 
20 Raymund Schwager, Must there be scapegoats?: Violence and Redemption in the Bible 2nd ed., 
(Herefordshire: Gracewing, 2000), 173. Cf. Mt 5:39, Rom 12:17, 1 Thess 5:15, 1 Pet 3:9. 
21 Schwager, Must there be scapegoats? 172. 
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Mimetic theory, according to Girard, claims that rather than violence being part of 
politics, it is politics which is part of violence.22 It is the endemic nature of violence in 
the human approach to relationships which is misunderstood, resulting in its constant 
use. Despite the outcomes of violence over millennia, that is, the deaths and 
destruction arising from it, the human race has yet to learn that violence begets 
violence. Summarising Girard, Hodge notes that "political rationality has failed to 
comprehend the nature of violence in its reciprocal, unpredictable and escalating 
character."23 Girard's insight in his final book describes the path taken by the 
Timorese people. Though difficult in the short-term, the most effective and long-
lasting solution is "to adopt the behaviour recommended by Christ: abstain completely 
from retaliation."24  
 
The victim is judge 
Australian recognition of the victim 
Recognising the influences that led to the significant changes in East Timor's fortunes 
and to the involvement of Australia provides a partial understanding of the history of 
the relationship. Nevertheless, application of Girard's insights adds significantly more 
clarity, by identifying in the Australian response the mimetic components of what 
Girard calls "conversion".  
 
                                                            
22 René Girard, Battling to the End: conversations with Benoît Chantre, trans. Mary Baker (East 
Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2010), 109. 
23 Joel Hodge, "War, Terrorism and Cultural Crisis: The escalation of mimetic rivalry and re-
sacralising violence in modernity," (Melbourne: Australian Catholic University, 2015), accessed 
September 5, 2017, 
 http://www.acu.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/762283/War,_Terrorism_and_Cultural_Crisis_2_-
_Hodge.pdf . 
24 Girard, Battling to the End, xiv. 
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James Alison states, "mimetic anthropology is par excellence an anthropology of 
conversion."25 As has been discussed, Girard's initial insights into mimetic desire 
concerned certain novelists who saw that human desires are borrowed from others, 
leading to rivalry and conflict. He realised that it was growth in the novelists' 
understanding of themselves which was reflected in later novels. Such perception of 
mimesis was described by Girard as a "conversion".26 The ability of the great 
novelists to recognise the previously unconscious influence of relationship, rivalry 
and conflict in their own mimetic desire indicated a growth in self-knowledge, a type 
of collapse of their prior understanding of themselves as autonomous individuals who 
possessed control over their object-orientated desires.27 This major personal 
conversion was a reversal of inaccurate notions of themselves: in Girard's term, an 
"existential downfall".28  
 
Girard then identified mimetic rivalry in ancient myths, which he interpreted as 
accounts of the resolution of social conflict by scapegoating. In the Jewish and 
Christian scriptures, however, he found that victims are presented as innocent. In the 
Gospel accounts of the Passion particularly, the sacrificial foundations of cultures and 
religions are revealed as lies. Girard saw that the Gospels are thus a fundamental 
growth and revolution in humanity's understanding of itself, similar in structure to the 
conversion he witnessed in novelists.29  
 
 
                                                            
25 James Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong: Original Sin Through Easter Eyes  (New York, The 
Crossroad Publishing Company, 1998), 62. 
26 René Girard, The Girard Reader, ed. James G. Williams (New York: The Crossroad Publishing 
Company, 1996), 284. 
27 René Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1965), 3. 
28 Girard, The Girard Reader, 284. 
29 Girard, The Girard Reader, 262-3. 
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Foundational to this growth and revolution is the Gospel witness to the death and 
resurrection of Christ. It is the resurrection of the sacrificed victim, Christ, which is 
the foundation of the insight into the victim. Alison states; 
The resurrection is the possibility of a completely new and previously 
unimaginable human story, a rereading of all human stories from a radical 
perspective that had previously been hidden. It had previously been hidden by 
the reality of death. So the resurrection brings a completely new perception of 
what Jesus’ life and death had been about: the Father’s interpretation of Jesus’ 
life as hated without cause. By giving him back, the Father permitted a fresh 
rereading of the death of Jesus, and of his life and self-interpretation leading 
up to it, and thus affords a completely new perspective on human victims. 
Thus, when Paul has his vision on the road to Damascus, he is perceiving 
exactly the same new regard on human life as previously had been 
experienced in a public way by the disciples: this is the revelation of God as 
human victim.30  
 
It is the crucified and risen Christ who provides an opportunity for humans to live in a 
new mimetic way with insight into their own violence and liberated from its absolute 
power, through a new model. The conversion that Girard sees as fundamental to 
human survival and flourishing has its goal and model in Christ. Girard regards Christ 
as the perfectly mimetic being who, as the victim of human violence, is able to love 
completely in giving himself for the good of the other.31 
 
In the Girardian perspective, the recognition of the basic lies of novels and ancient 
myths, and insights into the associated deficiencies of religious, cultural or personal 
foundations, can transform the perception of the self and the foundation of culture. 
The change in understanding of the basis of identity and culture leading to change in 
behaviour constitutes the conversion of which Girard writes. I argue that the events of 
the late 1990s can be perceived as an Australian conversion in regard to East Timor 
that significantly affected changes to official government policy and action. A 
                                                            
30 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 77. 
31 Hodge, Resisting Violence and Victimisation, 122. 
 
 298 
Girardian interpretation of the relationship at that time reveals the presence of the 
cardinal structure of mimetic theory, that is, the recognition of the victim. The 
extraordinary about-turn, politically and socially was brought about by the perception 
of the vast majority of the Australian community that the East Timorese nation and 
people were the persecuted victims of violence – violence which was enabled by 
Australian policy – and were virtuous and even Christ-like in their reactions to such 
violence. This perception permeated Australian civil society and politics with ever-
increasing urgency, through the inspiration of the Timorese and the advocacy of the 
solidarity movement, as discussed above. 
 
Seeing the victim and realising the Australian position of victimiser are the two sides 
of the conversion process which Australians embraced. Many showed the capacity not 
only to see the victim, but to see through the violence and the cover-ups and lies 
which supported it, and which had brought the Timorese to their knees. In recognising 
that reality, the deficiencies of Australian history and self-appraisal were obvious. 
Instead of the "loyal mate" of popular lore, Australians recalled that they had 
abandoned those who had been loyal to them. The images of courageous battlers and 
diggers gave way for a time to the realisation that Australian fear of losing the 
patronage and security of larger powers contributed to the sacrifice of their weaker 
neighbours. Independence was seen as the dream, and dependency the reality. In 1998 
Hamish McDonald quoted former diplomat Bruce Haigh: "We think that we're so 
terrific, but in terms of moral courage inside the bureaucracy...it's non-existent."32 In 
parliamentary speeches as Australian InterFET troops entered East Timor a few 
politicians acknowledged the betrayal, the appeasement, the "grave and tragic 
                                                            
32 Hamish McDonald, “Failure of the Inevitable,” The Sydney Morning Herald, August 29, 1998. 
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mistakes", the "timid acquiescence" of previous Australian policies.33 Paul Kelly 
described as "multiple delusions" the Australian ignorance of Indonesia, misplaced 
trust in America and underestimation of the East Timor challenge.34 In Girard's terms, 
this "existential downfall" was the catalyst for turning towards East Timor, and 
recognising the victim. Australians saw through the violence, and knew victim and 
victimiser more keenly than ever before. 
 
The authority of the victim as judge 
The victimisation of the innocent is a human construct upon which has been built all 
religious and cultural systems.35 The recognition that such a basis for human systems 
is now unveiled as a lie by the death and resurrection of Christ is a moment of 
significant insight. That recognition requires change in one's perception of the world. 
The criterion for relating to the world can therefore no longer be human institutions 
and their value judgements, but must be the recognition of the victim. In other words, 
this criterion carries greater weight than the authority of political institutions claiming 
to ensure national security or national interests. I have shown that giving due weight 
to the moral claim of the victim was the fundamental struggle that occurred in 
Australia during World War II and over 24 years of Indonesian occupation. It still 
remains a scar on the psyche of the Australian body politic and political class that has 
been sought to be suppressed by revisionist histories like those examined in Chapters 
Four, Five and Six of this dissertation. 
 
                                                            
33 Alan Ramsey, “Timor: a debt dishonoured,” The Sydney Morning Herald, September 25, 1999. 
34 Paul Kelly, "Shattered myths," The Weekend Australian, (September 11-12, 1999): 25. 




This scar has come about because of the challenge that the recognition of the victim 
represents: it fundamentally undermines and upends conventional morality, politics 
and cultural logic. The logic of politics – which generally involves sacrificial 
judgements to maintain order and security – are fundamentally challenged. In this 
regard, Alison refers to the subversion of the idea of judgement throughout the Gospel 
of John, culminating in the realisation that "it is by being crucified that Jesus is the 
real judge of his judges."36 An obscure scriptural debate of little apparent importance 
provides an entry into reflection on this concept in regard to the Australian-East 
Timor relationship.  
 
At one point in the Greek text in the nineteenth chapter of St John's Gospel a curious 
enigma occurs. The scene is the judgement seat of Pontius Pilate, the Roman 
governor. Jesus of Nazareth stands before him, having been scourged and crowned 
with thorns. The process of unconscious scapegoating is underway, with the political 
and religious leaders joining with the crowd in baying for the blood of the innocent; a 
unanimous chorus of condemnation. Even Jesus' companions, infected by the 
contagion of blame, have denied him and fled.  
 
The text reads: "Pilate had Jesus brought out, and seated himself on the chair of 
judgement at a place called the Pavement, in Hebrew Gabbatha" (John 19:13). In the 
Greek text there is a grammatical anomaly concerning the object of the verb "to sit". 
There has been debate over interpretation of this word among a minority of scholars, 
who point to the possibility of the verb being transitive, so making Jesus the one who 
is seated. Observing that the syntax is inconclusive, Andrew Lincoln asks: "Does 
                                                            
36 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 121. 
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Pilate sit or does he seat Jesus on the judgement seat?"37 He notes that some scholars 
suggest that the biblical narrator may have been deliberately ambiguous, so that either 
interpretation of who sat down is possible.38 Regardless of the cause or intention of 
the minor grammatical oddity, the irony of the scene suggests a theological reflection, 
and gives an insight into the meaning of Jesus' power, authority and judgement. It is 
linked to Jesus' earlier response (in the same scene) to Pilate's assertion of power over 
life and death, where Jesus had indicated that authority comes from God. "You would 
have no power over me if it had not been given you from above..." (Jn 19:11). Thus 
the whole trial is given a "cosmic perspective."39 Jesus then proceeds to make his own 
judgement as to the relative guilt of those involved: "that is why the one who handed 
me over to you has the greater guilt" (Jn 19:11b). Lincoln concludes: 
So Jesus as the witness who has been put on trial not only points to the one 
with ultimate authority in the cosmic trial but also again becomes judge 
himself as he hands down his own verdict of guilty on the earthly judge and on 
those who have brought him to trial.40  
 
Thus in the Gospel narrative, the hasty trial of a perceived rabble-rouser in a 
provincial backwater is inverted to reveal its universal application as the trial of the 
innocent victim who reveals the innocence of all victims. As Girard states, "The 
protective system of scapegoats is finally destroyed by the Crucifixion narratives as 
they reveal Jesus' innocence, and, little by little, that of all analogous victims."41 A 
single verb ironically contributes to a larger theological and anthropological 
perspective that John has been building to with reference to Jesus' "hour" of glory: 
                                                            
37 Andrew T. Lincoln, A commentary on the Gospel according to St John (London: Continuum, 2005), 
469. 
38 Lincoln, A Commentary, 469. 
39 Lincoln, A Commentary, 468. 
40 Lincoln, A Commentary, 468. 
41 Girard, Battling to the End, xiv. 
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that the accused victim, Jesus, is divine judge and, from his place as victim, passes 
judgement on the court.  
 
 
However unlikely the moment, the incongruity between victim and judge throws light 
on the meaning of the Timorese people's place in the relationship with Australians. 
They, as victims, ironically came to be the judges of Australia's complicity with 
Indonesian persecution. Their claim on the conscience of Australians challenged the 
Australian political mythology that led Australians to believe that supporting 
Indonesia was the only politically effective and expedient action to pursue. Occupying 
the place of the victim, they possessed the credibility to be able to see through the 
violence which had decimated them and which unveiled the craven inhumanity of 
their persecutors. Through the magnitude of their suffering the Timorese people took 
their place on the judgement seat, with complete authority to judge.  
 
Scourged and crowned with thorns, sacrificed to concerns which were considered of 
greater importance to their neighbours, they interpreted and judged the history of their 
relationship with Australia and the world. Throughout the invasions by Australia, 
Japan and Indonesia they were ignored insofar as their desires or interests were 
concerned. They were the subject of intense speculation only insofar as their 
geographical placement afforded their neighbours some material prospects or strategic 
advantage. They were treated as pawns in political games of rivalry and the pursuit of 
security. Their contributions to the welfare of Australian soldiers were treated with a 
silence bordering on contempt. Their murderers were cajoled and fawned upon. They 
were abandoned, excluded, belittled or ignored. They suffered the classic treatment 
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meted out to scapegoats, and for decades "lacked a champion."42 Having done nothing 
to merit such treatment, the Timorese people displayed the single feature which marks 
the scapegoat, and which they shared with Christ: innocence. 
 
Such treatment gives to the victim the status of judge of the society whose insecurity 
and fear arose out of the mimetic dependency inherent in the brutal game of 
international politics, which led to the scapegoating of East Timor. As Alison states, it 
is the very position of the victim as victim which bestows the authority to judge.43    
 
The forgiving victim 
Imitating Christ as the victim who forgives 
But in what does this judgement consist? Alison argues that in Christ, it is the 
approach of the forgiving victim towards the perpetrator that is the ultimate 
judgement. This is so because Christ, the quintessential victim, forgave, and he 
enjoins forgiveness in and with him. The risen Christ approached his weak and fearful 
disciples with words of love and forgiveness. The status of East Timor as a victim of 
larger powers - but one which has demonstrated forgiveness - is rare in the world 
arena. Reflection on the Timorese response with Christ as the "forgiving victim" is 
important for understanding the conversion that occurred amongst Australian people 
and government officials. 
 
James Alison has written extensively on Jesus as divinity becoming the forgiving 
victim, basing his insights on Girard's mimetic theory. Apprehending God as the 
                                                            
42 René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (London: Continuum, 1988), 14. 
43 James Alison,  Raising Abel: the recovery of the eschatological imagination, 2nd ed. (London: 
Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 2010), 141-142. 
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totally "Other", that is, outside of human violence and cultural projection, Girard and 
Alison both argue that God – through revealing himself in the midst of human 
violence – offers the possibility to see through the illusions of mimetic violence by 
exemplifying the full potential of mimesis in relationships of love. Thus, a human 
being can desire according to God's desire for the total good of the other, and can 
want what God wants. In the Christian understanding, God as Father loves and is 
love, so to imitate God is to love. But the bestowal and imitation of love cannot exist 
simply between the Father and the human person, as it were in a twosome. It requires 
a concrete manifestation and incarnation for humans to truly experience and receive 
it. God the Father points to the Son as the one that he loves and the Son incarnates this 
love in relationship with humanity, so the human being's act of imitation of the Father 
must be to receive the love of the Father manifest fully in the Son and to imitate the 
Son. The Spirit of love shared between the Father and Son is thus shared with 
humanity.44  
 
A vast expanse of meaning arises from this, as the Son identifies himself with 
humanity. In particular he identifies with the least, the oppressed, the poor, the victim 
(Matt. 25). Drawn to desire what God desires and to imitate the love found in God, a 
person discovers that "the Father can produce in us the same love which he has for his 
Son and the same love which he and his Son have for the human race."45  Alison 
explains further: 
...the Son himself, as risen victim, points out to us and enfleshes for us, precisely 
in his role as risen self-giving victim, what the Father's love for humanity looks 
like and is, so that we may imitate it.46 
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45 Alison, Raising Abel, 187. 
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The consequences of imitating this love are uncompromising, and almost 
incomprehensible. They are consequences which entail the forgiveness of the 
perpetrators of evil, in imitation of the Trinitarian love. Alison states: 
That love is in no way marked by any desire for vindication...for turning the 
tables on this world, and all that might seem to us to be just and proper, given 
the horror of the violence of our world.47  
 
Jesus, as the image of the invisible God (Col. 1:15), demonstrated forgiveness as the 
fundamental expression of divine love in his life, teaching and death. In his teaching 
he linked divine forgiveness to human willingness to forgive others, even innumerable 
times (Mark 11:25; Mt. 6:14-15; 18:21-35; Luke. 6:37-38). He personally associated 
with sinners such as the woman who anointed him (Lk. 7:36-50), and a corporate thief 
(Lk. 19:1-10). He declared that people's sins were forgiven (Mk 2:5; Lk 7:48), told the 
adulterous woman that he did not condemn her (Jn 8:11), and the repentant criminal 
that he would join him in paradise (Lk. 23:43). Luke's account of the crucifixion 
contains Jesus' prayer for those responsible for his death, "Father, forgive them, for 
they know not what they do" (23:34). Jesus' prayer to the Father is a response to the 
Father's love and is offered as forgiveness given freely out of love to those who willed 
his death.48  
 
Therefore, it is not only as victim that Jesus is resurrected, but in continuation of his 
life and teaching, as a victim who forgives his tormentors rather than blaming them.49 
Alongside the forgiveness displayed on the cross, the Gospel accounts of Jesus after 
the resurrection contain no reprimand, no calling to account and no blame by Jesus 
                                                            
47 Alison, Raising Abel, 187. 
48 Alison, Raising Abel, 188. 
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towards his disciples who had so recently abandoned and denied him.50 In this way, 
Jesus offers true peace and harmony to humanity in their mimetic relations with God 
and each other: “Peace be with you” (Jn 20:19) are Jesus’ first words to his disciples 
as they relax into his loving forgiveness after the resurrection. 
 
 
In the Gospel texts of the appearances of the dead and risen Jesus, however, there is 
neither  concealment of the truth, nor attempts to gloss over or disguise the cowardice 
which accompanied the disciples' betrayal. This willingness to display the situation as 
it was, without any deception, is the reverse of the treatment of the victimage 
mechanism in myths. The disciples' acts were recognised for what they were: the 
treachery of the fearful leading to the death of an innocent man, yet that same man 
returned, calling out to these same men that breakfast was ready (Jn 21:12). The 
resurrection introduces the possibility of a complete reversal in human relationships. 
As Alison states, the presence of the crucified and risen Lord "permitted a manner of 
looking upon reality that had previously been impossible."51 That manner of looking 
upon reality entails being able to see from the perspective not only of the victim, but 
of a victim who forgives. It is this perspective that the Timorese appropriated and 
enacted during the Indonesian occupation. Hodge illustrates that their faith in Christ 
moulded their identity together as members of his body, a body attacked and done to 
death, but living in hope of the resurrection in their totally loving and nonviolent God. 
Immersed in the selfhood of the victim Christ, and continually formed and 
strengthened as such in the Eucharist, they recognised that imitation of Christ required 
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them to forgive as he did. Despite the difficulty of that calling the Timorese efforts to 
embrace it permeated their response to violence.52  
 
As discussed, the forgiveness demonstrated by the Timorese was specifically 
expressed in their nonviolent resistance and lack of revenge. The scapegoating of East 
Timor would appear to be a minefield for revenge, yet the general tendency in the 
Timorese people has been to demonstrate a willingness to forego retaliatory violence. 
The Timorese forgiveness can be seen not only as an alternative to the non-existent 
application of justice to the criminality they endured, but as a response of an entirely 
different order.53  
 
Timorese Forgiveness - Expressions and criticisms 
This distinctive response received the commentary of Sergio Vieira de Mello, the 
UN's Special Representative during East Timor's transitional administration (1999-
2002). António Guterres, a past President of Portugal (who assumed the role of 
Secretary-General of the UN in 2016), stated in 2010 that de Mello: 
described the Timorese people’s capacity to forgive as the most surprising thing he 
encountered there, something he had never seen elsewhere, despite having 
witnessed a wide variety of conflicts.54 
 
The orientation towards forgiveness evident in the attitudes of the Timorese people 
has been demonstrated by significant leaders. Xanana Gusmão and José Ramos-Horta, 
                                                            
52 Hodge, Resisting Violence and Victimisation,114; 154. 
53 It could be argued that there were mixed motives behind such forgiveness, for example, evasion of 
responsibility for the unaddressed violence of the civil war prior to the invasion, and the serious crimes 
committed by Timorese in 1999. Nevertheless, the complicity of geographical neighbours over decades 
caused greater destruction of Timorese life and property than Timorese internal problems and 
divisions. 
54 Felix Neto, Maria da Conceição Pinto and Etienne Mullet, Forgiveness and Reconciliation in an 
Inter-group Context: East Timor's Perspectives (Hauppauge: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2011), 
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both of whom have had the roles of President and Prime Minister, have introduced 
concepts of forgiveness into the political dilemmas associated with their recent 
history.55 They have advocated publicly for amnesties and have spoken of 
reconciliation.56 They have presented concepts of reconciliation and forgiveness, 
rather than retributive and adversarial justice, for the restoration of peace and 
harmony and of assisting the people to embrace once again their own dignity and 
identity.  
 
Yet this immensely difficult task has serious risks. Where a wrongdoer refuses to 
acknowledge the wrong done, the effort to forgive can seem useless.57 It can also be 
interpreted as a forgetfulness, even a betrayal of the past and of those who suffered.58 
While acknowledging these threats, Robert Schreiter discusses forgiveness as both a 
gradual process, and a decision.59 Forgiveness can hardly be an immediate response to 
violence, but the arrival at a decision to forgive signals that the violated one intends 
not to be controlled by the past. "Forgiveness is an act of freedom."60 
 
This effort towards forgiveness was captured in a 2006 film made about the life of 
Xanana Gusmão who became President upon the restoration of Timor-Leste as a 
Democratic Republic in 2002.61 In the film an attitude of openness and willingness to 
forgive is shown in his reception of Eurico Guterres, notorious leader of the Aitarak 
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militia, whose trial in Indonesia was shown footage of him calling for independence 
supporters to be killed. Additionally, there were scenes showing Xanana embracing 
Wiranto, Commander of the Indonesian Military during the last two years of the 
occupation. The film also shows Xanana greeting his Indonesian jailers 
enthusiastically, and opening his arms to the Timorese man who betrayed him to the 
Indonesians in 199262. 
 
In the film, Xanana says: 
Forgiveness, to me, means peace of mind.  If we can forgive, we liberate 
ourselves from all bad sentiments of revenge of self-flagellation. If we forgive, we 
stop a part of our life. We say, "No, now I am entering a new phase of my life."  If 
not, I live every day the sense that I am the worst victim in the world. God, why 
me?  Why it happened to me and not to other people?  Where is the justice in this 
life?  We are every day trying to understand why, and we don't live in peace of 
mind. We don't live in peace. We are always trying to be selfish. "Me, me, why 
not him?" When we don't forgive, we don't free ourselves from thinking on 
ourselves. Forgiveness is the way to live in peace. Peace not with other people but 
firstly, with him or herself.         
 
Both Xanana Gusmão and José Ramos-Horta have spoken of the criticism they have 
received as a result of their public appeals and personal example that urged the 
Timorese people to engage in forgiveness for the decades of oppression.63 Pampalk 
sees the decision to forgive as an effort by Timor-Leste to promote bilateral relations 
with Indonesia "by means of ceding prosecutorial processes."64 She states that any 
accountability which had already been achieved in Timor-Leste was undermined by 
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political decisions such as to commute sentences and release people from prison, 
putting at risk the rule of law and necessary confidence in the judicial and political 
systems.65 Similarly, Linton voiced criticism of Timor-Leste for not pursuing 
violators and for granting amnesties in the light of the commitments it undertook in 
signing all the core UN human right conventions. She states:  
There are few who deny the importance of a good relationship with the deadly 
giant next door, or that one has to be realistic. But the prevailing position within 
the NGO community and critics of the official approach is that the price of the 
bilateral relationship with Indonesia should not be justice for victims.66  
 
Nevertheless, the recognition of forgiveness as essential to the future existed not only 
in the view of the Timorese leaders. In the absence of judicial processes during and 
immediately after the occupation, and in order to begin to respond to the violence and 
trauma of the occupation, many Timorese communities responded with their own 
efforts at truth, reconciliation and forgiveness. Hodge details an event at Suai on 
Christmas Eve 1999, where the residents re-enacted the massacre of 6 September, just 
after the announcement of the result of the vote for independence. The central element 
in the re-enactment was the opportunity for the survivors to tell the victims' story. 67 It 
was not used as an opportunity to call for vengeance but rather to begin a process of 
truth-telling and healing. It was an example of Xanana Gusmão's explanation that the 
Timorese seek reconciliation before justice. While not forgetting the past, 
reconciliation is seen as pre-eminent. "We advocate a reconciliation process whereby 
there is justice but which eschews revenge, resentment or hatred."68 Additionally, 
Hodge details a number of instances of Timorese responses to extreme violence which 
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illustrate a general pattern of a forgiving attitude among the Timorese people. He 
observes: 
This mood for forgiveness can be regarded as not just a strategic calculation but 
the out-working of the solidarity, faith and resistance that allowed the Timorese to 
survive and outlast the occupation.69 
 
This capacity of the Timorese people for forgiveness was acknowledged at the Dili 
Massacre Commemoration Mass in St Mary's Cathedral Sydney on 12 November 
2000, in the presence of a Timorese choir which was in Australia at the time. Father 
Tony Doherty, then Dean of the Cathedral, said: "The response of the Timorese 
people to violence has been beauty and grace."70 This statement was a poetic 
expression of a major Timorese accomplishment. In saying all this there is no attempt 
to idealise the Timorese people or to try to give the impression of the existence of an 
entirely pacific or positive situation. There were isolated actions of vengeance after 
1999, and there remain long-term effects of trauma and the prevalence of domestic 
violence, which witness to the complex situation that still exists among the Timorese 
people.71 Moreover, before and during the Indonesian occupation, violence was 
committed by Timorese against Timorese, necessitating Community Reconciliation 
Programs conducted in the first years of independence by the CAVR Commission.72 
However, it must be acknowledged that the actions and attitudes of the Timorese 
people have also provided startling contrasts to this legacy and to the calls for the 
application of international justice which, although right and just, remain in the realms 
of the future. They have already succeeded in the extraordinary achievement of 
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emerging from an unjust and brutal oppression in a forgiving manner, refusing to 
focus solely on the wrongs done to them. They have sought what Girard has 
advocated in the conclusion to his book The Scapegoat: "The time has come for us to 
forgive one another. If we wait any longer there will not be time enough."73  
 
In engaging in a process which values and enacts forgiveness, the Timorese people 
have given witness to the abstinence from retaliation which Girard sees as the only 
solution to violence in the world, a violence which if not renounced "will lead straight 
to the extinction of all life upon the planet."74 Demonstrating in detail the disastrous 
nature of human violence in modernity, Girard identifies the "escalation to extremes" 
as the tendency for human beings to imitate the violence with which they are 
confronted, resulting in more and more violence.75 What the Timorese have done by 
refusing to retaliate and choosing to forgive is to go against this violent trend. 
Admittedly with some mixed results following independence, they have attempted to 
release themselves from its worst consequences with singular success.  
 
Reconciliation 
A further reality to be explored in relation to the forgiveness demonstrated by the 
Timorese people is that of reconciliation, a possible outcome of forgiveness. 
Reconciliation can occur as a result of the forgiving victim's capacity and willingness 
to restore not only their own humanity, but that of their persecutors.76  
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Examples of attempts to incorporate forgiveness as a major element towards restoring 
harmony through reconciliation are discussed by Robert Schreiter concerning South 
Africa at the end of the apartheid era. In Schreiter's experience, forgiveness given 
freely is an invitation for the wrongdoer to repent so that a new relationship can 
emerge. The reconciliation needed to restore harmony is not a substitute for liberation 
from the evil done; rather, it requires an end to the oppression.77 It cannot be done in 
haste, or by glossing over the enormity of what was done. There must be recognition 
that perpetrators of evil usually whitewash their actions in order to evade the 
consequences.78 Neither does true reconciliation resemble a programme of mediation 
or negotiation, nor of other tools of management.79 In its essence, reconciliation is a 
gift – in the Christian understanding, firstly it is a gift of God, whereby the victim is 
being brought by God to forgive. In God a victim can discover the existence of his or 
her capacity to forgive, and the willingness of God to enable such forgiveness.  
 
In response to this, the perpetrator of the evil has the opportunity to repent and 
thereby to begin rebuilding his or her own humanity.80 A lengthy quote from Schreiter 
explains this point: 
What makes the suffering coming from violence so difficult is that it tends to 
rob us of our humanity. The victim is threatened in the act of violence, and 
engaging in an act of violence robs the perpetrator of some measure of 
humanity. How else can one murder or torture another human being? ...It is 
out of the welling up of God's grace in the victim's shattered life that humanity 
can be offered to the perpetrators of violence. For there to be reconciliation, 
the victims must forgive; the perpetrators cannot forgive themselves. And that 
forgiveness must carry something of the unboundedness of grace that God 
gives. We must not "count trespasses" any more than God has. 
 
Anyone who has ever experienced violence knows how difficult that can be. 
But precisely herein lies the point: to undo the violence that has been done, 
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only this kind of forgiveness can bring the perpetrator to repentance. Those 
who commit violence can be punished but punishment does not guarantee 
repentance. Punishment can fulfil a need for redress or vindication, but does it 
restore the humanity of the evildoer? In the reconciliation process, then, 
because the victim has been brought by God's reconciling grace to forgive the 
tormentor, the tormentor is prompted to repent of evildoing and to engage in 
rebuilding his or her own humanity.81  
 
Thus Schreiter presents the insight that in the process of reconciliation, forgiveness 
precedes repentance. While people normally expect that evildoers repent and make 
reparation, he states that the Christian understanding works the other way around: 
"We discover and experience God's forgiveness of our trespasses, and this prompts us 
to repentance."82 And further:  
We are prone to see repentance as proof of sincerity for seeking forgiveness - 
it is earning forgiveness. But the graciousness of God discovered in 
reconciliation also makes us aware that forgiveness is not something to be 
earned. It is given freely out of that same graciousness.83 
It is this perspective that helps to give a deeper understanding of the approach of 
Xanana Gusmão and other Timorese leaders towards their enemies. Theirs was not 
merely a political or strategic move, but also expressed a deeply-held religious and 
cultural imagination towards reconciliation. 
 
Furthermore, just as forgiveness cannot be earned, neither can it be required.84 The 
extreme difficulty entailed in the human embrace of forgiveness was expressed by a 
Religious Sister in the documentary A Hero's Journey when she stood in the aisle of 
the church at Suai, still red from the blood of those who had been massacred there in 
1999.85 She spoke of how hard it is to forgive, and that no one has the right to tell the 
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Timorese people to forgive.86 Despite such essential caveats, the recorded actions and 
sentiments of the Timorese people are evidence of the possibility of human beings 
giving the gift of forgiveness to their persecutors and becoming "forgiving victims". 
In their Christian faith and experience, they discovered an ability to forgive that 
opened a space for nonviolent resistance that sought to convert and reconcile with 
their oppressors, including the Australian government in its complicity during the 
Indonesian occupation. This willingness to advocate for the truth and to seek the 
conversion of their oppressors, rather than to destroy them, was a key to the success 
of the Timorese solidarity movement.  
 
Challenges to Australians 
This dissertation has sought to investigate the reasons for the Australian treatment of 
the Timorese people between World War II and 1999. Girard's insights assist in an 
understanding of Australian actions as demonstrations of the effects of mimesis on 
humans. National insecurity and fear in reference to external "enemies" – which 
manifest what Girard identifies as a deficiency of or yearning for being – fed into and 
arose as a result of unhealthy forms of mimetic dependencies on others which entailed 
the sacrifice of a near neighbour and wartime friend. The unveiling of the suffering 
victims in East Timor being "hated without cause", and in whose oppression there was 
Australian complicity, gradually brought about an Australian conversion towards the 
victim. In order to explore this process in more depth, three related challenges to this 
conversion are now discussed in the context of Girard's insights into the victimage 
mechanism: unconsciousness, blindness and re-mythologisation.  
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Unconsciousness and blindness 
In Girard's analysis, unconsciousness is a characteristic of victimisers.87 The 
unconsciousness of characters governed by mimetic rivalry in literature is a product of 
the weak self-knowledge which allows them to think of themselves as independent of 
others. The process is mirrored in all cultural myths, where those who exonerate 
themselves of the killing of victims do so oblivious of the fact that they are guilty of 
blaming the innocent. Girard underlines that the sincere belief of the persecutors in 
the guilt of their victims is essential to genuine scapegoating.88 In many ways the 
Indonesian regime believed their own mythologies which the Australian government 
and a major segment of its public were willing to believe and support because of the 
accusations (such as that of communism) levelled at the Timorese. 
 
When analysing the phenomenon of unconsciousness Girard discusses one of the last 
words of Jesus from the cross: "Father, forgive them; they do not know what they are 
doing" (Luke 23:34). Girard does not believe that this is simply the prayer of a saintly 
dying man willing to forgive his torturers. Instead he points to "its almost technical 
role in the revelation of the scapegoat mechanism."89 He continues: "It says 
something precise about the men gathered together by their scapegoat. They do not 
know what they are doing. That is why they must be pardoned."90 According to 
Girard, the fundamental recognition must be that scapegoaters do not know what they 
are doing. They are largely or fully unconscious of the way mimetic rivalry and 
violence has taken hold of their desires, and therefore must be forgiven. 
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In opposition to the unconsciousness of mimetic violence, the Judeo-Christian 
scriptures, particularly the Gospel accounts of the Passion, unveil the power of 
scapegoating and its mythology in human cultures. Girard states: "The Crucifixion is 
what highlights the victimary mechanism and explains history."91 The Gospel 
accounts of the death and resurrection of Christ revealed the innocent victim and 
demythologised human violence such that human groups could not divinise their 
victims (and so complete the justification and projection of violence onto victims). In 
different places, humanity has been gradually exposed over twenty centuries to the 
truth of scapegoating and, to differing degrees, is coming to realise that the victim is 
indeed innocent, and that victimising others exists for the protection of the self and 
the mob. The scapegoating mechanism is unmasked, as a result of which post-
resurrection societies are now unable to fully claim an "innocent" unconsciousness.92 
Nevertheless, such societies retain a level of unconsciousness when perpetrating 
violence, which is later disrupted by a moral realisation or remembrance of the 
innocence of the victim that is then supplemented by efforts to suppress or cover-up 
the truth of victimisation. 
 
During the Indonesian occupation, particularly in the late 1990s the Australian society 
struggled with the truth of victimisation. Overcoming the lies and political arguments 
that were used to justify and suppress Australia's official complicity with Indonesian 
oppression and acts of violence meant facing down the powerful and being willing to 
oppose unjust laws. The ability to see through the mythology attached to the 
Indonesian regime's violence came as a result of the recognition of the Timorese as 
victims and scapegoats. The Timorese and the international solidarity movement 
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painstakingly sought to cultivate this recognition through the advocacy and 
awareness-raising activities discussed earlier. That recognition expanded to a degree 
that there was an almost complete Australian championing of East Timor as victim in 
the late 1990s. The Australian public sentiment in 1999 described earlier 
demonstrated an acute awareness of the persecution of the Timorese, which was on 
display in appalling detail. This awareness was the basis for the appeal to the 
Australian public and government to act on their behalf. Australian society, including 
government and media, turned towards the victims and excelled itself on their behalf. 
Thus the thin veil of unconsciousness was pulled aside, and Australians demonstrated 
a consensus around the plight of their very close neighbour and the enormity of the 
Australian collusion in their misfortune. The fact that the conversion happened at all 
points to involvement in a process set in motion by the Bible, particularly the 
accounts of the death and resurrection of Jesus. The Gospel interprets Australian texts 
both in their complicity and conversion. 
 
Thus, alongside the unconsciousness which generated much of the Australian 
approach to East Timor there existed the possibility of culpable blindness. The 
exposure of widespread violence against the Timorese in 1999 unveiled the innocence 
of the Timorese to wider sections of the Australian public, such that more people than 
ever before became acquainted with the situation. There was a revelation of the 
complicity of successive Australian governments and the apathy of much of the 
population. After that, the Australian nation was incapable of returning to the innocent 
unconsciousness of the past. Any continuation of the scapegoating of East Timor 
would necessarily be influenced by wilfulness. The truth of the scapegoating of East 
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Timor having been demonstrated, further manipulation or exclusion of the Timorese 
people by Australia was the result of refusal to see – of culpable blindness.  
 
In this regard, John 9 provides some important insights into culpable blindness. The 
cure of the blind man in John 9 is the setting for Jesus' teaching on blindness in which 
he differentiates between the unconscious and the culpable. Towards the end of the 
narrative the Pharisees asked: 
"We are not blind, surely?" And he replied: 
"Blind? If you were, you would not be guilty, but since you say "We see," your 
guilt remains. (John 9:40-41)93 
 
In Alison's words, the unconscious are those "who are only blindly part of the 
mechanism of exclusion: they at least do not know what they are doing, and thus have 
no guilt."94 On the other hand are those who lay claim to morality, insight and 
discernment. These are they who think they can see, but are shown by Jesus to be the 
truly blind in their suppression of the truth.  Alison points out that Jesus' teaching 
about judgement here is not limited to the particular biblical incident in question, but 
is universal in its application. He states: 
All humans are blind, but where this blindness is compounded by active 
participation in the mechanisms of exclusion pretending to sight, this blindness is 
culpable.95 
 
Alison's interpretation reveals that the judgement of blindness against the Pharisees 
does not complete Jesus' teaching in the story. The other side of the recognition of 
blindness of the excluders is the temptation to blame those who did the initial blaming 
– to victimise the victimiser (as is popular in the modern media). The biblical insight 
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underlined by Alison is that both victim and victimiser dwell within the human being 
and that, in reflecting on the blind man and the Pharisees, our task is to "identify with 
the two positions at the same time."96 Therefore, one has "to learn to un-pharisee his 
own discourse."97  
 
As a result, the interpretation of the relationship between Australia and East Timor in 
accordance with Girard's insights into the victim requires the recognition of one's own 
"complicity in the murderous order of the world, and therefore of the degree of one's 
blindness."98 Hence condemnation of the actions of Australian institutions requires 
one to be aware of one's own complicity as a citizen in government policy. This holds 
true in terms of the prevailing unconscious mythology and deceit as well as regarding 
the recognition of the very great good that was accomplished, particularly at the end 
of the occupation and during the early establishment of the nation of Timor-Leste. 
Consequently, a reality to be considered in the light of the blindness of which Jesus 
speaks is the easy willingness of Timorese supporters, including the writer, to point 
the mimetic finger at others. It is also means a process of intense moral scrutiny and 
honesty for the Timorese themselves as they reflect on their own violence towards 
each other, especially in 1975 (which has been part of the CAVR process).99  
 
The application of this insight to all other political and social situations therefore 
presents a challenge to every person who wishes to take Girard's mimetic theory 
seriously. Girard refers to the "subtle and concealed" forms of resistance to violence 
which can appear "even in the language of nonviolence and in the concern for those 
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who are suffering."100 The willingness to avoid these effects of mimesis requires 
conversion of the type being discussed, that which resists scapegoating and blaming, 
is willing to reflect on our imitatory motivation for attitudes and actions, and to 
withdraw from rivalry. Girard states: "We have to acknowledge our mimetic nature if 
we hope to free ourselves of it", in the sense of the distortions and worst excesses of 
it.101 
Re-mythologisation 
Despite the insight into the erosion of the unconsciousness of scapegoating, reversion 
to mythic narratives still occurs. To our violent political realities lesser entities are 
sacrificed, including human beings. This is described as re-mythologisation, in which 
mythic self-aggrandisement and exoneration of the powerful is claimed at the expense 
of victims. While some societies express this by weaving mythologies with religious 
overtones, others, particularly in the West, endow "national security" or "national 
interest" with similar, though not stated, religious aura.  
 
Regardless of the genesis of such re-mythologisation, the cultural solution to violence 
is invariably regarded as the use of more violence. Girard contrasts previous eras of 
more structured warfare with the present "era of security."102 He further declares: "we 
have gone from an era of codified war to an era of security, where we think we can 
'resolve' conflicts just as we cure sickness, with increasingly sophisticated tools."103 
The resolution of conflicts which threaten security remain violent, demonstrating the 
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placing of ourselves "at the heart of violence."104 We choose this rather than 
understanding what we actually have the capacity to do: to renounce violence.105 
 
Thus national security becomes the overarching goal to which all else much be 
sacrificed. This discourse of security was, of course, the main driver in the Australian 
invasion of Timor in World War II and its complicity with Indonesia’s invasion and 
occupation of East Timor. It was believed that security could only be achieved 
through a stable relationship with Indonesia, at the expense of Timor. In a sense this 
was true, because rather than seeking for peace between neighbours, Australian 
governments settled for the security that their doctrines of realpolitik dictated. Despite 
nonviolent approaches to achieving peace in the region ‘security’ was the god of 
Australian foreign policy to which the Timorese were sacrificed. 
 
This dissertation has demonstrated this regression by investigating Australian 
government documents relating to three historical periods. The documents present a 
record which reveals unconsciousness of the depth of Australian dependency on other 
nations, and blindness as to the effects of its actions on the Timorese people. The 
casting of Australia as the "saviour" of 1999 while concealing prior complicity in the 
victimisation of Timor re-asserts the myth of fearless, loyal Australians dealing fairly 
with a regional problem. The forgetfulness of the general Australian population, aided 
by government reluctance to admit the official scapegoating of the Timorese people, 
is an attempted re-mythologisation. It may introduce elements of comfort, but is 
incapable of taking human beings back to the sincere unconsciousness which marked 
the scapegoating process before the revelation of the Gospel. The unveiling of the 
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victimage mechanism by Jesus Christ brings with it the greater human responsibility 
to recognise the innocent victim, and a consequent inability to claim ignorance. 
 
Promotion of myths in the official Australian documentary record regarding East 
Timor does not augur well for wider Australian relationships, as was discussed in 
Chapters Four, Five and Six. Resistance to the forgetting and concealment of 
Australian policy and action in Timorese history is an essential part of the rejection of 
re-mythologisation. The Timorese saga presents Australians with an opportunity to 
judge present international policy in the light of past errors. It signals probable effects 
on other weaker neighbours if fairness, loyalty and independence continue to be 
claimed as national characteristics without a balanced and honest appraisal of history. 
 
Positive Mimesis 
Imitating the good 
Mimetic theory presents cogent explanations for the rivalry and violence inherent in 
the scapegoating mechanism, the mimesis which leads to conflict.106 However, Girard 
also recognised the reality of human imitation that leads to the good and flourishing, 
through the formative power of example.107 He explains that Jesus himself advocates 
mimetic desire in that sense, stating "Jesus seems to say that the only way to avoid 
violence is to imitate me, and imitate the Father."108  
 
Positive mimesis, as a gift enabled by Jesus' own love, provides the possibility of 
behaviour that builds community and reins in violence. The non-retaliation and 
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forgiveness of the Timorese towards those who victimised them can be seen as an 
engagement in positive mimesis, through which they are in the position of a model of 
nonviolence and non-revenge to the whole world. They constitute an exception to 
Girard's lament that "positive models have become invisible."109 
 
In the example of the Timorese people, Australians found a positive model on a 
number of levels. Apart from nonviolence and absence of revenge, the courage of the 
Timorese during World War II and throughout the occupation is formidable. 
Similarly, their desire for independence remained, despite the array of measures taken 
in language, education and culture to "Indonesianise" them. The Indonesian 
oppression sought to envelop the Timorese, presenting capitulation to the desires of 
the regime as the inevitable solution to their suffering. The truth of the situation, 
however, – its injustice – was recognised as the means of this fundamental affront to 
their identity. As Hodge reflects,110 the blessings of the Christian faith provided the 
Timorese with the means by which they could together imitate Christ. In this 
solidarity with him, they could build and retain their "interdividual identity" as an 
ecclesial community, which strengthened and nourished their distinctiveness as a 
people. In positive mimetic identification with Christ and with one another they found 
the capacity to withstand the state-sanctioned violence which tried to force them into 
submission. At the same time their Christian faith enabled them to resist reciprocating 
the violence of their victimisers.111 Thus the desire of the Timorese to retain their 
culture and character was strengthened by the positive mimesis which is part of 
Christian faith. The faith and faithfulness of so many Timorese produced examples of 
nonviolent courage worthy of imitation. 
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Such a response is of an entirely different order to the tendency to retaliate and take 
revenge that is the norm in much human interaction, individually and collectively. 
The Timorese response is characterised by aspects of Christ's reality as victim. It is a 
manifestation of the two-fold identification of Christ and the victim – Christ identifies 
with victims thus enabling the victims to identify with him, as is comprehensively 
analysed by Hodge.112  
 
Values desired by Australians 
Paradoxically, a series of traits often claimed as describing "Australianness" was 
demonstrated for many years by the Timorese people: courage, loyalty and 
independence (in the sense of not succumbing to the mob). While many individual 
Australians showed these characteristics when championing the Timorese cause, it is 
difficult to apply these qualities to Australian institutions as a whole in regard to the 
Timorese people. The documentary record is witness to the fact that such features 
characterised Timorese actions during the historical events, whereas they cannot be 
said to describe the Australian part of the narrative. The historical record remains as 
witness to the events within which the actions of the Timorese provide a compelling 
model for positive mimesis. This positive mimetic example was a factor in the appeal 
of the Timorese to Australian consciences and added weight to the morally upright 
and innocent quality of their cause. Moreover, it provided a mimetic mirror of the 
kind of people so many Australians aspire to be. 
 
Undertaking imitation of the Timorese people's attitudes would require of Australians 
the ongoing human task of remembering truthfully the dire situation of the victim and 
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the Australian complicity with the oppressors. It calls for celebration of those who 
acted in solidarity with the victim in the face of official disdain. It requires 
remembering the Timorese victims and the work of Australian civil society on their 
behalf, instead of maintaining chronicles which form an Australian myth, a "romantic 
lie."  
New relationship 
Far from being simply an interpretation of the history, the conversion evident in 
Australian civil society and (to some degree) government, involved a change in 
relationship with others, particularly with East Timor and Indonesia. There is a new 
place to be inhabited by those who have experienced change in the process of 
reconciliation after enmity and suffering. As Schreiter explains: "Christian 
reconciliation never takes us back to where we were before. It is more than removal of 
suffering for the victim and conversion for the oppressor. Reconciliation takes us to a 
new place."113 The events of 1999 demonstrated the contours of this place, which 
included advocacy for and relief of the persecuted Timorese people from their 
oppressors, through diplomatic and military action. In other words, it required a major 
shift in Australian policy, driven by a more radical expression of public support for 
the victimised Timorese. This shift has on-going political and cultural implications, 
including support by Australia, as demonstrated by the Timorese request for 
Australia's intervention in Timor-Leste's internal crisis in 2006.  
 
The new place of the Australian and Timor-Leste relationship is under construction. 
To remain faithful to the spirit of 1999 requires the acceptance of the Australian 
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"existential downfall."114 Seeing the victim in the light of the violence condoned by 
Australia for so long has major implications for the Australian effort to seize the 
identity its people desire. Girard states: "True conversion engenders a new 
relationship to others and to oneself."115 Seeing through violence and seeing the 
victim reveals the self. Alison states that this essential work of perception involves: 
....learning to see the same reality from a different perspective: specifically the 
hugely culturally complex (and apparently very rare) process of learning to look at 
the act of victimisation from the point of view of the victim, which subverts 
identity (in order to rebuild it), rather than from that of the lynchers, whose 
viewpoint constitutes an identity that is also a cover-up."116 
 
Conclusion 
Girard's insights into Australian civil society's support for the Timorese people reveal 
the influence of the Christian scriptures' revelation of the innocence of the victim, 
providing an interpretation of the Australian society's gradual recognition of the 
victim in their midst as a "conversion". Greater Australian self-knowledge can arise 
from the "existential downfall" accompanying the recognition of complicity in the 
oppression of its neighbours. In its status as victim, East Timor undertook the role of 
judge in the manner of Christ, and offered forgiveness as the door to a new 
relationship with Australia which can thus evolve. Though obscuration has occurred 
to absolve the Australian government of its complicity in the oppression of East 
Timor, a reminder of the changed relationship with Timor and the debt owed by the 
Australian government and civil society is still effective in guarding against returning 
to past attitudes and approaches. Scrutiny of Australian history in regard to East 
                                                            
114 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, 3; 294. 
115 Girard,  Deceit, Desire and the Novel, 294. 
116 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 69. 
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Timor through a Girardian lens proves to be a potent force in determining "who we 
might be as much as who we think we were."117
                                                            
117 Hank Nelson, "Gallipoli, Kokoda and the Making of National Identity," in The Australian legend 





I began this dissertation hoping that I would be a witness for humanity in the 
"mangled mess" of human life as I wrote about two peoples whom I love: the friendly, 
inscrutable Timorese, and my own sprawling and dogged fellow-Australians. My 
initial desire was to try to understand why Australia, particularly through its 
government, was complicit in the oppression of the Timorese people. I wanted to "get 
beneath the surface" of the necessary, yet flawed, political rationales. This journey 
using Girard's theories has shown that by scapegoating East Timor and officially 
recording events in a way which continued the persecution, the Australian 
government and sections of civil society rejected the Timorese claims to their own 
identity and contributed to immense human suffering, before turning and recognising 
the victim.  
 
The discovery of René Girard's mimetic theory has provided a means of 
understanding why my nation, Australia, has treated East Timor in the way described 
in this dissertation.  The concepts of mimetic rivalry and the victim mechanism have 
provided ways to approach and understand the underlying forces that led to violence 
and cover-up in relation to East Timor and the way Australia’s government and 
military actions contributed to Timor’s scapegoating for "security" reasons.  
Moreover, I have applied Girard’s insights into the manufacture of myths and "texts 
of persecution"  to provide a critical way of interpreting the written historical records 
around East Timor and to see through the rationales for Australia’s actions. 
Significantly, I have shown that recognition of the victim can generate a reversal of 
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scapegoating - a conversion - which for Australian civil society was the culmination 
of being able to "see through violence" and come to be in solidarity with one’s victim.  
 
Three interrelated features of Girard's theses, then, have been used to interpret the 
relationship between Australia and East Timor in the dissertation: the scapegoated 
victim, texts of persecution and conversion. These features have been used in a 
particular way in this dissertation to show that the Timorese were sacrificed by 
Australia and other world powers. The dynamics of the sacrifice were in some ways 
peculiar to the particular context of international politics – in that the collective 
violence did not occur in a clear action of mob violence against a scapegoat, but rather 
as repeated and accumulated acts that subjected the Timorese to violence, oppression 
and marginalisation. These acts sacrificed the Timorese to the exigencies of 
Australian security policy and alliances. In this way, the dissertation has provided a 
way of analysing international politics and relationships amongst nation-states, 
showing how such relationships can involve the sacrifice of weaker nations such as 
East Timor. In briefly summarising my approach in this dissertation, I propose that it 
is one of the major implications of this dissertation and can make a major contribution 
to understanding violence in international affairs. The dissertation has shown how 
history and relationships can be interpreted from the lens of the victim, and how a 
theological interpretation is necessary to understand how victimisation can be 





The sacrifice of a scapegoat is an expression of the victim mechanism.1 Girard 
identifies certain defining elements of scapegoating which he describes as 
"stereotypes of persecution."2 These are crisis, crime, criteria for the selection of 
victims and the consequent violence done to them. As well as being used specifically 
in the case study in Chapter Six, these features have underlain the interpretation the 
history of the relationship between East Timor and Australia throughout the 
dissertation.  
Crisis 
Australians experienced specific crises during the 20th century which can be 
identified as generating the victim mechanism which in turn affected East Timor so 
badly. Drawn into the Second World War, Australia made a huge contribution relative 
to its population. Significant fear of invasion had been fed by literature which had 
painted Australia as the object of Asian, and specifically Japanese designs. The 
ferment of the global scene and regional threat threw Australia's vulnerable isolation 
into relief. With the approach of Japan and the realisation of the inability of Britain to 
maintain protection, such fear solidified, demanding personal and family sacrifices 
affecting all areas of national life. The national rivalries generating the war exacted a 
heavy toll on the Australian population, but the crisis passed without the feared 
invasion. Further crises arose as the decades after the War passed. These were 
countered by alignments with dependable larger powers for mutual security. The 
threat of communism intensified Australian ties with the vehemently anti-communist 
Indonesia, thus strengthening the alliance with the United States. As ways of ensuring 
                                                            
1 René Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, trans. J.G. Williams (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
2001), xv. 
2 René Girard, The Scapegoat, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986), 14-23. 
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national security, treaties with Indonesia tied the two nations together more firmly, 
allowing for the sharing of resources and for mutual protection. Clearly, the 
challenges of maintaining a small population in a huge land mass in a developing 
region whose peoples sought both expansion and protection posed a series of crises to 
successive Australian governments for many decades. The exploitation and sacrificing 
of a weaker neighbour was an outlet for these crises. 
 
Crime 
The second element identified by Girard as a feature of scapegoating is that of the 
crime, believed by those in crisis to be the cause of the emergency and the threatened 
harm to the community. In the case of East Timor there was no crime as such 
committed by the Timorese to invite their condemnation, neither in World War II nor 
under the Indonesian regime. In both cases however, the perception of the antagonists 
was pivotal to the events. In each case Timor was seen to occupy the role of obstacle 
to the attainment of the desires of the rivals. Connected to this, it was seen to be a 
weak territory that required the intervention of larger powers to prevent it becoming a 
threat (either from Japanese or communist use).  
 
In World War II the advance of both Australian and Japanese towards Timor was in 
the interests of rivalrous possession: the Japanese to occupy and thus expand, and the 
Australians to prevent occupation and so protect themselves. Neither perceived East 
Timor as a player in the events, either as an entity to be considered or as a reality with 
rights. The crime of Timor during the Second World War was its very existence, 
occupying a geographical position which was seen as either opportunity or threat, 
depending on the views of the rivals. Thus, Timor was the object over which the 
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rivals fought, but its status as the colony of a neutral power rendered it an obstacle to 
the realisation of each rival's dream. 
 
The crime of East Timor in relation to Australia and Indonesia in the 1970s was based 
on its geography and colonisation. As the outpost of an unstable Portugal on the 
Indonesian archipelago it invited the designs of Indonesian expansionism, with which 
Australia concurred. Furthermore, the spread of communism into Southeast Asia 
placed the fledgling political aspirations of the Timorese into question, thus providing 
useful excuses for the Indonesian invasion. The crime attributed to the Timorese was 
not something which had happened, but something which its neighbours calculated 
might happen: the possibility of either independence or communist control. As the 
Indonesian occupation took hold (with Australian approval), the Timorese desire for 
their own identity and for freedom was seen as their crime. Their hope challenged 
Indonesia's notion of its territorial integrity and again, Australia supported the 
Indonesian position as a means towards its own national security, as well as providing 
the prospects of financial gain from the Timor Sea. Hence, while Timor lacked the 
guilt of the commission of any crime, it bore the consequences of being an obstacle in 
the path of the desires of its neighbours.  
 
Criteria for the selection of the victim 
The third of Girard's stereotypes of persecution is the criteria for the choosing of the 
victim. Girard identifies victims as needing to be both marginal to the persecuting 
society and credible suspects. As a small half-island whose population was generally 
tribal, East Timor provided the insignificance required of scapegoats. Lacking the 
opportunity to be either politically or economically self-sufficient marked it in the 
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eyes of its neighbours as unviable as well as weak and exploitable in the brutal 
politics of nation-states. Moreover, it was accused of having communist leanings, thus 
providing its scapegoating with a veneer of validity. Of greatest consequence was its 
position of being friendless among suspicious and fearful neighbours who thus 
avoided any retaliation for their scapegoating acts. There was no one to take up the 
Timorese cause; there was no one to counter the lies; there was no one to champion 
the people.3 As a negligible and undefended entity, East Timor was a feasible 
candidate for sacrifice and victimisation. 
 
Violence 
Regarding the fourth and final aspect of Girard's persecution stereotypes, the violence 
done to the scapegoat, the Timorese people are notable among the world's victims. 
The decimation of the population in both World War II and the Indonesia occupation 
is nothing short of astounding. As has been discussed, the WWII death-toll in this 
colony of neutral Portugal is comparable to that of major nations in that same war. 
During the 24 year occupation by Indonesia, a further unconscionable number of 
Timorese died by violent means – up to one-third of the population. 
 
From 1942 to 1999, the history of East Timor is an acknowledged catastrophe. 
Australia was involved in that tragedy, the events of which formed its relationship 
with the Timorese people. Nevertheless, the Australian government and civil society 
underwent a  conversion towards the innocent victim that was integral to Timorese 
independence. Influenced by the Timorese nonviolent response to suffering and 
                                                            
3 René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (London: Continuum, 1988), 14. 
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committed resistance to oppression, all levels of Australian society contributed 
positively to the resolution of what was ultimately a moral crisis. 
 
Texts of Persecution  
In analysing the Australian-East Timor relationship through mimetic theory, I have 
argued that the revelation of the scapegoat mechanism is a fundamental means of 
historical interpretation. This revelation has opened up an essential insight into human 
culture and politics. The dissertation has used this revelation to identify how Australia 
governments were complicit in Timor’s victimisation and what forces Australian civil 
society confronted in order to overcome this complicity. Significant evidence of the 
victimisation resides in official documents. An abundance of that material is 
accurately described as "texts of persecution" because of the omissions, 
embellishments and lies which, as modern-day myths, continue the scapegoating.  
 
Initially I wrote that I was aware that the dissertation itself could become a text of 
persecution. I have imagined myself as an investigator of the rivalries and 
dependencies of my nation and of the undeniable unfairness which contributed to the 
suffering of the Timorese people. I have championed the Timorese. And yet when 
writing of Australian agencies, I have had to curtail certain expressions and re-write 
condemnatory passages. I am the one who has had to answer the question: "Is that 
fair?" The dissertation thus risks immersion in the same process that it attempts to 
reveal, that of scapegoating.  
 
It is not as if Australia did not treat East Timor abominably, as has been shown. The 
very real transgressions of the Australian nation are undoubtedly egregious and 
 
 336 
contributed to the unspeakable suffering of the Timorese people. For this reason, 
judgements must be made. Yet the realisation that I may have been victimising 
Australia and its governments in my text, thus attributing to one of Timor's 
persecutors the status of scapegoat because of the crisis of my own anger and disgust, 
is integrally linked to an understanding of the victimage mechanism. Alberg refers to 
this in no uncertain terms: "The victim who offends us also helps us to recognize that 
the 'normal’ way we do things is fundamentally flawed."4 What is the "normal" way 
we do things? It is the way of blame. It is the age-old method of securing peace by 
accusation and punishment, repeated ad nauseam. Thus, this dissertation is not 
fundamentally an accusation against the Australian government or people. It is rather 
an interpretation inviting recognition and acceptance of Australia’s history in an 
unadulterated light that can lead towards even deeper forms of conversion. 
 
Conversion 
In truth, the mere perception of scapegoating does not automatically give human 
beings the capacity to live without it. It is impossible for us who are bound by 
violence to release ourselves from the bind. As Girard points out:  
This unprecedented task of revealing the truth about violence requires a man who 
is not obliged to violence for anything and does not think in terms of violence – 
someone who is capable of talking back to violence while remaining entirely 
untouched by it.5 
 
Christ is that one who is untouched by violence and yet who is the answer to it. As the 
dissertation shows, it was in Christ that the Timorese people predominantly found the 
grace to resist revenge and to embrace forgiveness. Their example of nonviolence 
                                                            
4 Jeremiah L. Alberg, Beneath the Veil of the Strange Verses: Reading scandalous texts (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 2013), 90. 
5 René Girard, Jean-Michel Oughourlian and Guy Lefort, Things Hidden since the Foundation of the 
World (London: Continuum, 1978), 218. 
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inspired people across the world, not the least of whom were Australians, who 
recognised them as the victim. Ultimately, it is the Timorese nonviolence and 
forgiveness which interrogates and exposes the texts of persecution as well as calling 
those who were complicit in persecution to conversion. Jesus quoted the prophet 
Hosea's formulation of God's desire on a number of occasions: "I desire mercy, not 
sacrifice" (Mt 9:13; 12:7).  Following the Christian example of the Timorese people's 
forgiveness, the texts of persecution themselves can be read with mercy and  
forgiveness, rather than accusation and resentment.6 This reading with mercy, rather 
than accusation, is another major implication from this dissertation that seeks to give 
the opportunity to its readers to recognise the truth and open a space to change.   
 
The very call of Christ to show mercy can present a crisis, however. For if I "show 
mercy" to the Australian texts am I not condoning the violent realities which they 
record and the way they record them?7 In relation to accountability for crimes against 
humanity, a situation which applies to the Timorese history and to Australia's 
involvement in it, this is a deeply perplexing question.  
 
The application of justice to situations of violence, domestic or national, is humanity's 
attempt to come to terms with the violence of scapegoating revealed by the Gospels. 
The gradual understanding of victimisation has moved nations to place retributory 
violence against malefactors within the hands of the state, thus weakening the power 
of private or random acts of scapegoating, vendettas and rivalries.8 This can be 
problematic, however, because of the abuses of state power world-wide, and as 
                                                            
6 Alberg, Beneath the Veil, 120. 
7 Alberg, Beneath the Veil, 90. 
8 William T. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics and the Body of Christ (Malden, 
MA.: Blackwell Publishing, 1998). 5. 
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evidenced in this dissertation. The application to the Timorese people of many state-
based forms of "justice" in their recent history were deeply unjust and violent. In this 
regard it is also obvious that the usual forms of international justice have not 
eventuated for the Timorese people.9 The absence of accountability for the crimes 
against humanity committed against them raise questions not only of justice, but of 
impunity and its detrimental effects on possible future victims.10 Many concerned 
supporters of the Timorese people worldwide remain dismayed at the lack of 
application of justice as a scandalous affront to those who suffered and died, to the 
hard-won systems of justice worldwide, and to those who supported the pursuit of 
Timorese freedom. Despite pressure, the UN Security Council decided against 
establishing an international criminal tribunal, accepting Indonesia's assurances that it 
would bring any perpetrators to justice.11 Flawed international investigations, the 
general unwillingness to risk offending Indonesia and the complaints of activists have, 
however, coalesced into a vacuum. Alone among the reports of investigating bodies, 
the extensive suite of CAVR recommendations is practical.12  
 
The absence of accountability for crimes against the Timorese people underlines the 
victimage mechanism which has governed so much of their recent history. It implies 
that the truth of the Timorese persecution has not yet been fully acknowledged by 
those who perpetrated or supported it. The resulting impunity can ultimately lead to a 
                                                            
9 Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: the struggle for global justice, 3rd ed. (Camberwell: 
Penguin Books, 2006), 503 
10 Another related investigation occurred when Portugal took Australia to the world court in 1995 
claiming that Australia and Indonesia's Timor Gap Treaty refused to recognise East Timor's right to 
self-determination. The International Court of Justice, via a minor legal minutiae, declined to state the 
fact that Indonesia was an illegal occupier. Robinson, East Timor 1999, 495. 
11 Pampalk, "Accountability for Serious Crimes," 13. 
12 Uniya Jesuit Social Justice Centre, Justice and Reconciliation in East Timor: Australia and the 
CAVR (Uniya: Kings Cross, 2006), 12. 
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situation in which victims "can be exposed to violence without fear of reprisal."13 This 
risks a dangerous situation which elsewhere has all too often been filled by private 
vengeance.14 
 
Despite the injustice, the response to the violence which the Timorese people 
themselves have applied is mercy. This has opened a space for an alternative form of 
justice – a properly purified justice – that recognises the universal claims and rights of 
the victimised and oppressed. Whatever the inner workings of politics in that 
movement, the fact remains that mercy and forgiveness rather than revenge and 
retaliation have characterised the Timorese people's management of their recent 
history. Violence has not had the last word.  
 
Questions such as those concerning the lack of accountability for gross abuses have 
no easy answer. Yet the Timorese people have manifested themselves as part of the 
slow, inexorable growth of humanity towards universal mercy, a mercy shown 
through the revelation of the scapegoating mechanism by Christ. Denouncing 
reprehensible acts rather than attacking (in whatever form) the persons responsible is 
essential to prevent mimetic retaliation which can only repeat and escalate violence.15 
 
Inspired by the Timorese people, I share with other Australians the potential of being 
a witness to them and their recent history. While desiring to evade the very 
scapegoating described, there are positive contributions to be made by Australians, 
who willingly or ignorantly have been part of the persecutory structure of our nation. 
As part of the widespread friendships which describe the relationships between many 
                                                            
13 Girard, The Girard Reader, 82. 
14 Girard, The Girard Reader, 85. 
15 Alison, Knowing Jesus, 44; Girard, Things Hidden, 426. 
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Australians and Timorese people, friends are faced with the task of revealing the inner 
workings of systems which victimise. Friends "are able to demystify the world of the 
oppressors from within, to expose its weakness and incoherence, to point out its 
lies."16  
 
The relationship of "friend" is crucial in its positive recognition of responsibility 
towards the other. The extraordinary fellowship which exists at grassroots levels 
demonstrates the best of the Australian responses to the Timorese people. Veling 
quotes Emmanuel Levinas's preoccupation with that fundamental responsibility: "In 
the face of our neighbour we see the face of every other, such that our neighbour 
attests to 'the whole of humanity, in the eyes that look at me.'"17 This overarching 
relationship with the whole of humanity is "the prior, fundamental, primordial ethical 
relation of being-for-the-other and responsibility for the other" which is required to 
underpin social ethics and systems.18 Yet the basis of responsibility is personal. 
Expanding on Levinas, Veling states: 
Unless public life is underwritten by the personal, then its collective structures 
are always in danger of forgetting or repressing the very relation that 'give rise' 
to political activity, namely, the 'I and the other' of human fraternity and 
ethical responsibility.19 
 
Failures of our social structures are laid at the door of human refusal to recognise the 
basic responsibility inherent in relationship.20 Girard sees this responsibility in terms 
                                                            
16 Ada María Isasi-Díaz, quoted in Melissa Browning, Epistemological Privilege and Collaborative 
Research: A Reflection on Researching as an Outsider (Chicago: Loyola University, 2013), 13, 
accessed August 10, 2017,  
http://practicalmattersjournal.org/2013/03/01/epistemological-privilege/ 
17 Veling, For You Alone, 151. 
18 Veling, For You Alone, 70. 
19 Veling, For You Alone, 76. 
20 Veling, For You Alone, 70. 
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of our fundamental connection to and reliance on the other in the formation of our 
identity.21 
 
This primary responsibility is exemplified the history of the relationship with East 
Timor. There is an "answerability" to Australian actions through which a particular 
"other" has been grossly disadvantaged. Such answerability is not general, but 
particular, and is underscored because of the gaze of East Timor, the "gaze of the 
other."22 This dissertation has attempted to see East Timor from an Australian point of 
view. The process has revealed, however, that East Timor is looking at me, at us. The 
relationship is such that we are truly "addressed."23  We are faced with the 
interrogation and the questioning of the other, East Timor.24 Such interrogation 
examines my whole nation, and most importantly, the reality of our victim.  
 
Especially as scapegoat, this Timorese face "summons me, calls for me, begs for me, 
and in so doing recalls my responsibility, calls me into question."25 An Australian 
willingness to be faced by the other26 introduces elements of the existential 
conversion which Girard saw as necessary to the realisation of the influence of 
mimeticism.27 Hodge describes that conversion as "the breakdown of the rivalistic 
'romantic self' and the emergence of the relational, other-centred self, out of which 
self-awareness, agency and responsibility properly emerge."28 Yet the history of the 
                                                            
21 Ann Astell, "Violence, Mysticism and René Girard," Theological Studies 2017, Vol. 78(2): 391, 
accessed September 5, 2017, 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0040563917698560?journalCode=tsja 
22 Veling, For You Alone, 40. 
23 Veling, For You Alone, 115. 
24 Veling, For You Alone, 40. 
25 Veling, For You Alone, 23. 
26 Veling, For You Alone, 40. 
27 Girard, The Girard Reader, 284. 
28 Hodge, Resisting Violence and Victimisation, 46. 
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relationship depicts an Australian "romantic self" in the full flight of mimetic rivalry. 
The self-projection of the Australian nation as independent belied its dependence on 
greater powers, its anguish to remain British, or at least European, and its embrace of 
the United States of America. Instead of self-awareness, a vacuum of identity arose in 
association with the repudiation of the prior Indigenous inhabitants. 
 
Within a historical mix of hubris and cringe, Australians were summoned, called into 
question by the Timorese. We did not see them as they were, as the victims of our fear 
and insecurity, and when we looked at them at all, it was as an obstacle to our self-
protective desires, within which we wove an image of ourselves as victim. Because 
we did not see their face, we could not see our own. Once the face of the true victim 
was seen, however, the Australian desire for the emergence of its true self had some 
space and scope. The conversion entailed in the Australian recognition of the 
Timorese people as victim expressed itself in the shouldering of responsibility 
towards them. Countless Australians then saw the other, the victim: the tortured man, 
the raped woman, the fleeing family, the starving child. Through Girard's mimetic 
theory it is possible to see through the violence, but in the process we too have been 
seen, and we have been seen through. 
 
All facets of the perception have come by way of seeing through the window of the 
inspiration given by the Timorese people, who themselves have seen and experienced 
"transcendent violence" but also “transcendent love."29 Exploring the history of the 
Timorese people in that context may explain their willingness to bestow mercy, 
however incomplete those efforts may remain in the many challenges that face them. 
                                                            
29 René Girard, Jean-Michel Oughourlian and Guy Lefort, Things Hidden since the Foundation of the 
World (London: Continuum, 1978), 217. 
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In Girard's thought, in seeing and receiving that transcendent love, "we have to accept 
the idea that human violence is a deceptive worldview."30 Following Jesus Christ, the 
Timorese have shown that the triumph over that deception is mercy: extending 
forgiveness and friendship to those who caused them suffering. 
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